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Abstract
This thesis described the trajectory of the Italy’s Five Star Movement (M5S, 2005-
2014) from the perspective of the citizens who, as Internet users, participated in
in the political enterprise. Citizen-users, enabled and empowered by Internet
and mobile technologies, shaped and sustained the identity and evolution of
the movement that became the M5S. The case study selected for this research,
the M5S, is exceptional due to the magnitude of its success; but its features
(Internet-centered and fluid ideology) are becoming more common among polit-
ical organisations in Western democracies. The goal of the thesis is to assess the
impact of the Internet on the political process, through its connecting, mobil-
ising, organising, and to characterise the shape of political talk among citizens.
This is achieved by applying quantitative methods, including network analysis
and natural language processing, on 10 years of user-generated data collected
mainly from four sources: the blog of the Movement’s founder, the M5S official
forum, Facebook and Meetup.com. The thesis finds that the online discussion
fora fostered diversity without fragmentation, and contributed on at least one
occasion to shape the policy agenda of the M5S. Furthermore, the meetups of the
Movement maintained their capacity to attract and mobilise users, and their ter-
ritorial distribution clearly correlate with local results of the M5S in two elections,
suggesting a positive impact of Internet-enabled mobilisation. Finally, given the
votes received in the 2013 general election, the political communication generated
over the Internet offset the low attention dedicated by TV news broadcast to the
Movement during the electoral campaign. As Internet and mobile technologies
are routinised, it is easy to see how their importance in political organisation
and deliberation will grow. By studying the application of ICTs in the case of
the M5S, this thesis offers insights into their use in practice, as well as pointing
to possible democratic risks if online deliberation is non controlled to guaran-
tee its fairness and openness but instead steered by the leadership, turning a
deliberating community of citizen-users into a noisy crowd.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What this thesis is about The focus of this thesis is the citizen-user. The citizen-
user is a politically conscious citizen empowered by continuous and ubiquitous
access to Internet-enabled Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
The worldwide massification of access to Internet services has defined the rise
of the citizen-user not only because it has placed the user at the centre of an
informational and communicational sphere but also because the empowerment of
millions as Internet users has uplifted their expectations as citizens and increased by
contrast their sense of political disempowerment. This thesis taps into the digital
traces left behind by hundred of thousands of Internet users to analyse their
actions and interactions in the context of the political enterprise of the Five Star
Movement (M5S) over a period of almost 10 years, from 2005 to 2014. It measures
the impact not only of the combined effect of technological empowerment and
sense of political disempowerment on political mobilisation and organisation but
also on the output of any political system: deliberation.
Why Italy, why the M5S The last ten years have seen in Italy the acceleration
in the diffusion of the Internet access towards saturation levels in parallel with an
exceptional growth of resentment against political institutions. Together with a
sense of empowerment derived from the control of sophisticated communication
and information technologies, which are designed to place the user at the centre,
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citizens developed a sense of political disempowerment derived from the percep-
tion of a dysfunctional system, incapable of delivering because it was corrupted
by inefficiencies and (at worst) particular interests. The identity of the movement
that became the M5S was shaped—and would be unimaginable without—these
twin sentiments that crystallised in the figure of the citizen-user. Technological
empowerment fostered the self-confidence of citizens who gained the perception
of being able to access via the Internet unlimited sources of information and
knowledge. Political institutions, which had worked to reinforce legitimacy by
projecting their expertise and monopolistic access to technical information and
knowledge, were seen as delegitimised not only because of their poor standards
of behaviour but also because they were replaceable in their functions by citizens
who could tap into the expertise and knowledge available online to produce fair
and wise policy solutions. If these trends are emerging or becoming consolidated
in multiple political systems—democratic and authoritarian—and sometimes
contributing to the emergence of new political actors, it is in Italy, with the M5S,
that they have shown their full potential by shaking the foundations of political
institutions and representative democracy.
Political participation My work adds to the rich field of political participation,
and more specifically Internet-enabled participation, by providing a detailed
and longitudinal description of a movement that, at least in a first analysis,
seemed to have converted into practice all the most optimistic arguments about
the political disruptiveness of the Internet. Referencing two of the most popular
works (and most optimistic in terms of the user’s empowerment) on the social
effects of the Internet, these are the most stunning features apparently displayed
by the Movement: its capacity to organise on a massive scale without any formal
organisation (Shirky, 2008) and to replace effectively a public sphere dominated
by a ‘hub-and-spoke architecture with unidirectional links’ with a public sphere
of dense intersecting connections among peers, a ‘networked public sphere’
(Benkler, 2006, Chapter 7). Meetup did not only improve efficiency in how people
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organise, it dramatically enhanced people’s capability to organise: if mobilisation
in the past mainly occurred because political interest was coupled with existing
personal connections (family, friends, coworkers) to the organisation (Diani &
Lodi, 1989, see for example) Internet-based mobilisation does not require them
anymore.
Party and social movement politics But the experience of the M5S is not only
an interesting case for the field of political participation. The very existence of
a political actor such as the M5S and its electoral relevance in the Italian and
European context (since the 2014 election, the M5S has been the 11th largest
national party in the European Parliament) put under stress the common under-
standing developed over the last decades of what parties and social movements
are. Arguably, the Movement is compatible with minimal definitions of both
party, (a ‘political group identified by an official label that presents at elections,
and is capable of placing through elections [...] candidates for public office’
(Sartori, 1976, p. 63), and social movement, a social process ‘involved in conflic-
tual relations with clearly identified opponents; [...] linked by dense informal
networks; share[ing] a distinct collective identity’ (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). But
it clearly defies the practice of both, since it systematically participates in every
electoral competition without any sign of normalisation, as the Movement remains
at the time of writing without a formal organisation or a comprehensive political
agenda.
Computational social science Finally, this thesis puts into practice a few of the
most recent quantitative methods for the analysis of human-generated behavi-
oural and textual data to produce quantitative results that are comparable to
other results. That is, the contribution of this thesis is not only an inferential
one, based on the analysis of primary and secondary data sources but also a
descriptive contribution. The challenge in describing and statistically modelling
Internet data is not only volume. The very same technological advancements
that had brought the ICTs to the masses and made computing ubiquitous had
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slashed the cost of computing power such that a researcher sitting in front of a
desktop computer can comfortably compute statistics from millions of records.
The challenge is not even a lack of methodological options. As people and their
technologies had started to produce (and record) an enormous amount of digital
traces, physicists, computer scientists, mathematicians and statisticians have been
flocking to the domains of social sciences, producing a large literature of quantit-
ative methods to approach (and make sense of) the new data and creating a new
sub-discipline: computational social science. The real challenge is a lack of bench-
marks. The problem with new methods applied to new data is that researchers do
not really know which results to expect. This thesis contributes to the endeavour
of computational social science by providing statistics and analytics of social
interactions over different but common online platforms (specifically a blog, a
forum, Facebook, and Meetup). In so doing, it provides useful benchmarks for
future research. Questions that computational social science projects have not
been able to satisfactorily answer for lack of data from multiple sources, for
example, are: In observing the network of a discussion among thousands of users,
what is the difference in centrality measures among users that we should expect
in normal circumstances? And in an online forum for political discussion what
is the percentage of threads that we should expect to go unnoticed, receiving
no or very few comments? If this research alone cannot determine what is, in
quantitative terms, the ‘normality’ for online political talk, it can contribute to the
field by adding valuable observations which can then be referenced to by other
researches.
What does the Internet change for political participation? The core argument
of this thesis is that the impact of ICTs on political participation is dual. A direct
consequence of the spread of ICTs is that politics—in which I include socialising,
mobilising, organising, debating and deliberating with political goals—starts to
take place on (and consequentially to be mediated by) Internet services. Not
surprisingly, the relative importance of Internet-mediated politics grows along
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with the importance that the Internet has among citizens. But the migration
towards the Internet introduces important changes to politics. As I observe
and analyse throughout the thesis, the boundaries of political participation blur
and ought to be redefined. Because of social media services and because of
their role in projecting a user’s identity, politics is not defined any more by
only a precise set of activities happening in time and space (a rally, a meeting,
but also a discussion around the kitchen table). Politics is nowadays also a
meme that trickles through the ties of social media’s networks, and political
participation is also pressing the like button below somebody’s post. In the
face of a dense literature downplaying the political consequentiality of light
forms of political participation, or ‘click-activism’, I argue the opposite. The
Internet has opened up options for very low-intensity, ‘tiny’ (Margetts, John, &
Hale, 2015), forms of political engagement that are consequential because they
are forms of mass political expression happening on an unprecedented scale.
Almost two million Facebook users publicly liked the page of Beppe Grillo, a
very simple political action but still taken by enough people to vote a party into
Parliament. Also, the Internet revolutionises how and how often users may be
exposed to politics by easing access to political information and communication
and by bringing political contents through algorithmically determined filtering
and recommendation systems to users who are not directly searching for them,
something that every Facebook user is very familiar with.
But I also point to an important indirect consequence of the diffusion of ICTs on
participation, which is particularly salient for the M5S but not totally absent in
other instances: the daily use of efficient Internet services raises the expectation
of what politics, intended as a service to citizens, should offer (and is not offering).
The difference is made striking by the fact that as Internet technologies deliver
with incredible efficiency, the old technologies of politics dramatically under-
perform and especially so by the standards set by the ICTs. As a consequence,
citizens already critical towards the political system (Norris, 1999a) now have
not only a way to communicate and eventually organise on a massive scale their
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dissent but also to identify the standards of efficiency that politics should aspire
to.
What does the Internet change for political organisation? The impact that the
Internet has on the capacity of people to organise effectively to reach political
goals has the potential to alter profoundly the party system and representative
institutions in Western democracies. In this thesis, by observing the trajectory
of the M5S, I point to the fact that the Movement by (more or less) successfully
outsourcing to the Internet critical functions such as socialising, mobilising,
debating, organising, voting, funding and selecting candidates, has not only
created a new type of political organisation but has done so by leveraging virtually
no pre-existing resources, financial or organisational. Even by acknowledging
the exceptional character of the Italian context, which twice in the span of two
decades has seen an outsider attracting most of the popular vote, this seems to
support the idea the Internet under the right circumstances might indeed enable
organising extremely consequential collective action without organisation (Shirky,
2008). Even if, as I note in the following chapters, organisation does emerge in
practice in the form of hierarchies—in which key individuals assume the authority
to take binding decisions, make rules, certify members, groups and candidates
and set the agenda—it appears that organisation is most of the time imperceptible
and when it emerges it does so in a very light, selective (although not always
predictable) way.
What does the Internet change for political deliberation? Political delibera-
tion, intended as the full spectrum, from ‘everyday’ small talk to formal proced-
ural decision making, is changed by the Internet insofar as it has changed the
influence that different social components might exercise on the debate. There
is no arguing that the Internet multiplies the fora of debate by creating as many
‘deliberative enclaves’ (Sunstein, 2001) as demanded by users. The question is
whether and when these fora have an impact on the political process. The thesis
explores the discussion Forum of the M5S by leveraging network analysis and
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quantitative and qualitative text analysis to understand how users take part in
the discussion and whether it is possible to identify any instance of a discussion
that succeeded in influencing the debate at the national level. A number of
studies have been proposed which for the most part identified a low tendency
of users to engage with the diversity and instead to favour interactions with
like-minded. There are different potential reasons for this (many have worried
about its social and political consequences) and homophily is not necessarily a
consequence of users’ choices; as the number of ties connecting users to their
networks increases social networking services need to deploy algorithmic filters
to select which content to show to the user. But there are also reasons that could
justify the opposite behaviour: users, especially if they perceive that they have
the capacity of influencing the debate, might try to reach out to those who held
a different view to persuading them. In this thesis I use statistical models for
network data to formally test when and if homophily occurs.
The other debated question of those studying online forms of deliberation
is their relevance and consequentiality. Does online deliberation matter? The
main challenge in actually measuring the relevance of any discussion forum
is that of course no discussion takes place in only one forum and multiple
channels of influence are usually open. But the probability of missing from the
analysis relevant sources of influence decreases as we move from items debated on
mainstream media to ‘fringe’ items. In the thesis, I identify one of these peripheral
discussions taking place in the Forum of the M5S—the debate on introducing
some form of guaranteed minimum income—and track its evolution and framing
in terms of the topics raised in the discussion within the Movement. I measure
also the presence of the topic within the national discussion by measuring how
often the item is touched upon in the media and in Parliament before and after it
gained relevance within the Movement.
Citizen-users, communities and crowds As citizen-users turn politically active
online, they either aggregate into communities or crowds. Communities emerge
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when users are aware of others and invested in maintaining relations among
members while crowds simply need users’ copresence. Crowds would seem a
more natural environment for citizen-users concerned in maintaining their indi-
viduality and seeking a personal (instead of collective) experience but, as I show
in this thesis, communities do emerge from citizen-users’ interactions. What
determines the emergence of cohesive communities instead of inarticulate (and
messy) crowds is a crucial question for the future of political participation, organ-
isation and consequentially democratic (because participated) deliberation. The
political relevance of multitudes derives first from their capacity to synchronise
and act in a coordinated fashion. Only communities can independently sustain
political coordination and raise a political voice. Crowds can be noisy but they
also tend to be voiceless. Through empirical observation, in this thesis I reflect on
the fact that if neither communities nor crowds are necessarily consequences of
online political participation, only communities can be democratic and enhance
the individual political voice of the citizen-user.
Thesis outline This thesis is an attempt to understand the potential of the
massification of Internet technologies on political organisations and deliberation
processes by using the case of the M5S. The analysis describes the case of the
M5S on three levels—organisation, participation and deliberation—based on the
behavioural and textual traces left by Internet-users. Chapter 2 sets the ground of
the scholarly discussion on the evolution of politics, the role of citizen and online
participation with a particular attention to the themes of globalisation, inequality,
populism and the crises of politics. Chapter 3 tackles the methodological and
ethical challenges of working with digital data generated on unprecedented
scales by Internet users by reviewing the most recent development in the fields
of network and textual analysis. Chapter 4 introduces the political enterprise
of Beppe Grillo and the M5S, from the creation of the blog to the participation
in national elections, and contextualises it in the Italian political experience of
the last decades and against the changes in the media landscape. It provides a
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descriptive analysis of participation in the Movement and its organisation, by
combining original Internet data with survey data, and an inferential analysis on
the effect of the Internet on elections by comparing the activity of militants at the
provincial level with online (Facebook) and offline (Meetup) participation with
the electoral outcomes. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 focus on political deliberation.
In chapter 5, I describe the evolution of the debate on the different websites
pertaining to the Movement and map the interactions among users in three
selected debates mainly with the interest of understanding when and if users
with different opinions engage with each other. In chapter 6, I introduce the
method of explicit semantic analysis and apply it to the analysis of the debate
unfolding around the issue of the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income
in the Forum. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by discussing the impacts at the
level of organisation, participation and deliberation observed in the data collected
from the political experience of the M5S and postulating what should be ascribed
to the exceptionality of the M5S and what instead is a lasting contribution of the
massification of ICTs that has the potential to influence political process behind
the context that produced the M5S.
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Literature review
1. The Internet and the transformation of citizen
This chapter provides an introduction to themes that have emerged in the areas
of politics, citizen and political participation. This is a review of works which
explore relevant thematic issues around the vectors of change, the intersection
of politics and society and the interface between the two—citizenship, over the
last two decades. It is the argument of this thesis that changes taking place on
different levels, in society and technology, are all reflected in the emergence of a
citizen-user, who exploits empowering Internet technologies to overturn political
disempowerment.
Political scientists have mostly focused on social and economic causes to
justify the crisis of representative democracy, which especially manifested into a
more critical attitudes of citizens towards elected institutions. I argue that the
technological aspects, by which I mean to the effects of the Internet revolution
combined with a mobile revolution that made possible a personalisation of access
to ICTs, are not only relevant because they provide new tools to debate, participate
and organise politically but also because they permeate citizens’ expectations of
the political system. In this sense, the daily use of technologies changes citizens,
the demands citizens direct towards politics and what citizens expect from politics.
Citizens are more critical and more demanding also because of the shining success
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of the Internet revolution but its direct effects on political behaviours are not
sufficiently explored in the political science literature. I propose to tap into the
literature developed in other fields, sociology and philosophy of information,
and to apply relevant concepts formulated there to interpret changes to the role
of citizen.
Political participation and deliberation worldwide have seen the emergence
and consolidation of a new attitude of citizens that is not only more critical and
distrustful towards politics in general but also bolder in radically contesting polit-
ical (but also scientific and technical) elites by pointing and linking to alternative
versions of facts, figures and readings of ‘reality’. This new attitude does not only
justify the delegitimisation of political authority based on charges of corruption,
incompetence or inefficiency, it also contests the monopoly of political authority
over information, knowledge and ultimately truth. Whether or not this tendency
was present before the widespread diffusion of Internet access, it is the prac-
tice with Internet technologies (the same technologies that changed the popular
meaning of words such as search and share) that enable citizens to express it on a
massive scale. The literature addressing the crisis of politics and the emergence
of new forms—which are more radical, more critical and definitely angrier—of
contestation has so far not fully appreciated the effects of the shift from a citizen
that might critically engage the ruling class to an Internet-empowered citizens
who believes instead they have access to the resources to replace it.
The remainder of the chapter is divided in four sections. In the next section,
I review the literature on politics based on three themes. To characterise the
anti-systemic opposition (and rage) towards the political establishment that has
been taking shape in the last two decades, I review research on social movements
(and specifically anti-globalisation movements) and populism, which many argue
are important in characterising the political enterprise of the M5S and offer an
answer, which I suggest is partial, to why the M5S came about. This research
highlight important ingredients that have sustained the growth of the Movement
and contributed to the emergence of similar claims in other political contexts, with
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the consequence of either creating new political actors or transforming existing
ones. Nevertheless although they do stress the importance of the massification of
ICTs as communicational and organisational tools, they do not substantiate the
impact on individual behaviours and expectations resulting from a continuous
exposure to these technologies and their profound integration with our daily
routines. If the first two themes have a more transnational flavour, the last is
more contextualised and offers a review of the existing answer to the question of
Why did M5S emerge in Italy in the late 2000s. Research interested in the impact
of the transformation of the relation between media and politics in Italy, focuses
on the pluralisation of media and changes in media consumption patterns to
explain the success of the M5S. It is this body of research that provides a relevant
indication of changes at the individual level that have important consequences at
the collective and political level. The discussion around media and politics also
provides an historical perspective by introducing research that treats the electoral
success of the M5S in 2013 as a second instance (the first being Berlusconi’s Forza
Italia in 1994) in less than twenty years after a new political actor capitalised on
the collapse of established parties.
In the third section, on the changing role of citizen, I shift the attention from the
societal level to the individual level. This section describes what has changed for
individuals in Western societies because of the processes of globalisation and the
Internet and mobile revolutions. It also reflects on extensive research delineating
a progressively more critical attitude of citizens towards political institutions
and elites. In this section I criticise a focus—-which I consider too narrow—on
economic globalisation as a determinant in the rise of new inequalities and
discontents and I propose to expand it to also include the impact of technological
revolutions that have changed citizens’ self-reflexivity and societal interactivity.
In the fourth section of the chapter, on participation, I delineate the debate on
political participation and deliberation of the last two decades. If the Internet
and its impact in the area of participation has comprehensibly attracted major
attention, the section still roots its discourse in the pre-Internet works by Putnam
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(Bowling alone) and Habermas (The theory of communicative action. Reason and
the rationalization of society and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere)
because of the exceptional influence they had in framing the debate. In the section,
I follow the debate that contributed to shape a concept that I apply throughout
the thesis: ‘everyday political talk’ from Mansbridge (1999).
In the fifth section of the chapter, I introduce the literature treating the M5S.
The chapter provide a review of the most relevant definitions proposed to frame
the trajectory of the Movement and define its character. I also justify why the case
of the M5S is interesting in a comparative context because it expresses elements
that are also evident in political actors of other countries.
2. Politics
2.1. Social movements
In order to understand why the M5S did happen with the creation of Grillo’s blog
in 2005 and the foundation of the Movement in 2009, it is useful to frame it as an
instance of the broad anti-globalisation movement that was initiated by the 1999
WTO protests taking place in Seattle. This legacy, which is threefold—ideological,
organisational and technological—is not sufficiently stressed in the literature
describing the emergence of the M5S. To assess the importance of this legacy,
I quickly summarise the traits on these three levels of the anti-globalisation
movement emerging from the ‘battle of Seattle’ (J. Smith, 2001; Kahn & Kellner,
2004) and for Italy and Europe two years later with the ‘battle of Genoa’ (Davies,
2008).
Ideologically, the anti-WTO protests offered an organised response to the
multiple crises (economical, political, environmental, human rights) that were
perceived from the West to be shattering societies across the world and opened
a new and extremely broad contestation front. Similar to Genoa, protesters in
Seattle included labor organisations, consumer groups, environmental, human
right and global justice movements (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013, p. 29). The
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intellectual underpin of the protest was provided by books such as Naomi Klein’s
No logo (published in 2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000)
and Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and its discontents (2002). Although from very
different perspectives—Stiglitz was a Nobel prize recipient for economics, former
economic adviser in the Clinton administration and former chief economist
of the World Bank; while Negri, a Marxist sociologist and former militant in
extra-parliamentary left-wing movements—these books were all in tune in the
description of a neoliberal world order unaccountable to the people because of the
shift of the foci of power from local parliaments and governments to international
organisations and corporations.
Although the movement of movements that emerged in 1999 received support
from left-wing parties (and yet about 20% of protesters in Genoa in 2001 and later
at the European Social Forum in Florence the following year refused to collocate
themselves on the left-to-right political spectrum, see Della Porta & Diani, 2006,
p. 71), it challenged a core assumption which had guided the foreign policy of the
Left since the end of the Second World War: internationalisation in the form of
transferring power to supranational entities. To understand the repositioning of
social forces within Western democracies afar from parties’ positions, it is helpful
to apply a model of a bi-dimensional ideological space as proposed by Grande
and Kriesi (2012, p. 22) and later by Inglehart and Norris (2016). Globalisation
added a new cultural dimension, along a traditional economic dimension, to the
ideological space of Western democracies defined by the position on international
integration. Protesters on the streets of Seattle and Genoa had different motives
to oppose current globalisation trends (because of the democratic deficit but
also because of protectionist considerations) and different political and economic
proposals to govern them, but they did agree in opposing them on cultural
grounds: ‘to democratize and incorporate values other than profit making into
global economic institutions’ (J. Smith, 2001, p. 528). If a direct link between the
movement of Seattle and the M5S is attested by the involvement of numerous
MPs in environmental, social and humanitarian movements (Mosca, 2015) who
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marched in Genoa in 2001, a much broader influence emerges by analysing
the rhetoric of Grillo and that of his Movement. Supranational, financial and
anti-democratic institutions are a recurrent target in both contexts; WTO and the
IMF in Seattle and Genoa, the ECB and the ‘Europe of banks’ on Grillo’s blog.
But the ideological influence of the movement of Seattle on the M5S does not
stop at the anti-globalisation rhetoric. Technology is central in both movements:
as organisational and epistemological tool (to spread and shape information) but
crucially also in defining the identity of the two movements (Kahn & Kellner, 2004;
Natale & Ballatore, 2014). Internet and mobile devices empowered people (Rainie
& Wellman, 2012) at a time when social, economic, environmental and political
dynamics seemed to contribute to create new anxieties (Young, 2007; Inglehart
& Norris, 2016; Mishra, 2016). In Italy and in most of the European countries
two classes were penalised the most by the economic downturn that started
to bite in the early 2000s: the youth (Tanveer Choudhry, Marelli, & Signorelli,
2012) that not withstanding being the most qualified in history experienced
level of unemployment never seen before and those in the public or private
sector not covered by the safety nets provided by permanent contracts, either
because self-employed or because hired with flexible contracts that started to be
created in the late 1990s. The social distress (see Morlino & Piana, 2014) that
followed the economic downturn intersected with a crisis of political participation
that especially in Italy was directed towards political parties and international
agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation
and later the European Central Bank. The percentage of Italians expressing
trust for the European Commission dropped from 63% in 1997 to 36% in 2015
(European Commission, 2012, 2015).
In both Seattle and Genoa the organisation of the events was largely decent-
ralised with disperse organisations networking loosely to create a shared protest
platform to be used to promote specific issues; from human rights to the environ-
ment, from international trade to military interventionism, from global to local
conflicts. The Internet did play for the first time a role in the setup of the protests,
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facilitating the coordination among different and some time distant organisations
(J. Smith, 2001; Kahn & Kellner, 2004), but also in the construction by protesters
of their own media description of the events via publishing platforms such as
Indymedia (founded in 1999, see Kidd, 2013).
It has of course been noted that the dramatic increased in the capacity to
process, communicate and store information over the Internet has been a fun-
damental driving force in the globalisation of finance and the production of
goods and services as much as in shaping opposition to that driving force. As
ordinary and generally young people moved on the Internet, via home desktop
computers first and mobile devices later, so did the creation, organisation and
communication of dissents. The use of the Internet, because of its decentralised
and horizontal geography, immediately assumed also a symbolic relevance. As
opposed to a political order that was perceived as delegitimated, corrupt, unac-
countable and inaccesible, the Internet appeared to be a place of absolute freedom
of expression and an unrestricted repository of knowledge and information. The
Internet did non only allow to easily create online communities (which mimicked
a public space only insofar as members adopted publicly recognisable usernames)
where to unfold political talk but also to substantiate, legitimate and distribute
alternative interpretations of politically relevant occurrences by selecting and
connecting to a multitude of bits of information made available by the Internet’s
own diversity.
Wikipedia (launched in 2001) was the most iconic instance of a new form
of massive collaboration project made possible by the Internet. It was also a
symbol of a how the production of knowledge, once the monopoly of institutions
of professional experts, could be decentralised and diffused to thousands of
peer-contributors without losing authority or accuracy (Shirky, 2008; Reagle, 2010;
Bennett, Segerberg, & Walker, 2014). As hyperlinks facilitated the composition of
alternative descriptions of reality bypassing traditional source of information and
knowledge, the success of Wikipedia played into the argument of those opposing
mainstream interpretations and beliefs; it demonstrated that a self-reviewed
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crowd could compete with and potentially unseat the experts. The concept of
crowd-production of knowledge and information has always been a foundational
ideal for the M5S (see for example the YouTube video published in the early years
of the Movement ‘Prometeus - La Rivoluzione dei media’, 2007).
The construction of the M5S—of its identity, its ideology and its tactics of net-
worked, geographically diffuse mobilisation and participation—in the inception
years between the first blog post in 2005 and the foundation of the Movement
in 2009, can be ascribed to the same long wave of the anti-globalisation, anti-
corporate, social justice and crucially ‘real democracy’ protest initiated by the
anti-WTO marches in Seattle in 1999. This long ‘cycle of contention’ (Tarrow,
2011) includes the Internet-mediated protests of the late 2000s and early 2010s:
the Iranian Green Movement (2009), the Arab Spring (2010), 15-M Movement
(2011), Occupy (2011) and the Gezi Park protests (2013) (Golkar, 2011; Khondker,
2011; Morell, 2012; Lotan et al., 2011; Hardt & Negri, 2011, see). Although
these movements grew out of very different social backgrounds, they all had in
common a strong pro-democracy trait and, of course, the Internet.
Many have recognised that in these protests the Internet is ‘not a mere “tool”
that is external to the organizational and cultural structure of these movements.
Instead, it has become increasingly clear that communication is a form of or-
ganization, and the form of communication strongly interacts with the form of
organization’ (Tufekci, 2014b). But the case of the M5S also signals the importance
of the Internet within these movements because of its identitarian character: the
Interent does not only shape as it expands the capabilities of the crowd but also
provides an identity to the movement because it offers a form of redemption from
political disempowerment. And it is identity the core claim of these movements,
which have—using Tilly’s categorisation for social movement (Tilly, 2004)—very
weak (if any) standing and program claims. In the words of (Tufekci, 2014b) ‘the
widespread use of digital tools facilitates capabilities in some domains, such as or-
ganization, logistics, and publicity, while simultaneously engendering hindrances
to movement impacts on other domains, including those related to policy and
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electoral spheres’ (Tufekci, 2014b). But again the case of the M5S reveals itself as
a special case, because, although it did emerge (as did other other movements)
with large rallies organised via the Internet and featuring very similar style and
demands, it also succeeded in sustaining its momentum.
2.2. Populism
The goal of this section is to provide a possible answer to the questions of what
is populism and whether it matters in understanding the M5S.
A minimal definition of populism is provided by Albertazzi and McDonnell
(2008):
an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against
a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as
depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their
rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.
The duality us/them is rightly identified by many as one of the most defining
feature of the populist discourse. Nevertheless others point also to the fact that
‘[w]hether dimension or style rather than ideology or form of mobilization, popu-
lism is so elastic and indeterminate as to discourage all attempts at a rigorous
definition’ (Taguieff, 1995, p. 25). Taguieff proposes two ‘poles of the populist
rhetoric:’ the protest populism and the identitarian/national populism). If some of
the traits of the identitarian populism seem apt to frame the description of the
M5S (a direct and personal ‘appeal to the people’; an interclass ‘appeal to the
entire people’, thus bypassing class distinctions; and the call for a discontinuing
event, a ‘rupture’), it is the protest populism that fits almost perfectly with the
rhetoric of the M5S. In the definition of protest populism, Taguieff identified
as foundational an anti-establishment trait: ‘this type of populism can be de-
scribed as hyper-democratism, idealizing the image of active citizens distrustful
of systems of representation presumably threatening to deprive them of their
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power or initiative.’ Protest populism leverages on the tools of direct demo-
cracy such as referendum and citizens’ initiatives to bridge the gap between
the state and the ordinary citizens. Moreover, it features anti-intellectualism and
hyper-personalisation.
Given this battery of traits defining populism presented above, it is compre-
hensible that the populist character of the M5S is stressed by many. Tronconi
(2015a) identifies four elements that are usually used to place the M5S within
the populist tradition. First, the essential ‘juxtaposition between the establish-
ment, conceived as corrupt, quarrelsome, selfinterested and ultimately unable
to offer solutions for the problems of the country and the people, who on the
contrary are considered as fundamentally hard-working, honest and virtuous.’.
Second, the presence of a charismatic leader (Beppe Grillo) entertaining a special
relationship with ‘the people’. Third, a communicative style that tends to break
with traditional rules and etiquette. But in parallel to self-evident populist traits,
Tronconi mentions also other characteristics of the M5S, such as the presence of
‘post-materialistic values’ at the core of its policy platform and the importance of
the Internet as tool for democratic and horizontal participation and individual
expression.
To solve this apparent contradiction between a populist style and horizontal
forms of internal participation, Gerbaudo proposes the concept of Populism 2.0
(Gerbaudo, 2015). For Gerbaudo, the continuity between traditional forms of
populism and Internet-mediated populism is on two levels. First, populism
directly appeals to the common people, citizens, without any class distinction and
this, in the Internet age, easily translate to ‘generic interent users’. Second, as
already noted, forms of protest populism invest substantially in appeals to direct
democracy and the Internet does in fact provide a platform to exercise it as in a
always-on plebiscitarian system. The question is consequentially how users in
practice exercise direct democracy and how really distributed power is across the
network. Because it is easy to immagine what could go wrong. In the words of
Fuchs (2008):
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A plebiscitary system is a political system in which ruling parties or
charismatic leaders decide on which issues referenda should be taken
and how the questions for such plebiscites are formulated; citizens
then vote directly on these issues. The main criticism of this concept
is that it is prone to manipulation and that a plebiscitary system can
easily turn into totalitarianism. (p. 226)
2.3. Political and media crises
Within the Italian context, the success of the M5S is generally interpreted as
the product of the overlapping crisis of two systems: the party system and the
media system. The crisis in the party system (Bull, 2012), which in some sense
is mapped by the 1992 system meltdown, created the opportunity for political
entrepreneurs and outsiders to gain ground in the national political competition
at the expenses of other parties (which this time did not disappear but were
significantly lessened). The crisis in the media system (Mancini, 2013), which saw
the decline of the importance of the TV as source of legitimacy for political actors
and the reconfiguration of consumption habits in favour of less standardisation
and higher levels of personalisability, was caused by the massification of Internet
access but also by the multiplication of TV channels (on air and via satellite). This
shifted power from producers and editors of content to consumers, which turned
from passive to active (and critical) consumers.
Given the Italian contexts, the period (1994-2013) in which Silvio Berlusconi
was both a primary political figure (chief of the executive for more than eight
years or leader of the opposition when not in office) and owner of the largest
private media group; and given the role of television in shaping his political
trajectory (Ginsborg, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2004), the development of the two
crises were not perceived as independent since the two systems were indeed very
interdependent, with access to broadcasting media perceived as indispensable
for political visibility and electoral success (D’Arma, 2015). It is no coincidence
that mainstream media and parties were the first two targets of the Movement’s
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campaigning perceived as two faces of the same discredited elite.
Virtually no observer denies the importance of the media in Italian politics
(and symmetrically of politics in the media) in the period following the dissolution
of the Italian Communist Party in 1991 and the Christian Democracy three years
later. A referendum held in 1993 in the wake of major judicial investigations
(‘Mani pulite’) shifted the electoral system from proportional to semi-majoritarian1
(J. Newell, 2010) with the introduction of a minimum of 4% of the national vote
for a party to be represented in Parliament. A stronger national competition for
parties but also the simplification of the political stage towards bipolarity and
two party coalitions increased the importance of television (Mancini, 2013), which
parties could either access and so survive or miss and therefore disappear. On 23
March 1994, the first American-style face-to-face debate of the two contenders to
the government’s premiership in the history of the Republic was aired.
And yet the link between the development of new media consumption capab-
ilities among Italians (with the appropriation of a more critical role in navigating—
and for the first time creating—media content) and the widespread discontent
towards the political establishment and the party system is not explored in the
literature.
The early 1990s were crucial in the history of the Italian republic and tran-
formative for the Italian party system. In 1991, less than two years after the fall of
the Berlin Wall and a few months before the disappearance of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War, the Italian Communist Party (PCI)—one of the
largest in NATO countries—dissolved after the party’s leader announced a new
policy of disengagement from communism and a new name, the Democratic
Party of the Left (PDS) (J. Newell, 2010). The Christian Democracy (DC), also
affected by the ‘ideological thaw’ (Valbruzzi, 2013) following the end of the Cold
1The electoral law introduced after the 1993 referendum was more precisely an hybrid system,
or a ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ system. Although, it did not reduce substantially the number
of parties competing in each election, it resulted in the formation of pre-electoral party coalitions
(see D’Alimonte, 2001).
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War but in addition engulfed by corruption scandals and by the emergence of
systematic collusion with the Mafia in the deep South2 dissolved in January 1994,
few months before the general election won by the coalition led by Berlusconi.
If there is substantial agreement in the literature that a historical and political
phase characterised by the ideological opposition between the two main parties
(PCI and DC) ended in the years between 1991 and 1992, there is no agreement on
what followed. The conceptualisation of a transitional phase was initially proposed
but later (with reason) challenged because nearly two decades of supposed
transition did not transform to any clear and stable regime of ‘majoritarian
democracy’ of two competing party coalitions (J. L. Newell, 2009; Bull, 2012) as
initially hypothesised. The election of 2013, with its tri-polar outcome, clearly
pushed further away any bipolar configuration of the Italian political system.
In the election of 2013, the levels of electoral volatility, or the proportion of
voters changing party in comparison to the previous election, reached an historical
high, even surpassing the previous record registered with the election of 1994
(see Figure 2.1). Because of their revolutionary traits, a number of observers
have suggested that the election of 2013 might in fact have meant the end of
that Second Republic, which supposedly commenced in the early 1990s (see
D’Alimonte, 2013).
The indication of a closure of a cycle started with the election of 1994 and the
majoritarian, bipolar party system is also suggested by the extremely high level
of uncertainty in the electorate preceding the election. The election of 2013 is
referred to as a ‘critical election’ by Campus, Ceccarini, and Vaccari (2015). The
campaign of 2013 was more intensively followed than the campaigns of both
2006 and 2008 and the use of new media for political information significantly
increased (Ceccarini & Diamanti, 2013). Two reasons are generally indicated
as triggering a strong feeling of resentment towards the general state of affairs
and more specifically the political class: on one side the economic crisis and
2The trial against the Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti, three times Prime Minister, accused
of having been associated with the Mafia started in Palermo in 1993.
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Figure 2.1: Electoral volatility in general elections (D’Alimonte, 2013)
the so-called ‘austerity measures’ put in place by the incumbent government of
Mario Monti (also a candidate in the election), on the other a series of corruption
scandals that touched both the centre-left and the centre-right coalitions (Ceccarini
& Diamanti, 2013).
3. Citizen
3.1. Inequality, globalisation and citizenry
Changes in the productive structure of Western economies have propelled rising
economic inequality in Western democracies with consequent social grievances of
those who saw their relative income decreasing. Piketty, author of the bestelling
book Capital in the Twenty-First century 2014, provides national accounting data
from Western democracies covering more than a century to support the theory
that, because of a lack of effective redistribution policies, income inequality has
been growing since the 1950s and benefitting those with inherited wealth over
those who depend only on wages to grow their wealth. And this because the
52
Francesco Bailo
return on the accumulated private wealth has been systematically higher in
Western economies than the growth of the national income which is redistributed
through wages.
Although Piketty’s conclusions and accounting methodology are not uncon-
tested among economists (see for example Rodrik, 2014), they do concur with
the general opinion among social scientists that structural elements of world
and national economies have deepened traditional social divisions and created
new ones (for an analysis of the political causes of economic inequality in the
US see Hacker & Pierson, 2010). If economic inequality is probably the most
relevant symptom (and certainly the easiest to measure), it is globalisation and its
processes operating on different layers (governance, finance, trade, culture, media
and migration) that are identified as the paramount cause impacting almost every
aspect of society.
Contributing to one of the earliest analyses on the social impacts of globalisa-
tion, Bauman (1998) stresses the polarising tone of globalisation within society:
‘rather than homogenizing the human condition, the technological annulment of
temporal/spatial distances tends to polarize it.’ (p. 18). According to Bauman,
only the ‘mobile elites’ benefit from the new freedoms offered by globalising
trends and tend to segregate from the rest of the population, purposely isolating
themselves in emerging extraterritorial spaces. The others, those who ‘stay put’
in a locality, find the fruits of globalisation constantly on the move out of reach.
They also perceive their capacity to influence social processes heavily diminished
because they found that power has moved and dephysicalised.
Public spaces—agoras and forums in their various manifestations,
places where agendas are set, private affairs are made public, opinions
are formed, tested and confirmed, judgements are put together and
verdicts are passed—such spaces followed the elite in cutting lose their
local anchors; they are first to deterritorialize and move far beyond the
reach of the merely ‘wetware’ communicative capacity of any locality
and its residents (Bauman, 1998, p. 24).
53
Chapter 2. Literature review
Bauman identifies also a cultural disjuncture between the elites (the ‘globals’)
and the rest. A new ‘hybrid culture’, transnational and delocalised, is forged
by the elites on the move but owned by the ‘globals’ alone. It is a culture
that allows the elites to move comfortably as ‘tourists’ to operate everywhere
without interpreters, to avoid the feeling of ‘homelessness’ without being really
at home anywhere. But again those who are strained at home, the ‘locals’, do not
participate in the construction of ‘new hybrid identities’ and the response to ‘the
deregulation, dissipation of communal networks and forceful individualization
of destiny’ (p. 100) is by necessity a retrenchment in and revaluation of old
identities.
The same idea of a bipolarisation of society between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’
of the globalisation processes is at the core of the influential volume edited
by Kriesi et al. (2008) which studies the impacts of globalisation in a number
of European countries. The authors identify three mechanisms through which
globalisation affects society. First, globalisation increases ‘economic competition’
among countries. This puts pressure at the national level on the regulatory
framework that used to contractually protect workers but also on the capacity
of government to tax firms (which are now transnational in scope). Second,
globalisation increases ‘cultural diversity’. This results in increasing both the
sense of threat on an identity level perceived by the local population and the
competition for access to the welfare state, which was already stressed by the
reduction in the state’s income redistribution capacity. Third, and in line with
what raised by Bauman (1998), globalisation increases ‘political competition’ with
a multiplication of centers of sovereignty, thus reducing the capacity of state to
solve problems and of citizens to influence decisions.
Increase in inequality has been observed to have caused backlash against
the forces of globalisation. In their analysis, Grande and Kriesi (2012) suggests
the emergence of popular grievances (and their political exploitation) on es-
pecially two dimensions: in opposition to political competition and towards
the reappropriation of national sovereignty and in opposition to trasnational
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economic competition and towards a stronger intervention by the state in the
economy. More recently Inglehart and Norris (2016) theorised and empirically
prove that as consequence of globalisation processes, the ‘classic economic Left-
Right cleavage in party competition is overlaid today by a new Cultural cleavage
dividing Populists from Cosmopolitan Liberalism’ (p. 3).
Observing the stress caused by globalisation to traditional cultural and eco-
nomic relations, Young (2007) formulated the concept of ‘vertigo’ since ‘insecurit-
ies in economic position and status, coupled with feelings of deprivation in both
these spheres, engender widespread feelings of resentment both in those looking
up the class structure and those peering down’ (p. 12) but which also results
into scapegoating. In other words, Young points to the coupling of economic
anxieties with the perception of weakening of traditional identities (‘ontological
insecurity’) which causes a sense of ‘bitterness’ and ‘powerlessness’.
As the financial crisis of 2008 hit the periphery of the Euro area, with heavy
social consequences especially for Southern European countries such as Greece,
Spain and Portugal (Lapavitsas, 2012), the anti-globalisation sentiment—which
had been fuelling social discontent since the late 1990s—was promptly incor-
porated (Fominaya, 2015) in the anti-austerity movements, which assembled
throughout the continent on a platform of democracy and social justice (Glasius
& Pleyers, 2013; Della Porta, 2014; Castells, 2015). Inequality was at the center
of the anti-globalisation, anti-austerity—and in more than one instance anti-
establishment—protest that spread as the contraction of the economy and of wel-
fare services had real consequences for the weaker segment of societies. Democracy
was the solution offered by the anti-austerity movements. The 15-M movement
in Spain followed the organisation of a platform called ‘¡Democracia Real YA!’
(Real democracy Now!). To undemocratic decisions taken by financial and transna-
tional institutions (e.g. the FMI, the EU commission, the ECB) the anti-austerity
movements opposed the people, victims of the economic consequences but also
victims as citizens, since they were deprived of the possibility to participate in
those decisions.
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Gerbaudo convincingly argues that central to the claims of the anti-austerity
movements of Spain and Greece was the ‘notion of citizenship’, which they
demanded to be ‘recuperated and expanded in order to address rising economic
inequality’ (2017, p. 38). Referencing Balibar (1988), Gerbaudo points to an
inherent contradiction in the discourse on citizenship, simultaneously intended
both as empowering the state and the individual. In the words of Balibar,
citizenship ‘is bound to the existence of a state and therefore to the principle of
public sovereignty’ and on the other ‘is bound to the acknowledged exercise of an
individual “capacity” to participate in political decisions’ (Balibar, 1988, p. 723;
as cited in Gerbaudo, 2017, pp. 38-39). It is not clear how movements, claiming
on one side more participatory democracy in the name of citizenship and on the
other a more decisive state in protecting citizenship from above, would address
this contradiction in practice. But according to Gerbaudo (2017), citizenship has
replaced, in the anti-austerity movements of Spain and Greece, the notion of class
to shape the identitarian and aggregating discourse. In the discourse of the M5S
it is also possible to note attempts to overcome traditional class rhetoric, which
according to the Movement pertained to the politics of the old party system,
by deploying the image of a polity of equal citizens, directly participating and
entitled to strong welfare protections (e.g. the ‘citizen’s income’).
The role that citizenship played in the M5S has still to be fully explored by
the literature, but it is fundamental in its interplay with the other identitarian
concept: the Internet. Indeed, the construction of the identity of the M5S passes
through the two ideas of Internet and citizen. In their political manifesto We are at
war: For a new politics, Casaleggio and Grillo (2011) writes: ‘The Internet redefines
the relations between citizen and State, citizens become the State’. (as translated
by Tronconi, 2015b, p. 4). MPs of the M5S declined their title of ‘Honorables’
or ‘Senators’, which by law is acquired by members of the Lower and Higher
Chamber of Parliament respectively, opting instead for the simple title of ‘citizen’.
In so doing, they marked a separation between the citizens and the elite and their
pompous title but they also contributed to draw the border of a common identity,
56
Francesco Bailo
(1): Anti-austerity protests begins in Greece; (2) anti-austerity protests begins in Spain; (3)
Occupy Wall Street begins in the US.
Figure 2.2: Grillo’s posts mentioning ‘citizen’ or ‘citizenship’.
which could cut through traditional political and social classes. Moreover, the
flagship policy proposal of the M5S during the XVII Legislature (elected in 2013),
was the provision for a GMI aptly rebranded as ‘citizen’s income’.
It is useful to see the M5S in the light of other anti-austerity movements of
Southern Europe, since Italy shared many characteristics with those countries,
relative to the economy and the demographics, but also in terms of political
traditions. But the discourse on citizenship of the M5S started few years before
the financial and economic crisis that triggered the emergence of anti-austerity
Movement. Indeed, Beppe Grillo’s attention to the role of citizen and citizenship—
especially in the sense of citizenship as right to direct participation—preceded
the anti-austerity protests (see Figure 2.2).
In fact, I argue, that the analysis of the idea of citizenry within the Five Star
Movement (M5S) is important also as contribution to understanding the wave of
protests that started in the late 2000s and continued in the early 2010s. But it must
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also be seen in light of the emergence of a new idea of Internet-connected and
Internet-empowered individual. The idea of citizenship is not only instrumental
for claiming economic, social and political rights but also as for cementing a
common identity. Similarly, the idea of the Internet is intended as social platform
to organise and broadcast collective demands and as a tool to construct a common
identity through repeated interactions via social networking services.
3.2. Infosphere, onlife and networked individual
As globalisation is observed by many to have an impact on people so is technology.
A new reality of continuous connectivity and streaming of communication and
information has been taking shape. If the scale of change for individuals and for
social interactions is not contested, questions are still pending on the quality of
change.
The ICT revolution introduced the masses to a new class of informational
and communicational capabilities. Abundance has been one of the early feature
of such a revolution with social consequences that have been explored in the
literature. Dahlgren (2009) observes that the explosion in the number of channels
of information, or their pluralisation, has the effect of creating heterogeneous
audiences. Individuals have now more possibilities than ever of cultivating
special and ‘niche’ interests, and this feeds into processes of individualisation of
society, which sees on one side the progressive weakening of social (collective)
institutions and on the other the rise of the importance of media (ubiquitous in
their different forms—TV, newspapers, magazine and off course the Internet—in
our lives) as alternative socialising forces. Moreover, not only individuals are
more intensively connected trough different media, but also information is more
accessible thanks to the incessant process of digitalisation of texts, sounds and
images (still and in motion).
In light of the abundance and ubiquity of our access to the informational
sphere, Floridi (2014) postulates the concepts of infosphere and the emergence of
a new form of identity at the intersection of a our online and offline worlds—
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which thanks to mobile technologies are permanently synchronised and virtually
indiscernible: the onlife.
The infosphere is the space populated by informational entities and by their
relations (processes, programs, interactions). Because the physical reality around
us is subjected to an aggressive process of digitalisation and our identities, or
better projections from them, are constantly digitised and updated (pictures,
conversations, statuses), according to Floridi, the infosphere will eventually
become what we consider the Reality since we will spend most of our existences
in it.
The concept of onlife derives from an informational understanding of our iden-
tity and ICTs, which by design mediate information, as ‘powerful technologies of
the self’ (Floridi, 2014, p. 69). As progressively we blur the distinction between
technologically and non-technologically mediated projection of ourself, we create
a new experience of our self, the onlife, which ‘does not respect boundaries
between different online and offline environments’ (p. 74).
Of course, technologies also mediate our relation with others and society. In
this sense, Rainie and Wellman (2012) recognise the emergence and characteristics
of what they call the networked operating system.
A different social order has emerged around social networks that
are more diverse and less overlapping than those previous groups. The
networked operating system gives people new ways to solve problems
and meet social needs (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 9).
This new social order is the result of two parallel developments: the ICTs re-
volution and the mobile revolution, which bring easy and cheap communication
interfaces to the masses and to every spatial and temporal corner of their lives.
The networked individual, the actor of the emerging new social configuration,
manoeuvres between different ego-networks according to personal needs and
interests. That is, for the actor each network is modular and independent and
the actor’s ties to the networks can be switched on or off depending on the
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circumstances. By depicting the geography of social relations as a succession of
dense clusters of ties separated by large regions crossed by sporadic connections,
the social researcher generally assumes that ties are not all functionally equivalent.
Rainie and Wellman (2012) point to two kind of ties: bonding ties that keep the
clusters together through ‘trust, efficiency, and solidarity’ (2012, p. 49) and
bridging ties that are usually less navigated and transmit information in and out
the cluster.
The concept of bonding and bridging ties closely related to the concept of tie
strength, which has a long tradition in the social network analysis literature and is
generally defined as ‘combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity,
the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize
the tie’ (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1362). Thus a dense cluster of relations such as
a family is populated by individuals linked by strong ties, while weak ties are
assume to link family members to the rest of the world. In the literature weak ties
are assumed to be crucial in terms of informational exchange between clusters
and in general for social cohesion. Indeed Putnam stresses the important social
capital function of bonding networks in ‘bring[ing] together people of different
sorts’ (Putnam, 2000; as cited in Norris, 2002b, p. 3).
Referring to a recurrent question of communication research, in a new ‘in-
formation and media ecology’—which is ‘denser, broader, and deeper’ (Rainie &
Wellman, 2012, p. 226) but also less hierarchical, more personalised, and more
multimedial—does the actor confuse the medium with the message (McLuhan,
1964)? Does the medium (being instant messaging, video chat, anonymous post-
ing or face-to-face conversation) effect the participants in such a significant way
that it is in fact possible to argue for a remodulation of the participants’ self when
switching among different media? In other words, do we present different selfs to
the same person when we move from offline to online interaction?
Traditionally the literature had been inclined to treat online presence and
behaviour as something walled off from ‘normal’ life, a ‘second self’ (Turkle, 1984;
Utz, 2010, see also). But in recent years, along with a consolidation of a tendency
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towards a continuous online presence, that argumentation has been eroding.
Indeed, the research presented by Rainie and Wellman points significantly in the
other direction: it ‘shows that people’s online and offline interactions are almost
always integrated’ (2012, p. 126).
While facing the networked individual, encircled by a multitude of active ties—
but by even more dormant ties ready to be activated—a fundamental question
concerns the motivation behind participation and non-participation in networks.
The question is especially relevant in the case of political discussions. Rainie and
Wellman (2012) offer a convincing reason for participation. It could be generally
assume that people would tie with a particular network because of individual
benefits resulting from being connected. But it is also possible to argue that a
strong motivation could reside in a sense of belonging from being part of a coherent
community and in a sense of empowerment from acting effectively as part of a
community.
The sociological and philosophical literature that describes the impact of ICTs
technologies on societies and individuals is important to contextualise the rise
of the M5S and more generally to understand how politics, from organisation to
participation, has changed. As noted, Grillo and the M5S not only leveraged ICTs
as resource (organisational and communicational) but also used the disruptive
change brought by the Internet technologies as a powerful metaphor for the
reorganisation of society. The political enterprise of the M5S has its roots in the
infosphere, in the belief that users of Internet services are able not just to connect
and debate but also to crowd-source expertise and policy solutions better than
any expert. Sitting at center of their networks, and with the tools to savvily
navigate them, users feel they have total access to the digital knowledge of the
infosphere. Users feel they can outsmart traditional decision making and problem
solving.
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4. Participation
4.1. Evolution of political participation
The definition of political participation has been evolving together with the
transformations of industrialised societies. The literature seems to agree that
traditional forms of mobilisation (such as parties, unions, or other hierarchical
forms of association) have been eroded in the last decades, but there is not a
univocal agreement on whether to consider a new repertoire of citizen actions as
political participation.
Arguments pointing to an erosion—or for others reconfiguration—of political
participation are grounded in figures on electoral turnout and civic engagement
in general. Probably the most referenced study detailing the decline in civic
participation to the American society during the last decades of the 20th century
is Putnam’s Bowling alone (2000). Putnam’s argument, which is not limited
to political participation, warns against people’s disengagement from forms
of collective life towards a more individualistic existence, and consequentially
against the erosion of what he helped to popularised as social capital (Putnam,
1993). Boggs also expresses concerns towards what he describes as a decline of the
public sphere (1997).
Data pointing to similar trends of disengagement from political participation
are also identified in European democracies. Mair and van Biezen in two different
studies (2001, 2012) describe a steady decline between 1980 and 2009 in party
membership in all European democracies and across all the political spectrum
(with the notable exceptions of Spain and Greece that democratised only in the
1970s) (see also Dassonneville, Hooghe, & Vanhoutte, 2012).
The factual decline in traditional forms of participation necessarily opens
questions about what caused it. According to Norris (2002a, p. 118) there may
be causes on both the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side,
post-industrialism can explain change in cultural norms and values with post-
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industrial individuals refraining from using traditional channels of participation.
On the demand side, social modernisation theorists argue that direct televised
communication made mass party membership redundant.
But does political participation only consist of turnout and membership? A
strong argument in favor of adapting the definition to embrace emerging forms
of participation is advanced by Dalton (2008) based on survey data collected in
the United States in 2005. According to Dalton, different generations envision
different forms of ‘citizenship norms’. A concept of participation as ‘citizen
duties’ such as voting, reporting a crime or serving in the military are more
entrenched among older generations. Contrastingly, younger generations perceive
this traditional repertoire as relatively less important compared with new forms
of direct and personalised engagement such as being active in politics and in
voluntary groups (Dalton, 2008, p. 83; see also Inglehart, 1997; Micheletti, 2003;
Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). This reconfiguration of social norms might result in
new challenges for state institutions from ‘citizen-initiated and policy-oriented
forms of political participation’ (Dalton, 1996; as cited in Norris, 2002a, p. 24)
urging traditional political agencies to transform in order to capture them.
4.2. Evolving contours of political agencies
A significant trend identified by the literature on parties and social movements
is that the distinction between parties and non-party political organisations has
been progressively fading. Chadwick (2007, p. 284) argues this has occurred
because all political agencies ‘borrow from each other’s typical organizational
and mobilisation repertoires’. A relevant question is then whether both agencies
have been converging because of the same socio-political ecology or whether
their evolutions proceeded in parallel but mainly propelled by different causes.
In the case of political parties, of their three core functions—governing, or-
ganising, and campaigning for elections (Key, 1942/1958; see also Sartori, 1976;
Lawson, 1980)—it is especially the organisational part that is put under stress by
the weakening of traditional forms of political participation (Norris, 2002a, p. 103).
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In other words, it is the party’s role in linking citizen claims with government
actions that is perceived as progressively less effective. Indeed this might have
encouraged parties to embrace new repertoires of engagement and towards more
‘hybrid’ and less hierarchical forms of organisation and mobilisation (Chadwick,
2007).
Arguably non-party organisations responded to similar societal transforma-
tions (social capital endowment, communication technologies and organisational
modes) which seems to imply ‘changes in the modes of human interaction and
engagement in collectivities’ (Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006, p. 49). Indeed
membership based social organisations also experienced processes of hybridisa-
tion by opening to different forms of participation such as new project-oriented
volunteers (Bimber, 2003, p. 144).
The impact of Internet-mediated communication on political agencies has
been investigated since mid-1990s (see Myers, 1994) but the interest in online
social interactions dates back to mid-1980s (see Meyrowitz, 1985). The literature
provides strong evidence that, until recently, parties and non-party organisations
have been responding very differently to the advent of the Internet, with the
formers embracing and incorporating it more slowly and mostly using it as a
broadcasting medium (On the use of the Internet by paries in the Italian and
European context see Vaccari, 2008; Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013; Fraia &
Missaglia, 2014). An earlier project by Gibson, Nixon, and Ward (2003) similarly
concluded that parties did not enthusiastically embraced platforms for online
participation and instead mostly conceived their Internet footprint as an informa-
tional resource for interested voters. As the authors argue ‘innovation in the form
of interactive campaigning is much less well developed and where interactivity
does occur it is controlled by the parties rather than the voters’ (p. 235). An
explanation for this hesitancy is offered by J Stromer-Galley (2000), who theorises
that parties and candidates might restrain from adopting horizontal ‘two-way
human interaction’ instead of traditional ‘one-way, top-down’ communication for
fear of losing control of the message and ‘ambiguity of the campaign communica-
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tion’. I argue that Stromer-Galley’s theory is still relevant today not only because
it points to the exceptionality of the M5S vis-à-vis other parties (the M5S built its
public image around the notion of radical and continuous two-way interaction)
but also because it raises interesting questions on the Movement such as how
does it control its message and avoid ambiguity?
The first categorisation of social communities in terms of their online activity
was proposed by Virnoche and Marx (1997) and based on the geographic dis-
tribution of the communities’ members. They distinguish between a community
network, where both a ‘virtual’ and ‘geographic space’ are continuously shared
by members; a virtual extension where the virtual presence compensate for an
‘intermittent’ physical co-presence; and a purely virtual community with no ‘shared
geographic space’ (Virnoche & Marx, 1997, p. 87).
The literature on the adoption of ICTs by political agencies—interestingly both
for parties and social movements—seems to agree with the fact that different
types of agencies, moved by different strategic goals, will adopt ICTs differently.
Four different driving goals are identified as possibly shaping how ICTs are
used by parties: ‘vote maximising’, ‘office maximising’, ‘policy seeking’ and
‘intra-party democracy’ (Römmele, 2003, p. 14). Accordingly ‘while some parties
are expected to emphasize the participatory aspects of the new technology, others
will focus on the possibilities for top-down information dissemination and broad
monitoring of public opinion’ (Römmele, 2003, p. 8).
It is also possible to conceptualise a selective impact of ICTs on social move-
ments depending on their ‘resource mobilisation strategies’, which can focus
alternatively on ‘professional’ or ‘participatory resources’, and on the character-
istics of their population of interest (Diani, 2000).
For Diani, who applies Virnoche and Marx categorisation (1997), the first type
of strategy, which does not require investment in building a strong identity but
quick and cost-effective fundraising, will result in ‘the conversion of dispersed
communities of sympathizers into virtual communities with a slightly higher
degree of interaction’ (2000, p. 393). Conversely, grassroots organisations, which
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depend on a strong shared identity, will create online community networks on
existing physical interactions (Diani, 2000; see also Virnoche & Marx, 1997;
Wellman et al., 1996).
But as the boundaries of the online and offline political engagement have
been blurring, is the geographic presence still relevant for political actors? In
this sense, it is interesting to analyse the political enterprise of the M5S in which
strong virtual and geographic communities coexist. In investigating both the
online and onsite communities, this thesis presents data on about 1600 meetups
linked to the M5S, which are geographically defined, and about 2000 Facebook
pages with a local scope, comparing their effects on local election results.
4.3. Emerging forms of online participation
A recurrent line of reasoning in the literature on online participation until the
mid-2000s was that ‘[s]ustained collective action is unlikely to originate from
purely virtual ties if they are not sustained by previous interaction’ (Diani, 2000,
p. 394). If virtual-only—or virtual-mainly—communities were theorised (see
Virnoche & Marx, 1997), online participation was regarded as ‘especially suited
to maintaining intermediate-strength ties between people who cannot see each
other frequently’ (Wellman et al., 1996, p. 231) mainly because that was how ICTs
were used in practice before the ‘surge in “organizing without organisation”’
(Karpf, 2012, p. 3; see also Shirky, 2008).
MoveOn.org, an Internet-based political participatory platform independent
of any conventional form of organisation, is identified in the literature as the
prototype of the new form of political participation (Chadwick, 2007; Karpf,
2012). According to Chadwick MoveOn.org defies all traditional categorisation of
political agencies. A ‘hybrid mobilisation movement blend[s] repertoires typically
associated with all three organizational types—parties, interest groups, and social
movements’ (2007, p. 283).
For Bennet and Segerberg a logic of collective action is replaced by a logic of con-
nective action because ‘digital media do change the dynamics of the action: these
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networks operate through the organizational processes of social media, and their
logic does not require strong organizational control or the symbolic construction
of a united “we”’ (2013, p. 28). The significance of these new forms of agencies is
attested by the interest showed by the literature for analogues platforms across
different countries such as ¡Democracia real YA! in Spain (Chadwick, 2013), GetUp!
in Australia (Vromen & Coleman, 2011), Put People First and 38 Degrees in the UK
and OccupyWallStreet in the US (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).
Bennet and Segerberg identify significant differences among these emerging
platforms, which can be either organisationally enabled if they are supported by
a network of traditional organisations or crowd-enabled if ‘playing the role of
virtual political organizations to coordinate the actions of people operating in
geographically scattered face-to-face settings’ (2013, p. 22). Also, participation
occurs and spreads across different platforms, technologies and historical events
(from Cairo to Madrid, from New York to Istanbul) in a process of continuous
emulation and adaptation (see Beissinger, 2007; Burgess & Green, 2009).
The evolution of political agencies and new forms of participation also con-
duces to reshape the rationale behind participation at the individual level. In
this sense, two interpretative narratives are proposed in the literature, focusing
alternatively on technological changes and societal changes. Bimber et al. pro-
pose a causal argument where ICTs affect individual choice of public action (or
inaction) because ‘the boundaries between private and public domains are porous
and easily crossed’, thus transforming (possibly without the full awareness of
the participants) ‘private discourse into public discourse, without any specific or
centrally organized goal of public goods production’ (2005, p. 378 see also Benkler,
2006). Alternatively, Bang (2005) argues that the weakening of political solidarity
among ‘ordinary’ citizens, where collective identities are replaced with project
identities, is evidence of a new selectively active citizen who pursues well defined
and (usually) local goals through ‘small’ tactics and strategic communication.
The Internet and mobile revolutions, bringing continuous connectivity to the
masses, might have eroded the difference between online political engagement
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and offline. In terms of political consequentiality, the main limit that the literature
sees in online forms of participation is that it does not emerge from strong,
personal links of social relations (see for example Gladwell, 2010). This assumes
that online social interactions are not recurrent interactions: that is, ‘not sustained
by previous interaction’ (Diani, 2000, p. 394). But if this was true in the early days
of online social connectivity, is not anymore: indeed, it is possible and extremely
common for users to track behaviour of friends across platforms. Consequentially,
weak and strong (that is, recurrent) social relations are symmetrically replicated
online. Vromen, Xenos, and Loader (2015) noted the importance of online
networks of friends in delivering political content, generating political talk and
engagement.
4.4. Instrumental deliberation and dialogic deliberation
In political science the scope of the definition of deliberation is contested and
debated along the cultural vs rational divide. A narrow definition sees deliberation
only as a formal set of preconditions and rules (Cohen, 1989/1997) used by
‘reasonable and rational agent[s]’ with well defined ‘plans’ and ‘ends’ (Rawls, 1997,
p. 93) to make decisions. A looser definition discerns instead between instrumental
deliberation, which takes place ‘among politicians or representatives within formal
settings’ and dialogical deliberation, which takes place ‘among citizens within the
informal public sphere’ (Habermas, 2005, p. 388 and J. Kim and Kim, 2008).
By recognising dialogical deliberation as an institution of a deliberative system
(Mansbridge, 1999), which encompasses both formal and informal deliberative
procedures, Habermas moves forward from the normative claims for strong demo-
cracy (Barber, 1984) and convincingly argues why what happens in the informal
public sphere also matters for public decision making. Habermas postulates
a functional—but not hierarchical—division of labour between a weak public
and a strong public (Fraser, 1990) respectively responsible for society’s ‘opinion-
formation’ and ‘will-formation’. Accordingly the ‘criteria for judging deliberation
thus fall along a continuum that may not break at the binding/nonbinding dis-
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tinction’ (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 227). In other words, according to Habermas’
conceptualisation of deliberation, a debate might be deliberative whether it takes
place on an Internet discussion or in a parliamentary assembly (Mansbridge,
1999).
Chadwick (2012) recognises and characterises the importance of the distinc-
tion between two different contributions to the literature on deliberation: the
approach of the ‘participatory democrats’ and the approach of the ‘liberal indi-
vidualists’. Chadwick stresses how the latter see deliberation as predetermined
by the interests of the participants while the former argue that ‘we discover
legitimate solutions to political problems only by engaging in sustained, reflective
discourse’ (2012, p. 46). That is, dialogic deliberation would allow to define an ‘in-
terpretive community with shared values’ which is a precondition for a functioning
democracy (J. Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 62).
‘Participatory democrats’, by decoupling deliberation from teleological ration-
ality, provide my research with a substantive conceptualisation for political online
interactions that, as they argue, are a form of meaningful deliberation. Indirectly
this redefinition helps also to conceptualise differences within the repertoire of
political engagement; among actions that are merely motivated by the appeal of a
strong communitarian identity (e.g. marching around flags) and actions justified
by a communicative aspiration.
4.5. Communicative action
In his Theory of communicative action (1981/1984), Habermas focuses on the dif-
ferent sets of rules that regulate behaviours within the strong public sphere and
the weak public sphere, which he sees respectively as the domains of strategic
actions and communicative actions. Strategic—and coherent—actions implied a
knowledgeable actor with a clear understanding of the issue and a well defined
set of goals. But
there are contexts of action that do not primarily serve the carrying
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out of communicatively harmonized plans of action (that is, the pur-
posive activities of the participants) but make communication possible
and stabilize it—for instance, chatting, conversing, and arguing—in
general conversation that becomes an end in itself. (Habermas, 1981/
1984, p. 327)
Habermas’ distinction between strategic and communicative actions is not really
contested in the literature on political participation, yet what seems contested
is the practical relevance of the distinction: in times of ‘project identities’ (Bang,
2005), political participation is mostly strategic communication. Indeed collective or
connective actions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) alike would probably be categorised
as strategic actions by Habermas since in those settings success is not ‘mutual
understanding’ but is defined by ‘achieving individual goals’ (Bohman & Rehg,
2011). But, I argue, by researching political discourse, theorists of strategic
behaviours run the risk of having (possibly) important non-strategic motivations—
such as understanding complex realities—slipping below their radar.
Indeed, the importance of a nonpurposive and informal political conversation
(J. Kim & Kim, 2008) in shaping public ideas, and in knitting society together, is
justified because citizenship is primarily a shared experience (S. Coleman, 2012)
that ‘arises out of acting and speaking together’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 198). Focusing
on rationality and purposefulness as a necessary condition for deliberation, will
necessarily limit our understanding on how society makes public decisions. But
it will also not contribute to answer a fundamental question: how complex and
open societies avoid being constantly torn apart by differences.
Looking at the entire dialogic experience of the political discourse—at ‘how
people think and talk about politics’ (Gamson, 1992, p. xi), and not only at the
final steps of decision making, improves our understanding of how we reach
political consciousness on any issue. Indeed, before being rational and purposive,
‘[p]olitical thought is representative. [People] form an opinion by considering a given
issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints
of those who are absent, that is, [they] represent them’ (Arendt, 1967, p. 115). In
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practical terms that means that people need iterative political discussions, and
others’ feedbacks and inputs, to make sense of what they know, to shape their
understanding on complicated political issues, and to reach an opinion.
4.6. Everyday political talk
According to Mansbridge, everyday talk produces collective decisions ‘the way a
market produces collective results, through the combined and interactive effects
of relatively isolated individual actions’ (1999, p. 212). Thus informal talk that
happens to occur in the kitchen, online or in the corridors of parliament might
all contribute without any coordination to shape meanings, understandings and
ideas, which then permeate the institutional public decision making process.
Still claiming everyday informal talk to be properly ‘political’ is open to
dispute and possibly problematic: what is not a political talk? Mansbridge, who
is not confortable within Habermas’ strict definition of political as what concerns
exclusively the ‘state’, defines ‘political’ broadly as ‘that which the public ought
to discuss’ (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 214). That is, it is political whatever is discussed
publicly.
The concept of everyday political talk is valuable in describing a society of
networked individuals (Rainie & Wellman, 2012) who selectively engage in public
discussions displaying multiple interests and identities. Still in the age of online
public mass communication, Mansbridge’s definition needs to be restrained, to
avoid labeling as political everything that is discussed online (including hobbies,
TV series and sports). The subject of everyday political talk needs to be not only
important for the discussants, but also have broad and deep implications for the
life of many. Clearly discussion boundaries are necessarily contested and need
to be kept open to iterative contestation by participants, with an example being
feminist activists’ successful battle against a rigid separation between public and
private spheres that ‘render[s] power relations within the household as “natural”
and immune from political regulation’ (McAfee, 2011; Fraser, 1990, see also).
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4.7. Online deliberation
The massification of Internet communication, and its application to political talk,
immediately raises questions on the parallel between face-to-face and computer-
mediated communication. Current computer-mediated technologies are biased
towards a text-based and asynchronous conversation with significant implications
for interaction (Castells, 1996/2010; Dahlberg, 2001a; Rainie & Wellman, 2012).
Whether the differences outweigh the similarities—and consequentially—whether
deliberation theories and concepts are applicable to online deliberation, has been
debated since the early 1990s.
Scholars who stressed the differences between offline and online political
discussion moved to described opportunities and threats of the latter. Price
(2012) provides a review of the most important. Among the threats imposed by
online political conversation are superficiality (Fishkin, 2000; Putnam, 2000); social
masking and impersonality (Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984); and hyper-selectivity,
which discourages engaging with different opinions (Sunstein, 2001). On the
other side, opportunities are: reduced social dominance since ‘online discussions
are generally much more egalitarian than face-to-face encounters’ (Price, 2012,
p. 130 and Dubrovsky, Kiesler, and Sethna, 1991; Walther, 1995; Hollingshead,
1996; S. Coleman and Price, 2012); openness in terms of more exchange (Rains,
2005) and more new ideas (Gallupe, DeSanctis, & Dickson, 1988; Dennis, 1996);
greater honesty and self-disclosure (Tidwell & Walther, 2002; Bargh, McKenna, &
Fitzsimons, 2002); ease in handling disagreements (Jennifer Stromer-Galley, 2003);
and finally the advantage of writing (Dahlberg, 2001a; Price, 2012).
At a macrolevel Coleman and Price (2012) focus on online deliberation in
terms of its potentiality of transforming political distance within society. They note
that technologies of political communication might ‘expand or limit distance and
reach between people involved in the authoritative allocation of values’ (2012,
p. 26). Online participation could have important consequences in terms of
‘long-term community building’, since it offers more channels to share knowledge
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and personal experiences (Burgess & Green, 2009; S. Coleman & Price, 2012); in
terms of collective action and civic participation, since coordination costs have
disappeared, with the emergence of citizen networks as new public actors; and
in terms of an greater involvement of government beneficiaries into governance
by developing forms of coproduction (Ostrom, 1999; S. Coleman, 2012; see also
Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).
If online deliberation is largely recognised to significantly augment political
freedom, it will not necessarily improve political equality (Norris, 1999b; Diani,
2000; Albrecht, 2006; S. Coleman & Price, 2012). The literature rightly points
to open questions concerning how the distribution of power will be affected. In
particular, will the importance of political intermediaries such as parties be
affected by active and networked citizens? How would citizen voluntary activism
play out against the expertise of professionals such as journalists, public servants,
policy analysts or scientists? How and through which transmission would online
activism impact real policy making? (Chadwick, 2012). And probably most
intriguingly, are we moving away from a ‘mass audiences’ to a more partisan,
segmented and polarised system (S. Coleman & Price, 2012, p. 39; see also
Sunstein, 2001, 2002)?
How diversity of opinions plays out in the online conversation has dominated
the scholarly debate and attracted attention also out of academic circles, with
arguments and empirical results pointing in both directions (Dahlberg, 2007):
towards homophily (Fisher, Margolis, & Resnick, 1996; Hill & Hughes, 1998;
Selnow, 1998; Graham, 1999; Wilhelm, 1999; McKenna & Bargh, 2000; Sunstein,
2001; Harmon, 2004; Wojcieszak, 2010) or heterogeneity (Jennifer Stromer-Galley,
2003; Balkin, 2004; Weinberger, 2004; Horrigan, Garrett, & Resnick, 2004; Shah,
Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Min, 2007; S. Coleman & Price, 2012).
What the literature agrees on is that the Internet potentially allows a plurality
of voices to surface, especially if compared to traditional broadcasting media.
Also the Internet allows a much more decentralised control on filtering content
in or out. Online communication does improve access to the debate but it also
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provides users with extremely effective tools to personalise it. The result might be
the constitution of ‘community of interest’ that not only act to isolate themselves
form the rest of the debate, but that also might favor internal homogenisation
(Dahlberg, 2001b, p. 618). These assumptions will be tested in this research. By
focusing on selected debates within the onliven the particular trajectory of the
Movement significantly diverse, I assess whether homophily is in fact a recurrent
feature of online political talk.
Social media services potentially allow exposure to a much broader spectrum
of opinions. A number of studies have explored whether exposure, via Internet-
mediated social ties (either strong or weak) to political opinions that might conflict
with the subject’s opinions, plays a significant depolarising role. With two experi-
ments, Messing and Westwood (2014) have demonstrated that, on social media,
‘social endorsement’—that is, approval of Internet content by someone who is
known by the subject—is a stronger predictor for the selection of a news article
than the political alignment of the source of the article. The authors suggests that
‘social endorsements change the calculus and the heuristics that people utilize
to select news in the context of social media’ and consequentially because of
the diversity of the user base of social media services, they conclude that ‘social
media should be expected to increase users’ exposure to a variety of news and
politically diverse information’. Similar results are found by Barberá (2014). By
analysing Twitter interactions among millions of users in three countries, Barberá
concludes that, first, users are connected to politically diverse networks and,
second, that diversity contributes to ‘political moderation’. Moreover, recent
studies have also concluded that ideological homophily when it emerges is not
necessarily ‘symmetric’. By analysing the interactions of liberals and conservat-
ives Twitter users, the study of Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson (2014) and the
study of Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, and Bonneau (2015) both concluded that
differences do emerge in the behaviours of the two groups. According to Barberá
et al., the importance of ideological segregation in online settings is possibly
‘overestimated’: even if people do tend to interact with like-minded they are not
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sealed off from contacts with people holding different opinions.
But does homophily and ‘enclave deliberation’, necessarily exacerbate polarisa-
tion of opinions? Few arguments point indeed to the quite unintuitive possibility
that deliberation also among like-minded might result in depolarisation. Sunstein
argues that in like-minded group two factors might work against polarisation:
lack of a strong sense of common identity among participants and presence of
opposing subgroups within the group (2002, p. 180).
The debate on diversity is not only on empirical grounds but also on norm-
ative grounds; indeed it is contested whether heterogeneity of positions should
be always considered valuable per se, or that heterogeneity might sometimes
discourage change to the status quo by marginalising minority voices. Dahlberg
(2007) defines the concept of discourse drawing it from post-Marxist discourse
theory. For him discourse is intended ‘as socially contingent systems of meaning,
which form the identities of subjects and objects’, and which are shaped by the
contraposition with what is left ‘outside’ to it (2007, p. 835). The discourse is
always the result of temporary hegemony and exclusion. According to Dahlberg
then difference in not ‘a threat to the formation of public opinion and social
stability’ (2007, p. 832) but on the contrary ‘intra-discursive’ contestation and
‘inter-discursive’ contestation by multiple ‘counter-discourses’ are a necessary
condition for a truly democratic Habermasian public sphere.
In this sense, according to Fraser (1995), participants in the public sphere are
not ‘peers’ but instead are defined by society’s structural inequalities; consequen-
tially a single public sphere can not fairly represent the multitude of different
social instances. Vulnerable subordinated groups (i.e. women, gay, ethnic or
political minorities) necessitate protection from the hegemony of the majority
and consideration as ‘subaltern counterpublics’. In other words she contends ‘that
in stratified societies arrangements that promote contestation among a plurality
of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a
single, comprehensive, overarching public’ (Fraser, 1995, p. 291).
In the words of Laclau, ‘the fragmentation of social identities and proliferation—
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in a computerized civilization—of new forms of social mediation, gives demo-
cracy its specific fragility, but also its inherent political possibilities’ (2000, p. 143
cited in Dahlberg, 2007, p. 836). By reframing the fragmentation debate, Dahlberg
shifts the focus on three important questions: does the Internet facilitate the
emergence of counter-discourses? How effectively is the dominant discourse
contested? And most importantly, which one of the two possible effects of online
activism is more significant: contestation of the status quo or ‘non-engagement’
with the difference (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 841)?
In this sense, particularly relevant for the debate counterpublics and online de-
liberation is the case of the M5S in which ‘fringe positions’, involving conspiracy
and alternative economic theories, have found hospitality and in few cases have
been sustained for years. In fact, this non-prejudicial hospitality typical of open
Internet communities—in which every theory, no matter how unsubstantiated is
given space—might have played a very positive role in sustaining the mobilisation
of the M5S and at the time of writing still plays an important role in the identity
of the Movement. For example, in this thesis, I offer the analysis of the debate for
the introduction of a form of guaranteed income for all citizens, which in 2013
became an official proposal of the Movement. As I note, the debate was initiated
as a form of contentestation towards the predominant economic dogma of the
European Central Bank. As the debate progressed, Beppe Grillo took interest in it
and fuelled it by hosting on his blog a post of a self-declared ‘counter-economist’.
5. The case of the M5S
5.1. What is it the M5S?
Both research and analysis targeting the M5S have mostly highlighted the de-
parture from a traditional party form on at least four dimensions. First, the
Movement rejects traditional left and right categories and electoral data has in-
deed confirmed that it is able to attract voters out of parties representing the entire
political spectrum (extremes included) (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016). Second,
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the Movement takes a radically different organisational shape, which is less
hierarchically defined (no official leadership, head of local sections, headquarters)
(Lanzone, 2015) and more plastic, adaptable to events and circumstances. Third,
the Movement voices a radical opposition to traditional forms of political repres-
entation and is instead in favour of more extensive use of direct participation via
referendum, citizen’s initiative and the Internet, used as a forum for ‘permanent
participation’ (Hartleb, 2013). Fourth, for the Movement, the Internet is not
only an operational tool - to inform, organise and participate - but also a symbol
representing the essence of democracy: freedom of expression, transparency,
equality.
In parallel to the intellectual excitement for the political innovations represented
by a Movement whose success took almost every political commentator by
surprise, it is also largely recognised that the Movement is anchored to the
trajectory of the Italian political and party system and that its style and vocabulary
are not new in the Italian or European contexts. The rhetoric adopted by its
founder (and owner of the brand) is referred to as populist (Passarelli, 2015)
because of his recurrent juxtaposition of ‘we, the righteous people’ against
‘them, the corrupt elite’. But is also been noted that, the label of populism
is more often used by journalists and only cautiously by scholars which see
some limitations to the definition (Mancini, 2015). The Movement is collocated
in the tradition of catch-all anti-system parties (Diamanti, 2014; Valbruzzi, 2013;
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015). In this line of reasoning, the M5S is only one of the
last occurrences of anti-establishment (Hopkin, 2015) and personalistic parties
(Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016)—other parties being Forza Italia (in 1994), the
Northern League, Italy of Values—and the success of the Movement derives from
a crisis of political representation fuelled by pervasive perception of widespread
corruption and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, as the support for the M5S
has, at the time of writing, consolidated between 25 and 30% of the electorate,
it is progressively more difficult to consider the Movement only in light of its
anti-systemic propulsion (which I do not contest). This research wants to cast
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light on the content of the debate within the Movement, which as I observe
has a high practical value (what needs to be done), because the Movement has
also—and necessarily given its electoral support—demonstrated to be propositive
political actor.
Others have advanced new ad hoc definitions for the Movement. According
to Urbinati (2013), the M5S is a ‘light party’ because of the absence of any
bureaucratic and organisational infrastructure. For Sartori (2012), the Movement
is instead a step forward. If almost all parties have became ‘lighter’ in the last
two decades, because of television and the primacy of media communication over
mass organisation, the M5S has pushed this trend to the extreme, turning into
a ‘liquid party’. Referring to Bauman’s notion of ‘liquidity’, Sartori notes that
if parties have progressively lost all of their weight as organisations, the M5S—
which has even lost the name ‘party’—is also characterised in an unprecedented
way by the volatility of its policy platforms (it run in the election of 2013 with
only a few pages program) and by a total uncertainty regarding its internal
decision-making, where Grillo has of course a primal influence but which only
selectively exercises. In the same line of reasoning, Mancini (2015) defines the
M5S a ‘post-party’ because of its ‘post-bureaucratic’ form. For Mancini, the M5S
is in fact the ideal type of Bimber’s ‘post-bureaucratic’ organisation (see Bimber,
2003); thanks to the Internet the Movement can make available online a large
amount of information (decisions but also documents and data) and maintain a
continuous debate among interested users.
Agreement on a more comprehensive definiton charactering the M5S (clearly
not only an Internet movement but neither a party in the traditional sense), which
is inclusive of its different features, ought to be found by a holistic analysis of
its political manifestations, both taking place offline in terms of the Movement’s
lasting political effects and online in terms of the consequences that the Internet
crowd might have on the choices of the Movement. The definition should not
only stress the transience of the M5S towards more traditional party forms, that
is, outlining it as a ‘movement party’ (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016) but also as
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a ‘hybrid actor’, mixing ‘resistance and adjustment to the system’ (Bordignon &
Ceccarini, 2015).
5.2. What the M5S representes for political participation
The development of the M5S as a political actor has crystallised under the influ-
ence of significant trends over the last two decades. On one side, it is clearly a
protest movement, with characteristics that linked it back to movements that are
generally placed under the broad umbrella of anti-globalisation protest. But in
its rhetoric and style, we also find populistic traits that we do not necessarily
associate with any anti-globalisation movements, most notably the presence of a
charismatic (and some would say authoritarian) leadership. It can be argued that
what connects these two faces might be the emergence of a new cultural dimen-
sion in the political alignment of citizens, which is the product of globalisation.
The challenge in framing the M5S as political actor is that it is also an Internet
party and thus the foci of political activity are exceptionally dispersed, distributed
across websites and Internet services. If important themes have been developed
in the literature to understand and describe emerging forms of participation
and the social and political background that contributed in shaping them, what
is missing is a comprehensive and longitudinal analysis of one of these new
Internet-mediated actors from the perspective of the citizen-user. The analysis
that I propose in the thesis tries to offer this contribution and mostly through the
observation of user-generated data.
The M5S is an exceptional case study, both for its political and electoral
trajectory and for its total adoption of the Internet as core infrastructure for every
activity. The problem with the corpus of analysis focused on the M5S is that is
too narrowly focused on the Italian case and consequentially misses important
characteristics that transcend the Italian case. The specific Italian situation, a
crisis and an important electoral vacuum, facilitated the coalescence of features
present everywhere in Western democracies into one subject. The fact that so
many definitions and framings have been proposed for the M5S, borrowed from
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the Italian political traditions as well as from analysis developed from other
contexts, points to a case that is multifaceted as well as relevant beyond Italy.
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Methods and challenges for a new
kind of data
Not everything that can be counted counts.
Not everything that counts can be counted.
William Bruce Cameron
Networks are the data structure of the 21st
Century.
Marc Smith
Sociology has to account for chaos and normality
together.
Harrison White
In this chapter, I offer a general discussion on the quantitative data and
methods that I use in the thesis. I first delineate the development of what has been
called ‘computational social science’, an interdiscipline that brings methods (and
scientists) from the natural and mathematical sciences into domains traditionally
of the exclusive interest of the social sciences. Second, I present a general view of
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what I deem are the defining features of the data generated from the digitalisation
of lives, things and processes and their criticalities, including some reflection on
the ethical questions that must be addressed when manipulating digital traces
published, not always consciously by people. In the final sections, I introduce
developments, potential and limits of two of the analytical toolboxes that I
extensively use in the thesis—network analysis and quantitative text analysis (i.e.
Natural Language Processing)—and delineate how I apply them in the thesis.
1. Computational social science
1.1. Complexity and modelling
Computational social science is an emerging phenomenon more than a consolid-
ated discipline or inter-discipline. Although departments and research centres
of computational social science have been created and graduate programs have
been developed, there is no strong consensus on its limits or on what its meth-
odological approach should look like. What seams clear is that the focus of
computational social science is the collection and analysis of data on a large scale
applied to social science investigations.
The emergence of computational social science was made possible by two
factors: sophisticated methods for data analysis developed in the fields of math-
ematics, physics, computer science and statistics and the explosion of human-
generated digital data. There is no doubt that although the domain of the data
and the research questions postulated by the computational social science pertain
to the domains of the social sciences, the contribution of social scientists to its
development has been limited for reasons that I have already detailed at the
beginning of this chapter.
One of the most direct and influential contributions to computational social
science comes from the science of complexity, which is rooted in mathematics, and
its application in the late 1990s to social networks by physicists such as Watts
and Strogatz (1998) and Barabási and Albert (1999) who published two highly
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influential articles for the field of social network analysis and computational social
science. Notably, the two articles mention no work conducted in social network
analysis by sociologists with the exception of the work by Milgram (1967) and the
work published by Wasserman and Faust (1994) (a statistician and a mathematical
sociologist). This—along with some resentment in the community of social social
network analysts (see Freeman, 2011)—signalled a powerful dissociation with a
corpus of work previously conducted on social networks and towards a more
quantitative and mathematically-driven approach to the data.
The paradigm espoused by the science of complexity is one that envisioned
physical reality as made of interconnected bits forming a complex system. In
this sense, the complexity of the system derives from the observation that the
behaviour of the system as a whole is extremely difficult to understand, model and
predict—if not impossible—from the observation of its individual components.
Different systems on very different levels have been conceptualised as complex:
ecosystems, the brain, the world wide web, and of course social networks. Because
interconnectedness of its components is a defining property of each complex
system, the common language of the scientists of complexity is quite naturally
the language of networks.
Computer scientist Melanie Mitchell (2009) defines a complex system as ‘a
system in which large networks of components with no central control and
simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behaviour, sophisticated
information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution’. This definition
introduces two critical features of complex systems, the presence of ‘nontrivial
emergent and self-organizing behaviours’ (Mitchell, 2009, p. 13). The idea of
emergence is foundational to the discipline and identifies a property through
which from a very simple set of rules complex and hard-to-predict behaviours
do emerge. In this sense the science of complexity has developed from the
observation—initially treated as a curiosity by the scientific community but
which then bloomed to challenge the foundations of the scientific method—that a
‘[s]eemingly random behaviour can emerge from deterministic systems’ (Mitchell,
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2009, p. 38). The idea of self-organisation postulates instead that the system does
not require an internal or external ‘controller or leader’ to organise and direct its
components.
A complex system, which as we have seen is complex not because its individual
components are complex (in fact, they are simple and behave simply) but because
of the complexity of the behaviour that emerges from their dynamic interactions,
is particularly apt to be mathematically modelled because only a few (but precise)
rules are sufficient to accurately describe the entire functioning of the system.
And if a complex system can effectively be described through a simple model, its
dynamic behaviour can, in effect, be synthetically replicated by computational
simulations based on the same model. Simulation is the crucial epistemological
approach of the science of complexity (and is also what helped attract most of the
criticism of this science, which was accused of being ‘fact-free’: see Horgan, 1995
as cited in Mitchell, 2009). Indeed the development of the sciences of complexity,
such as the extremely productive field of agent-based modelling, to cite one of
the most well-known applications of the ideas of complexity within the domain
of the social sciences, was only made possible by the availability of computers
and consequently accelerated as computers became cheaper and powerful.
1.2. Understand and predict
As illustrated in the previous section, the condition for the emergence of computa-
tional social sciences in the early 2000s and the growing interest that it attracted in
the late 2000s was the copresence of the massive amount of digital data describing
human activities and the computational methods that could be applied to mine
those data. Two influential papers, published respectively in 2009 and 2012 in the
form of manifestos, are helpful to understand computational social science and
to provide a loose definition of its data, methods and aspirations.
The first paper (Lazer et al., 2009) published in Science by 15 academics
from US universities with backgrounds in sociology, political science, physics and
computer science, points to the potential of aggregating this new kind of data ‘into
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comprehensive pictures of both individual and group behaviour, [transforming]
our understanding of our lives, organisations, and societies’. The paper described
the new kind of data and the different technological advancements that are
contributing to producing it—on a very different scale than in the past. The
authors cite new technologies that are producing transactional data, such as
emails, badges, mobile phones, and the Internet as a source of expressive and
relational data. Accordingly, these new data offer unprecedented insights into
the lives of individuals and societies and the potential for the identification of
patterns of individual and group behaviours to ‘predict’ these behaviours. But the
authors do not offer a clear definition of the discipline and point only to the
observation that ‘a computational social science is emerging that leverages the
capacity to collect and analyze data with an unprecedented breadth and depth
and scale’; the same capacity ‘to collect and analyze massive amounts of data
[which] has transformed such fields as biology and physics’. Arguably, it is to
these disciplines that aspiring computational social scientists should look, for
both methods and inspiration. Indeed, the authors indicate that the way forward
is, at least partially, to overcome the obstacles imposed on traditional social
research:
what does existing sociological network theory, built mostly on a
foundation of one-time ‘snapshot’ data, typically with only dozens
of people, tell us about massively longitudinal data sets of millions
of people, including location, financial transactions, and communica-
tions? These vast, emerging data sets on how people interact surely
offer qualitatively new perspectives on collective human behaviour,
but our current paradigms may not be receptive.
The second paper (Conte et al., 2012), published instead by 14 researchers
(mostly physicists) from European universities, set the same two premises for
the emergence of a computational social science: new data and new methods.
‘First, ICT produces a flood of data. These data represent traces of almost all
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kind of activities of individuals enabling an entirely new scientific approach
for social analysis. Second, the development of computer capacities makes it
possible to handle the data deluge and to invent models that reflect the diversity
and complexity of the society’. But the analogy with the perspective presented
in the paper published by Lazer et al. (2009) continues also in terms of the
appeal to overcome the limitations imposed by a traditional approach to the
social enquiry. Conte et al. (2012) note that ‘[t]heories grow slowly, impeded by
entrenched assumptions and lack of data. The large-scale, founding constructs
that should drive our understanding of society are debated and misunderstood.
In social sciences, there is no consensus on the general mechanisms that underlie
phenomena like institutions, norm compliance and enforcement, reputation,
trust, etc.’ In this sense, the authors recognise the exceptional contribution in
addressing the unresolved questions of the social sciences that can come from this
new kind of data and from ‘the role of computation in inspiring, formalising and
implementing the core scientific concepts, principles, and ideas of computational
social science’. The observation of human-generated data on an unprecedented
scale can finally help social scientists find rules, ‘uncover the laws of the society’,
and produce ‘predictive and explanatory models’ that accurately describe ‘the
complexity of social and behavioural systems’ with the objective of ‘efficiently
and effectively identify optimal paths for our society’.
1.3. Domain and methods
The natural domain of the computational social sciences extends over all those
human behaviours, activities and dynamics, that generate digital data or that
more generally can be described by data that is machine-readable and granular.
The attention of computational social science practitioners is dedicated to new
data, in the sense of data that were generated by human activities that—although
not necessarily new—were digitally recorded or coded to an unprecedented level
of granularity. The Internet and social media sites have been the major source of
data for computational social science because of the ease of access.
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But other sources have also been created and tapped (see Jungherr, 2015,
pp. 29-30). Interest has been dedicated for example to the study of non-verbal
communication, interactions, economic flows, migrations, civil wars with data
generated ‘mining reality’, that is, capturing dynamic location data of people
and things from phones, remote sensing or other gadgets to draw extremely
accurate and dynamic maps of social networks (see Eagle & Pentland, 2006;
Christia et al., 2015). New datasets (or databanks) with exceptionally detailed
information on countries and societies have been created by mashing statistical
data, archaeological data and importantly data coded by experts. Among the
many examples of expert-coded datasets, there are the Militarised interstate
dispute data (Palmer, D’Orazio, Kenwick, & Lane, 2015) and Seshat, a databank
aggregating detailed information on social and political organisations in societies
throughout history. Finally, growing interest has been attracted by the digitalisa-
tion of historical records such as books, documents produced by state institutions
such as parliamentary documents, and newspapers.
The methods of computational social science are effectively summarised by
Cioffi-Revilla (2010):
• Automated information extraction (including Natural Language Processing
(NLP))
• Social network analysis
• Geospatial analysis (through the use of geographic information systems)
• Complexity modeling
• Social simulations models (including agent-based modelling)
1.4. A different kind of complexity
A possible definition for computational social science is ‘integrated, interdiscip-
linary pursuit of social inquiry with emphasis on information processing and
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through the medium of advanced computation’ (Cioffi-Revilla, 2010). Proponents
of the formalisation of a discipline around the data and methods of the computa-
tional social science have been setting extremely ambitious goals. By means of
computation, information that used to be inaccessible—because it did not exist or
was not in a machine-readable format—has the potential of becoming knowledge,
understanding of rules regulating the human endeavours. New information
(which is large and granular) combined with sophisticated quantitative methods
and unprecedented computer power will purportedly allow unveiling of the
mechanisms, laws, patterns that move people and societies.
The social sciences have failed to do this because they missed the data (not
the methods, which were in most cases already available). But because they have
been focusing on methods and perspectives shaped by data that were limited
in scale and static, they now need to rethink their approach to overcoming the
limits that those methods and perspectives impose (Lazer et al., 2009). The
non-computational social sciences do not reason in terms of mathematical models
but mostly through descriptive contextualisation and interpretation of individual
instances of phenomena of interest. But because new data is available, which is
granular, large in scale and dynamic, the attention must move from the detailed
description of the micro to the modelling of the macro, the only level of analysis
that will allow the observation of laws governing individuals and their aggregates.
The ideas that shaped the development of the science of complexity—and
which permeate the computational social science—such as the idea of emergence
or the idea of self-organisation are clearly immensely fascinating for political
scientists observing the development of new forms of Internet-mediated political
organisations. Nevertheless, a critical assumption for the study of a complex
system is that the system can be reduced to a simple set of rules that govern its
complex dynamics. And this assumption must induce some perplexity in any
attempt to apply it to human endeavours. For example, whether or not processes
of political engagement and participation are determined by rules or laws (see
Conte et al., 2012) and whether (if they are) these rules are simple enough to be
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described mathematically is clearly highly debatable.
But the problem is also lexical. The debate within the computational social
science, necessarily an interdisciplinary enterprise, has been so far dominated
by the methods more than by the subject of investigation (people and societies).
This has allowed some vocabularies to be applied acritically to totally different
fields of investigation. For example, the idea of contagion is very popular in
social network analysis. Contagion is the mechanical transfer of some attribute
through exposure. In the context of networks, in which individuals are precisely
related to one another, contagion is a powerful idea. But if in epidemiology the
contagion of an organism can be estimated probabilistically based on precise
pre-existing conditions, to talk about contagion from exposure to political ideas
assumes that the researcher is in fact in the position of understanding, given
sufficient information on dynamics and relations, what determines the political
opinion of any individual at any time. But clearly, if the classification of any
individual as infected or non-infected is objectively provable, the classification of
an individual based on her political opinion is clearly very much subjective and
contextual: a left-right spectrum would be risible if applied to the population of
rural Afganistan.
2. A new kind of data
2.1. Size and complexity
With the digitalisation of social activities (from phone calls to tweets, from bus
trips to page views), a process that has touched virtually every aspect of our
lives, social scientists discovered that the problem of data scarcity (when data
was expensive) had been replaced with a problem of data abundance. In fact,
social scientists came late to this realisation and, as I describe in the next section,
scientists from other disciplines, such as computer science and physics, moved
first onto the new data. The reason for this delay is mostly explained by two
features that characterise this new kind of data: their size and their complexity.
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The size of the new data is larger, much larger, than anything used before
in the social sciences. Before the massive process of digitalisation of human
artefacts, interactions and behaviours—n, the number of observations used in
the analysis, was usually in the range of a few hundred and only exceptionally
included thousands of observations. Since size is usually elevated as the defining
feature of the new data, they are commonly referred to as ‘Big Data’. Among the
many definitions of Big Data, one of the most popular is that of the United States
National Science Foundation: ‘The phrase “big data” refers to data that challenge
existing methods due to size, complexity, or rate of availability’ (National Sci-
ence Foundation, 2014). This definition is interesting because it also identifies
additional challenges derived from working with this kind of data.
Size is probably the easiest of the obstacles to overcome. Thanks to the mas-
sification of personal computers and the ubiquity of microchips, the capabilities
of a laptop are sufficient to open and manipulate very large datasets. For ex-
ample, a dataset with two variables and one million observations can be stored
using only 16MB of memory. The second feature characterising the new data
is instead much more difficult to overcome and is the structure (or lack thereof)
and consequent complexity of the data. Because of their generative process and
rate of accumulation, the new data can be extremely complicated to read. For
example, the entire ‘dump’ of the Italian version of Wikipedia, which I use to
conduct a semantic analysis of tens of thousands of posts and comments, has
a size of 2.2GB and can be easily downloaded and stored in few minutes. But
access to the information contained in the data requires knowledge of the data
schema and format (which define how the data is structured in the data file)
and of parsing techniques to retrieve information from millions of lines. In addi-
tion, the new data challenge established approaches of social scientists to data
because of their multidimensionality. Traditionally, quantitative methods applied
by social scientists implied data in two dimensions: observations and variables.
But the shape in which new data is stored is generally optimised to increase
computational speed and not to facilitate human reasoning and understanding
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of the information contained in the data. And this requires reshaping of the data
before the analysis or the application of quantitative methods that can deal with
multidimensional shapes, such as network analysis.
To increase the complexity and readability of this new kind of data, although
new data are digital and by definition machine-readable (with virtually no excep-
tion), they are not necessarily structured so as to facilitate targeted information
retrieval. For example, the archive of a newspaper can be digitised and made
accessible to Internet users but, even assuming that the digitised pages are
text-searchable (which required them to be processed with an optical character
recognition algorithm), crucial information such as titles, dates and authors of
articles might not be easily parsed from the document and required the formula-
tion of complex search patterns. Another example is the data contained in HTML
documents, the file format for webpages. HTML documents are by definition
structured to be read by browsers but the information visualised by the browser
is not. In this thesis, I use web data produced by the users of the blog of the
founder of the M5S but in order to extract the information of interest and store it,
such as the content of postings (including comments), their date of publication
and the name of the author, I had to specify the search patterns that identify the
corresponding part of the document.
2.2. Expressive, transactional and relational data
The growing universe of sensors and devices generated a stream of data that can
be divided into three broad categories: machine-generated data, nature-generated
data and human-generated data. Although social scientists might also have an
interest in nature-generated data, it is clear that the main interest for the social
sciences lies in data that are the (direct or indirect) product of human activities.
It is possible to identify at least three types of human-generated digital data. The
human-generated data that are richest in meaning are what I refer to as expressive
data. Examples of expressive data are texts (such as posts, comments and tweets),
pictures, videos and audio recordings (such as podcasts) but also (although
91
Chapter 3. Methods and challenges for a new kind of data
intrinsically less meaningful) the actions of liking or sharing somebody else’s
content. Expressive data are consciously produced by users with the primary
intention of being consumed in their format by other users.
The second type of data is transactional data (Manovich, 2012), which are much
‘thinner’ in terms of meaning but still of extreme interest to the social scientists,
especially in aggregate form. Classic examples of transactional data are logs of
phone calls, web searches and also public transport trips. Transactional data are
not produced by users to be consumed by other users but are rather traces left
behind (consciously or not) as a consequence of some action.
The final type of data is relational data. This type of data shares some com-
monality with the transactional data in the sense that they can be intended as
traces left behind—again, consciously or not—by users as result of some action
but they differ because importantly they allow the inference of some sort of
relation—even though it might be difficult or impossible to qualify the value of
the relation—among individuals. boyd and Crawford (2012) refer to relational
data as networked data and propose a further distinction. They define articulated
network data as data that ‘result from people specifying their contacts through
technical mechanisms like email or cell phone address books, instant messaging
buddy lists, “Friends” lists on social network sites, and “Follower” lists on other
social media genres’. Behavioural network data is instead data that is generated
from the purposeful communicative interaction between at least a pair of users.
Importantly, although the dataset accessible to the researcher might not include
the content of the communication, some sort of content or message must be
exchanged by the users. Behavioural network data—which might be directed or
undirected but must identify at least a pair or users involved in the exchange—
are for example data on phone calls, emails, and the large family of messages
exchanged among users taking place on webpages or within social networking
platforms.
The definition of three types of data (expressive, transactional and relational)
is important more to understand the purpose of the data for the researcher than
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to frame why and how the data were actually generated. In other words, the three
typologies are not exclusive and it is easy to imagine that the same data could
be assigned to more than one typology. For example, in the thesis, I use data
obtained from Meetup.com on events organised by the M5S. The data include the
venue of the event, the date, the topic and crucially the list of users who registered
for the event. Although I mainly use them as transactional data, to quantify
spatially and longitudinally the mobilisation of the M5S, it is certainly possible
to also use them as relational data if we assume that those users by participating
in the same onsite event entertained some sort of relation. Another example,
which is implicit in the definitions of the different data typologies, involve data
on comments that users might post in reply to somebody’s else posting. These
data are clearly both expressive and relational but the adoption of one or the
other typology has an implication for the class of analysis that will be conducted.
2.3. Objectivity, interpretation and aggregation
The acutest critique towards this new kind of data concerns the claim of objectivity
(boyd & Crawford, 2012). Boyd and Crawford raise an important issue when
they question the objectivity claims of Big Data practitioners. They rightly point
to the fact that a social researcher always interprets the data, independently
by the scale of the dataset or by the precision of the sensor that captured the
data. Also, the fact that data need to be cleansed before use through subjective
choices (deciding what to keep or what to discard) invalidates by definition any
objectivity claim (boyd & Crawford, 2012, p. 667; see also Mahrt & Scharkow,
2013). In respect to interpretation, another challenge for the social researcher is
to estimate how representative are users in terms of the population of interest but
also how representative are the observed communicative exchanges if compared
to the entire flow of communication between people, which certainly takes
place on multiple platforms (e.g forums, Twitter, Facebook), on multiple media
(e.g. Internet, SMS, phone, face-to-face) (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012; Tufekci, 2014a)
and in multiple contexts (i.e. public and private). Indeed, ‘[m]ethodologically,
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single-platform studies can be akin to looking for our keys under the light. [...]
Sometimes, the only way to study people is to study people’ (Tufekci, 2014a,
pp. 5-6).
A related problem is the availability bias. Most of the research on online
communication concentrated on a single medium: Twitter. According to the
already cited paper by Tufekci (2014a) about half of the papers presented in 2013
at the International Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM) were solely
based on Twitter data. The reasons for the popularity of Twitter are twofold:
first, the large majority of content published on Twitter, including information
on users (e.g. location, description, friends) is public and, second, Twitter offers
an easy programmatic access to its data with very few (and mostly negligible
from a research standpoint) limitations. But, as a matter of fact, Twitter has not
only a fraction of the user base of Facebook but also less users than other social
media services such as Instagram, Pinterest and Linkedin. Recognising that in
the case of the M5S the activity of users is distributed across multiple services
and websites, this thesis is not based on user data collected from a single source
but from multiple sources, some of which although popular are not sufficiently
studied (e.g. commenting sections) because of the inherent difficulty of parsing
data from HTML pages (see Table 3.1 for details on sources and data collection
techniques).
The claim of objectivity is also problematic because when a researcher harvests
the Internet for user-generated data (expressive, transactional or relational), he or
she is rarely in a position to be able to assume absolute completeness and validity
of the data. In other words, the objectivity of methods and results are invalidated
because a bias is introduced by the non-random absence of bits of information.
For example, data used in this research include the postings (i.e. blog posts
and comments) published on beppegrillo.it between 2005 (dates of the first post)
and 2015. But nothing guarantees that all comments ever published in response
to Grillo’s own postings are actually present on the website at the time of the
data harvesting in their original form; they might have been removed or edited
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by the administrators of the website or by their respective authors. If a service
such as the Wayback machine1 of the Internet Archive allows the appearance of
popular webpages to be controlled (between October 2000 and November 2016,
beppegrillo.it was saved 1,913 times by the Wayback machine), it is impossible to
do so when the comments published are in the millions. The issue of completeness
and validity clearly applies also to all data generated within social networking
services such as Facebook, Twitter and Meetup. But a researcher should also
reflect on the fact that most user activity might actually be inaccessible because
it takes place in private sections of the service (see Margetts et al., 2015, p. 225),
because a service artificially restricts the amount of information it is willing
to share through its APIs or simply because of errors generated somewhere in
the pipeline that requests and transfers the data from the data provider to the
researcher’s database. In this sense, the biggest challenge for the digital data
researcher is that if on one side it is possible to reasonably assume that the data
are only partially complete, on the other it is not possible to quantify (or qualify)
how much is actually missing.
Another potential fallacy of the observer of online social interactions is to
assume that behavioural networks, that is, those networks derived from traces left
by the use of communication technologies, might correspond to personal networks
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; on ‘hyperlink interpretability’ see Park & Thelwall, 2005;
Freelon, 2014). Clearly, the interpretation of the value or meaning attached by
each user to his or her online actions is highly problematic, and measuring the
frequency of each connection, or the strength of the tie, does not necessarily
facilitate its interpretability (boyd & Crawford, 2012). Indeed, frequency does not
translate into importance when communication has no cost.
Boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 666) seem to link the vulnerabilities of Big Data
analysis to a more general critique raised by Latour (2010) towards the tendency
of the social sciences to consciously move in the direction of a quantification of the
discipline; or in his own words ‘to drown individual contributions into statistical
1https://archive.org/web/
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means’ (2010, p. 153). Yet Latour is not against quantification per-se—in fact, he
is quite enthusiastic about the opportunities of following digital social traces
(2010). What he criticises is the type of quantification that focuses on the aggregate
level (that is, society) instead of searching for a quantitative evaluation of the
individual.
The situation of the natural sciences, where individual variations
remain inaccessible to any direct inquiry and are far too numerous to
record, is in no way the same as for the social sciences. For human
societies, there is no reason to limit quantification to only some of the
ways of doing statistics. (Latour, 2010, p. 152)
2.4. Ethical considerations
The collection and use of this new kind of data bring new ethical considerations
into play (see boyd & Crawford, 2012). The first question concerns clearly who or
what should be treated as the owner of the data produced by users on proprietary
platforms such as Facebook but also on websites published under a creative
common licence (such as beppegrillo.it at the time of my data collection). Is
it the platform, which provided software and computing resources, or the user,
who actually created the information based on his or her persona, that owns the
data? There are few doubts that in the majority of cases, from a legal perspective,
it is the platform that owns the content with the agreement of the user (who
clearly must agree to the policies of the platform in order to use it). But from
a research ethics perspective, it is clearly the person behind the user that must
be safeguarded by the researcher. In other words, the fact that some research
practices are respectful of policies established by the legal owner of the data
(e.g. a corporation, a not-for-profit foundation, a private individual) does not
make them ethical towards those persons who are actually described by data.
In fact, from a research perspective, it is probably more correct to consider the
person behind the data as the actual owner of the data and the platform as a
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lawful administrator, as hospitals are of data produced through examinations of
patients.
Additionally, when dealing with data generated by Internet users, at least
three classes of issues that should generate reflection by the researcher might
arise. First, the concepts of public and private implying that, contrary to private
data, public data, which is defined by the fact that is publicly available online
(that is, non-password protected), can be stored and publicly discussed without
explicit consent from data producers, must be reconsidered. Second, although
users acknowledge that every interaction they perform on platforms such as
Facebook, Twitter, Meetup and Disqus (responsible for the commenting system
on the Forum of the M5S) is recorded, they also know that each action can
be edited or deleted, this implies that even assuming that a user knows what
is public and what is private, every public action must be considered only as
temporarily public. Third, aggregating data produced by different users, at different
times or on different websites can provide a high level of detail—much higher
than possibly realised by those who created the data in the first place.
These issues generated a number of ethically relevant consequences. First,
online postings should not be considered as public as, for example, readers’
letters published by a newspaper. In my opinion, they are public in the sense
that they are relevant to specific research interests, but not necessarily a public
representation of the person behind the user. Indeed, if platforms allow users
to delete at any time their postings, a researcher should not apply a different
standard and ask users to be accountable for what they posted at the time of data
collection. Moreover, exchanges taking place online are usually intended as a
reaction to something or somebody (I reply to somebody, I link something); even
if they are published on a publicly accessible section of the Internet—something
that in theory active users should acknowledge—the researcher should probably
recognise that for those involved these interactions might, in fact, represent
not a series of statements to the world but intimate exchanges among visible
participants.
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Second, by aggregating data from different sources and from different times,
the researcher necessarily breaches whatever ‘agreement to publicity’ is implied
in any individual action by the user. That is, even assuming that a user might
have implicitly accepted the scrutiny of his or her (published) actions being
scrutinised by anyone, it is much harder to argue that the same user has also
implicitly accepted the tracking of his or her behaviours across platforms and
across time. A number of studies have pointed to the possible unforeseen and
grave consequences of data aggregation. For example, Sarigol, Garcia, and
Schweitzer (2014) shows that by aggregating the complete relational data of users
of a social networking site, it was possible to infer the sexual orientation of those
who decided not to disclose it by comparing their position in the friendship
network with the position of those who decided to reveal their sexual orientation.
In this thesis, I respond to these issues by refraining from singling out postings
or any other interaction, in other words to link any individual record to a
specific user, with the only exception being the case of users who can be clearly
linked to persons of public relevance (e.g. member of the leadership of the
Movement, politicians, journalists, academics). In fact, data are mostly presented
in aggregated form and individual users are never mentioned. In my research, I
do aggregate data from different sources and I do track the behaviour of users
across time. But again, results are always presented in aggregate form—that is, I
always describe the crowd of users and not single users—and in fact, no user’s
name is ever mentioned or information data that could point to an identification
provided.
2.5. What data is used in the thesis and how
In the previous section, I highlighted important issues and potential fallacies
that must be addressed when reading Internet-generated data. Indeed, because
of these issues, the data that I use in this research are all susceptible to being
misused. In this section, I present how I address them in my approach to data
analysis. The sources of data will be presented in more detail later, but it is
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still important to briefly mention them here. Most of the analysis is conducted
on data from two sources: Grillo’s blog and the Forum of the M5S. Data from
these sources are treated in depth as transactional, relational and expressive data
in order to quantify trends and model relations among users and discussion
topics. Data from Meetup.com are treated exclusively as transactional as I am
interested in understanding the mobilisation of the M5S in quantitative terms.
Data from public Facebook pages pertaining to the Movement are treated as
transactional and expressive (but only limitedly and to validate insights from
other data sources). Data from newspapers and from the parliamentary archives
are treated as transactional data since I am interested only in the frequency of
occurrences.
Assumption of incompleteness and use of multiple sources As previously
noted, I always assume that no dataset is complete and then absolutely objective
in representing a picture of the phenomena I describe. In all the data I present,
bits are missing because they have been deleted or because I cannot access them
(see Ruths & Pfeffer, 2014). Sometimes I know what is missing (e.g. because a
group of M5S militants on Meetup.com has explicitly opted to protect information
from disclosure to non-members) and sometimes I do not (e.g. in the case of
deleted comments of Facebook posts). In my research, I confronted two types
of missing digital data: traces such as postings and likes that were removed or
altered individually by the author or by the page administrator and traces that
were removed or made inaccessible en bloc.
I argue that especially since the number of postings in the data is so large and
so diverse, they can be considered to be fairly representative of a multifaceted
debate that I assumed occurred within the Movement in the period under analysis.
2Since mid-2012 the Forum has been using Disqus as commenting system, which offers an
API.
3SPARQL is a query language to request linked data in a Resource Description Framework
(RDF) format. The web sites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Italian Parliament
both provide SPARQL endpoints to access their RDF data.
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source collection data transactional relational expressive
beppegrillo.it web scraping posts ts top, sem
beppegrillo.it web scraping comments ts
beppegrillo.it/
listeciviche/
forum
web scraping and
API requests2
comments ts net top, sem
facebook.com API requests posts ts top, sem
facebook.com API requests comments ts
facebook.com API requests likes ts
meetup.com API requests groups ts, geo
meetup.com API requests members ts, geo
meetup.com API requests events ts, geo
change.com API requests signatures ts
repubblica.it web scraping news articles ts top, sem
corriere.it web scraping news articles ts top, sem
camera.it SPARQL requests3 documents ts top, sem
senato.it SPARQL requests documents ts top, sem
ts: timeseries analysis; net: network analysis; top: topic analysis; sem: semantic analysis; geo:
geographic analysis.
Table 3.1: Sources of original primary data used in the thesis and their application
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Evidence does not suggest that postings challenging the view of the leadership of
the Movement or of Beppe Grillo himself might have systematically being deleted:
in fact, there is an abundance of them in the data I collected. This motivated me
to ignore the first type of missing data.
More problematic were the limitations imposed by privacy settings on Meetup.com
and by Meetup users who cancelled their registration, thus deleting en bloc all
their traces (registration date and participation in events). This information
cannot be treated as marginal or random because the decision of a group to
fence information off or of a user to abandon the platform might be motivated by
relevant political considerations and—crucially—not being randomly distributed
in the population. To address the problem of data completeness, I compare
insights and patterns derived from the analysis of multiple sources and from
secondary data such as surveys, polls and news media analysis.
Contextualisation Most of the digital data used in this research are thin, that is,
although they are collected on a very large scale they individually provide only
tiny bits of information. The most characteristic examples, to which the literature
as described in the previous chapter has dedicated considerable attention, are
the ‘tiny acts of political participation’ (Margetts et al., 2015) such as likes and
retweets that literally require only a click. These traces contain a very limited
amount of information: who liked what (and sometimes when). By aggregating
these thin traces, the researcher can gain interesting insights but only if the
emerging pattern is properly contextualised and triangulated with environmental
knowledge. Indeed only contextualisation can help in dealing with the absolute
lack of information on the meaning that each user attached to the action.
For example, it is clear that the action of registering a member for one of
‘meetups’ linked to the M5S might have different meanings and motivations
depending on whether it happens in 2005 (when the Movement took its first
steps) or in March 2013 just after the success in the general election. Margetts et al.
(2015) have experimentally determined that personality and social information
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(that is, information on what other people are doing) play a role in shaping
the trajectory of online political engagement and different people will engage
for different reasons at different times. Consequently, although a registration
that takes place in the early days is accounted as qualitatively identical to a
later registration, only contextualisation will provide different meanings for (and
insight into) the two acts.
The context for the analysis of any particular bit of information in the data
can be provided by secondary data but also by other primary data. In my
research, I leverage expressive data such as postings to contextualise thinner data.
For example, I often refer to the analysis of Grillo’s blogposts—both analysed
individually and in aggregate through topic modelling techniques—to provide a
context for the different phases of the political enterprise of the M5S. In this sense,
contextualisation plays a crucial role in Chapter 6 in which I assess the impact of
the discussion on the Forum of the M5S relative to the broader national debate on
a selected issue. By itself, the attention dedicated on the Forum to the issue does
not indicate whether the interest is dependent or not on the attention dedicated
to the same issue on a national level (i.e. by the media and by Parliament) and
only contextualisation can assess the direction of the vector of influence.
Variations of focal length Digital data is tight in terms of meaning but rich in
terms of granularity. Each data point from a digital dataset provides usually only
a very limited amount of information—which in fact is mostly useless without a
thick layer of contextual information—but very detailed and precise. Among a
huge crowd of users that more often than not is measured in hundred of millions
of individuals, we know exactly who is related (or ‘friend’) to whom although
we ignore the actual meaning of the relation. Because of this characteristic, the
natural way of using digital data would seem to be at the aggregate level. But
although I do conduct analyses of the data at the aggregate level, I also integrate
them by varying the focal length of analysis and reducing the angle of view to
exclude most of the data. The use of aggregation is in fact particularly problematic
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as many have identified an increase in the individualisation of behaviours—in
part also driven by the same technologies that are responsible for producing the
data. In order to focus on a more limited number of data points and map their
interactions, I leveraged two data analysis techniques (which I detail later in this
Chapter) that have been largely applied to digital data: text analysis applied to
expressive data and network analysis applied to relation data.
3. Network analysis
3.1. A research paradigm, not a theory
Social networks analysis is a structural approach to the study of different social
phenomena with applications that range from sociology to psychology, from
economics to political science. Simply, the interest of the social network analyst is
more focused on the relations among social actors—either people or groups of
people—than on the individual actors.
A key aspect of adopting a network approach to data is provided by Marin
and Wellman (2011, p. 22)
Social network analysis is neither a theory nor a methodology. Rather,
it is a perspective or a paradigm. It takes as its starting point the
premise that social life is created primarily and most importantly by
relations and the patterns they form. Unlike a theory, social network
analysis provides a way of looking at a problem, but it does not predict
what we will see. (Marin & Wellman, 2011, p. 22)
Taking social network analysis as a theory (e.g. the Earth revolves around the
Sun) that mechanistically explains social phenomena instead of an observational
tool (e.g. the telescope) is particularly troubling when applied to digital relational
data, which is available on a massive scale and can easily fit whatever model
a social network analyst might decide to adopt. That is, the observation of the
‘relation’ between two users, who happened to have commented on the same
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blogpost, per se does not explain anything, and neither does the observation that
a few users will tend to be responsible for most of the commenting and a few
postings will attract most of the comments. These are insights (that is, patterns)
provided by network analysis but their meaning and relevance strongly depend
on theory. When data are digital traces, left behind by users as they click (or tap)
around, a relation linking two actors must be assumed as neutral and it is generally
wrong to read it a priori as social affinity or closeness. Only contextualisation
can provide meaning, and only a theory can provide an explanation of why we
observe some patterns in the relation among users.
Mathematical research on network properties—to which also social scientists
have contributed—has provided social network analysis with an extremely di-
versified set of analytics and modelling techniques, which I summarise in the
next section. This necessarily introduces into any data-driven research the issue
of ‘model dependency’. As correctly pointed out by Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart
(2007), ‘[s]ome researchers surely respond to this diversity of possible models
by inadvertently choosing specifications that support their favoured hypotheses’
(p. 221). There is no doubt indeed that this is especially problematic when the
network analysis is based on data that are big in volume but thin in meaning, as
data based on digital traces usually are.
Social network analysis developed based on data collected through direct
observation by the researcher or by self-reporting of the actors making up the
social network. Relations based on transactional data (e.g. emails, tweets, social
media friendship) requires more caution and a stronger role for the theory
supporting the analysis for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, we do not
know what the relation means for the actors involved and the fact the relation
exists does not imply that both the actors involved acknowledge it. Second, if the
process of drawing a social network always implies to compress the differences
qualifying the relationships among actors—although ties can be weighted, in a
network a relation either exists or not—in social networks drawn on digital data
the level of compression, by flattening information, happens on a much larger
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scale.
3.2. The field and its toolbox
Freeman (2004, p. 3), an influential social network analyst, argues that the field
has consolidated around four defining features.
1. Social network analysis is motivated by a structural intuition
based on ties linking social actors,
2. It is grounded in systematic empirical data,
3. It draws heavily on graphic imagery, and
4. It relies on the use of mathematical and/or computational mod-
els.
That is, with a structural perspective on social interactions, social network
analysis models observational data—indeed, a large family of observational data—
into visual and mathematical representations. The building blocks of any social
network analysis are dual: nodes or vertices, which represents the set actors or
groups of actors under empirical investigation, and ties or edges, which represent
the set of relations connecting the same actors. That is, a node is connected to
other nodes only via ties.
If social network analysis has been applied in different fields and to support
different theories, the focus has always been on detecting patterns first to identify
defining characteristics of the network under observation and second to compare
it to other networks. The methodological effort of practitioners of social network
analysis has been concentrated in three areas: network measures, substructure
detection and network formation.
Network measures can either be global, describing properties and features of
the whole network, or local, describing individual network components. The
ability to measure is essential to describe the network and its parts, nevertheless
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what to measure and how do it is not trivial. The number of measures and
metrics proposed in the literature is large and growing fast. Although few basic
network statistics, which I present here, have been consolidated, the frontier
of the body of social network measures is constantly expanded by the need to
capture well-known characteristics in new ways or new characteristics as the
complexity of the network abstractions increases, such as with multidimensional
or dynamics networks.
The most basic measures are those that measures that define the size of the
networks. Unfortunately, no agreement has emerged on whether to consider the
number of ties or the number of nodes as the n of the network. Another measure
qualifying the size the network that has being proposed is the diameter of the
network, which captures the longest shortest path we can find in a network. In
network terminology, a path is a series of ties connecting a pair of nodes; if the
nodes are not directly connected by a single tie, the path will necessarily touch
on other nodes (it is, of course, possible that no path actually exists if the two
nodes belong to different components.) Of all the paths connecting two nodes, the
shortest is the path with the lowest number of ties. The longest shortest path in
a network is thus the path connecting the two most distant nodes and provides
non-trivial insights into its structure.
Most social networks, independently of their size have been observed to have
a very short longest shortest path. In a famous experiment, by asking random
participants to hand-deliver an envelope only through personal connections,
Milgram (1967) found that the median number of intermediaries who connected
any two people in the United States was only five. Although the experiment has
attracted some criticism (for example, Milgram did not account for the envelopes
that never reached their final destination), the so-called small-world property
identified in the experiment was observed in almost every social network and
mathematically modelled in an influential paper by Watts and Strogatz (1998).
If global properties of networks shape their overall structure, local properties
are helpful to describe the role of single components of the network in relation to
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other similar components. A large family of metrics tries to capture the centrality
of a node relatively to all the other nodes. The most trivial statistics of network
centrality are measured in the immediate neighbourhood of a node and is its
degree or the number of nodes to which a node is directly linked to. If the network
is directed, that is, if ties have an origin and a destination, the measure of degree
can be expressed in terms of indegree and outdegree, counting respectively the
incoming and outgoing connections to and from each node.
The degree distribution of a network has attracted substantial attention in
the literature. A property that has been often observed in social networks—and
almost systematically observed in Internet-mediated social networks—is the
property of preferential attachment (also known as the Matthew effect, from the
Gospel of Matthew in which the parable of the talents is narrated) prescribing
that important nodes will tend to attract more attention than other nodes thus
becoming exponentially more important. In a landmark paper, Barabási and
Albert (1999) describe the mathematical characteristics of what they call ‘scale-
free power-law distributions’ generated in random networks through preferential
attachment. They convincingly argue that preferential attachment is responsible
for generating similar scale-free degree distribution in many real networks,
including networks of hyperlinks. Barabási and Albert (1999, p. 510) write that
large networks self-organize into a scale-free state, a feature unpre-
dicted by all existing random network models. To explain the origin
of this scale invariance, we show that existing network models fail to
incorporate growth and preferential attachment, two key features of
real networks.
Long tail (because of their density plot) degree distributions are also found in
the Internet-mediated social network data analysed in this research. And they
raise interesting questions on social behaviours to which satisfactory answers are
yet to be found. If it is not difficult to explain why someone is more likely to
comment on to a very popular post (e.g. the post can be interesting or served
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to users in a relatively more prominent position). But less obvious is why the
volume of the activity of users, measured for example by the number of posted
comments, also tends towards a power-law distribution, with the number of users
posting n comments varying almost as the negative power of n. In other words,
if it is reasonable to assume that different users will have a different level of
involvement, it is not clear why the decay is so regular and exponential.
The degree centrality determines the ‘importance’ of a node based on the
number of its immediate connections. Nevertheless, degree centrality does not
provide any hint on the position of node relative to the broader network. And
the relative importance of an actor in a social network usually not only depend
on the number of immediate connections. In this sense other measures of node
centrality have been proposed (for a detailed description see Newman, 2010,
Chapter 7) that capture the importance of the nodes to which a node is connected
(eigenvector centrality, Katz centrality and PageRank), the average distance of a node
to each other nodes (closeness centrality) and the number of shortest paths that
transit through each node (betweenness centrality), which gives an idea of how
important a node is in connecting different regions of the network.
A property commonly found in social networks is the propensity for the
friends of someone to also being friends among themselves. The measure that
captures this local property of nodes is the clustering coefficient, which is the
proportion of the connections that are observed in a node’s neighbourhood and
the number of theoretically possible connections—which of course depends on
the number of actual neighbours. It is not difficult to imagine why a network
of social relations will tend to have a high cluster coefficient—people are driven
together by geographic constraints and by cultural and social commonalities. But
Internet-mediated social networks present the user with many fewer constraints
(physical distance does not matter) and it is possible to argue that clustering
coefficients are less effective as measures of sociality when new social ties are less
and less dependent on the structure and reach of already existing ties (see Rainie
& Wellman, 2012).
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Network substructures are groups of nodes that can for some structural reason
be set apart from the rest of the network. The interest of social network analysts in
finding communities in the network based on precise structural properties cannot
be overestimated. But the interest in community detection—possibly the most
active subfield in network science if we consider the hundreds of community
detection algorithms proposed in the literature (for a review see Fortunato, 2009)—
goes well beyond social network analysis and has, in fact, crucial applications in
almost every network analysis.
When approaching the problem of partitioning a graph there are two possible
solutions. The first solution involves simply separating nodes into cliques or com-
ponents based on whether they are connected to others or not. The second solution
instead separates nodes into communities based on specific structural properties
in the connecting patterns. If cliques and components are well-defined concepts
in network science (given a network, two network scientists will identify the
same cliques and components even if they choose to apply different algorithms)
communities are not because no natural definition exists of what a community
should be.
Network formation is the process through which the network assumes its
observed structure. The understanding of such a process passes through the
construction of a theoretical model that is able to replicate the features of interests
observed in real networks. Network modelling is a key epistemological approach
of network science and has proven to be able to provide fundamental insights
into the development of our understanding of naturally occurring networks.
A model is a randomly generated network or a random graph. It is clearly
possible to calibrate the generative process by modifying its parameters to pro-
duce specific outcomes. The most simple version of a random graph is a network
generated by specifying only three parameters: the number of ties, the number
of nodes and the probability of observing a tie between any pair of nodes. More
sophisticated models take into consideration network characteristics and vary the
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probability of observing a tie accordingly. The literature has proposed a number
of theoretical network models that are invaluable tools for network analysts.
Networks are abstract representations and difficult to interpret in the absence of
benchmarks for comparison. In this sense, theoretical network models provide
the researchers with a large family of randomly generated networks that can be
compared with the observed networks.
For example, in the networks connecting users and discussion threads (see
Chapter chapter 5) I find that both the indegree and the outdegree distributions of
users are long-tailed distributions significantly similar to those generated by the
scale-free power-law Barabási and Albert (1999) model or ‘preferential attachment’
model. Also the model proposed by Newman (2002), based on the observation
that some networks do feature assortative mixing tendencies, offers important
insight that can help to explain why I often observe in Interner-mediated social
networks the emergence of giant components of connected nodes.
Finally, in this research, I apply a family of models called Exponential random
graph models (ERGMs) (Lusher, Koskinen, & Robbins, 2013). The intuition
behind ERGMs is that every network that we observe is one realisation among all
possible realisations given the structure of the network. In its basic formulation,
an ERGM defines a set of possible networks and determines the probability of
observing each network in the set. Again, intuitively, we might assume that if we
observe a social network with n nodes and e ties and define around this network
a set of possible network realisations, the probability of randomly drawing from
this set a new network with a number of edges similar to e is higher than the
probability of drawing a network with a much lower or higher number of edges.
This, of course, is a consequence of the crucial assumption that social networks
are not random but constrained in their formation by some characteristics. In
this sense, the probability distribution over the possible network realisations acts
as a constraint that allows us to estimate the answer to precise questions on the
structure of some observed network. In the words of Newman (2010, p. 570)
the exponential random graph model enables us to answer questions
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of the type, ‘If I know certain things, A, B, and C, about a network,
what is my best estimate of some other thing D?’ For instance, if I
know the average degree of a vertex in a network, what is my best
estimate of the degree distribution? Or the clustering coefficient? The
exponential random graph gives a rigorous and principled answer to
questions of this kind.
3.3. Pre-computational network analysis
In this and the next section, I describe the historical trajectory of the development
of social network analysis. The interest is not in providing a comprehensive
review of contributions and contributors but in listing some of the building blocks
on which social network analysis stands today. A significant divide emerged in
the late 1990s when a number of natural scientists (especially physicists) added a
significant series of contributions to the field based on computational simulations
of random graphs.
Network analysis, intended as a representation of ‘shape and characterist-
ics of social structures’, has been applied as a tool for social inquiry since the
1930s (Carrington & Scott, 2011). The insight that made possible the formula-
tion of a network approach for the description of a group of individuals was
that—although relations among people were (and are) intrinsically different—it
is difficult to imagine that any two personal relations might have the exact same
meaning for the people involved, they could be simplified into a binary classifica-
tion: whether or not there is a relation. By compressing the quality of relations
into a dichotomous variable, the abstraction of a social structure represented by
points and lines (that is, people and their relations) is possible along with the
mathematical representation of the resulting structure.
The first formalisation of the concepts of sociometry and sociogram was pro-
posed by J. L. Moreno (1934), a sociologist and psychiatrist. Accordingly the
‘principal concern [of socionomy] is with the intricate interrelations of various
groups and their activities and the way in which these activities affect the welfare
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of the community’ and the ‘part of socionomy which deals with the mathematical
study of psychological properties of populations, the experimental technique of
and the results obtained by application of quantitative methods is called soci-
ometry’ (p. 10). Moreno introduced the concept of network to describe the relations
among individuals (but see also Lewin, 1936 as cited in Carrington and Scott,
2011) and its visual representation. One of the many network diagrams drawn by
Moreno is reprinted in Figure 3.1. Each node represents a child (circles are girls
and triangles are boys) and each directed line the ‘attraction’ of one towards the
other as observed by the researcher. Notably, this kind of visual representation
has persisted through the decades and is still largely used (also in this thesis).
The interest behind the representations of relations among individuals as lines
and points was the identification of patterns in the social structure and social
dynamics, which is fundamentally what still motivates social network analyses.
But social researchers, between the 1930s and the 1990s, had to rely on direct
observation and crucially interpretation or questionnaires to gather their data
(J. L. Moreno, 1934). This clearly puts limits on the size on the social networks that
they could analyse but also introduces an element of subjectivity in the analysis:
relations are determined and qualify either through an external observer or by a
participant. This points to a crucial difference between studies applying social
network analysis—and subjective relational data—before the ICTs revolution, after
which digital traces replaced data based on reported or interpreted information
as the only data source.
According to one of the early and most influential social network analysts,
sociologist Granovetter (1973), the formalisation of a structural analysis of social
networks allow researchers to link ‘micro and macro levels of sociological theory’.
Indeed, in Granovetter’s words it is easy to recognise the same aspirations
presented earlier in the chapter of those who, almost 40 years later, will call for
the development of a computational social science:
A fundamental weakness of current sociological theory is that it does
not relate micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns in any con-
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Figure 3.1: The representation of relations among children of a kindergarten as a directed network
(J. L. Moreno, 1934, p. 34).
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vincing way. [...] [H]ow interaction in small groups aggregates to form
large-scale patterns eludes us in most cases.
I will argue [...] that the analysis of processes in interpersonal networks
provides the most fruitful micro-macro bridge. In one way or another,
it is through these networks that small-scale interaction becomes
translated into large-scale patterns and that these, in turn, feed back
into small groups.
Sociometry, the precursor of network analysis, has always been curi-
ously peripheral—invisible, really—in sociological theory. This is
partly because it has usually been studied and applied only as a
branch of social psychology; it is also because of the inherent complex-
ities of precise network analysis. We have had neither the theory nor
the measurement and sampling techniques to move sociometry from
the usual small-group level to that of larger structures. (Granovetter,
1973, p. 1360)
The 1970s experienced the emergence and consolidation of a ‘networked think-
ing’ applied to different disciplines: sociology but also anthropology, economics,
psychology and political science (Freeman, Mitchell, & Ziegler, 1978). The leading
sociological journal on social network analysis, Social Networks, was created in
1979. As the interest in and volume of applications of social network analysis
increased, so did the number of methodological contributions. Social scientists
engaged with mathematics to formulate measures for important characteristics
that they were observing in networks. As network studies were making non-
trivial observations on the structural properties of social networks, the need for
appropriate measures for this characteristics increased.
The previously cited paper by Granovetter (1973) on the ‘strength of weak
ties’ identified the structural importance of interpersonal relations that can at
first appear marginal. This insight, which is counterintuitive, derives from the
observations that according to survey respondents, crucial information to find a
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new job is more likely obtained from persons with whom we do not have frequent
interactions (weak ties). And this is because weak ties are extremely important
in conveying new information since people with whom we share strong ties will
tend to be immersed in the same information as we are. Although Granovetter
does not mention it in his paper, the structural property that he observes in weak
ties is the property of betweenness. The measure of betweenness refers to the
number of shortest paths connecting each pair of nodes that transits through a
node or a tie. In this sense, a node or a tie can be extremely important if they
are essential to connect different regions (or communities) of the network. The
first formal approach to measuring the betweenness of a node is proposed by
sociologist Freeman (1977).
3.4. Computational network analysis
The publication of two of the most influential papers in network science in the late
1990s by four natural scientists (Watts & Strogatz, 1998; Barabási & Albert, 1999)
in Nature and Science can be symbolically noted as the beginning of a period of
sustained attention by computationally inclined natural scientists and computer
scientists to social network data and modelling.
Social scientists were clearly not oblivious to computers and their potential
for the study of social networks. As early as the late 1950s, J. S. Coleman and
MacRae (1960) published a paper titled ‘Electronic processing of sociometric
data for groups up to 1,000 in size’ in which they detailed a computer program
they designed to find communities in network data and in the early 1980s the
development of general purpose software for network analysis such as UCINET
(Freeman, 2004, p. 140) popularised computer modelling and analysis of social
networks. But natural scientists brought a different perspective to the field which
focused primarily on the mathematical modelling of networks.
A computational approach to network analysis was certainly made possible
by the availability of large datasets with granular details on naturally occurring
networks against which to test network models. But it was also driven by a math-
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ematical interest in unveiling structural characteristics of network abstractions
that could be applied to networks occurring in different domains (social, natural,
infrastructural) and on a very different scale (movie actors, the power grid, brain
neurones). In fact, it was (and still is) the crossdisciplinarity of the network
science (or actually its adisciplinarity) that fascinates and helps recruit intellectual
energies from the natural sciences. And it is not casual that many were physicists
by training, who cultivate a disciplinary tendency in reaching encompassing
theories, and specifically a master theory that could bring under the same set
of physical laws micro and macro behaviours. When working on networks,
social scientists were generally grounded, even in their structural abstractions of
network properties, by the weight of the elusiveness of social interactions. The
working material of physicists is instead the lightness and precision of sensor
measurements such as the output of sophisticated experimental machinery or the
log of transactions taking place on the Internet.
Although a certain scepticism has greeted the incursion of natural scientists
into somebody’s else field and resentment has grown out of the apparently
culpable ignorance of an entire body of research (see Figure 3.2), the positivity
of the contribution is difficult to underestimate. The attention dedicated by
social scientists to the findings, both theoretical and methodological, presented
by natural scientists since the late 1990s clearly demonstrates their relevance.
For example, in addition to the previously cited methodological contributions
(i.e. community detection and network formation), two other areas of research
have largely benefited from a computational approach and have pressed social
scientists to engage with similar data: social homophily (see Adamic & Glance,
2005) and social influence (see Watts & Dodds, 2007).
3.5. Application of network analysis
Network analysis is applied, as detailed in Section 4 of Chapter 5, to the relational
data collected from the Forum of the M5S, to map the discussion among users
and around threads. As discussed later in more detail, the objective is to analyse
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the interactions among users at different scales; at the level of the entire network
and at the level of subnetworks developing around specific topics and limited in
time.
First, I computed the network statistics from different typologies of networks:
a bipartite network connecting two types of nodes (users and threads) and a
direct network connecting users based on replies to other postings. By drawing
a network abstraction from the relations linking users and threads, I compare
different realisations of the two typologies of networks, specifically based on data
from the fora of the M5S and of the German Pirate Party. Second, by applying
exponential random graph models, I analyse effects and relevance of specific
networks’ features (e.g. the gender of users) in the formation of direct reply
networks. The application of network analysis is justified by the size of the
data but also by the understanding that participants in an online discussion are
inherently influenced by the behaviours of previous users and thus should be
treated as relational actors.
4. Quantitative text analysis
4.1. Two kinds of expressive data
Along with network analysis, text analysis is another bustling field on the devel-
opment frontier of computational social science. If network targets relational data,
text analysis targets users’ expressive data. Although the number of texts produced
and published on the Internet is massive, textual data is not the only expressive
data produced by users. With the advent of smart phones, the production of
visual data (i.e. pictures and videos) has dramatically increased. But if the quant-
itative researcher has a number of options to extract meaningful insights from
large corpora of texts—which I will briefly detail in this section—visual data are
almost inaccessible to a purely quantitative analysis.4. This bias due to practical
4Internet corporations such as Facebook and Google, which are a huge repository of human-
generated visual data, have been heavily investing in technologies to retrieve information from
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(in)accessibility is, of course, relevant and contributes again to challenge the
notion of data completeness of computational social science research (see Highfield
& Leaver, 2014).
In fact, images are among the most re-shared contents on social media. Social
media services centred only around the act of sharing images, such as Instagram
(bought by Facebook in 2012) and Snapchat are widely used. Images are highly
expressive and much easier to produce than text and especially so in mobility (as
of March 2016, 90% of Facebook users were mobile users, see Facebook, 2016).
Not surprisingly, Beppe Grillo and the M5S use many images and videos of a
different nature on their platforms. Visual content, whether a video of a rally or a
cartoon making fun of political opponents, are among the most shared resources
on social media networks by the sympathisers of the Movement. They make for
immediate ‘reading’ (to read a picture takes only a fraction of a second) and in
general are more accessible and entertaining than text. And they are powerful
tools to reach those who are only marginally interested in the Movement: as the
advertising industry knows well, in a crowded Facebook timeline, a catchy image
probably has a higher chance of attracting the attention of a user than a long text.
This is also confirmed by my data: without controlling for the actual con-
tent of the post or the time of posting, the median number of comments and
likes received by a Facebook post with a picture is respectively 78% and 129%
higher than for posts without an embedded picture (see Figure 3.3 for the actual
distributions).
In conclusion, although images are extremely important personal communic-
ative devices on the Internet—and actually might play a more important role then
words—we do not have yet the tools to approach their analysis in quantitative
terms. For this reason, in this thesis, I do not carry out a systematic analysis of
images. Deep-learning (see LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015) is in this sense one of the most
promising technologies. Nevertheless, its use as a research tool is not consolidated at the time of
writing for mainly two reasons: it is still far from precise and is extremely demanding in terms of
computing requirement.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of comments and likes over 21,041 posts published on Facebook on Beppe
Grillo’s public page between 2008 and 2015
images embedded in the postings and focused instead on the textual content.
Yet, it is important in recognising the importance of the visual component in the
communication of the M5S—the Movement along with a YouTube channel has
also a website dedicated to videos, La cosa channel (www.la-cosa.it)—to appreciate
the unavoidable incompleteness, although I argue extremely meaningful, of an
analysis that targets only the textual part of the communication stream.
4.2. Bag of words
Quantitative text analysis is a mature field and offers to the quantitative researcher
a well-established set of methods to code textual documents. The main reason for
the ease in quantitatively processing texts to retrieve information and hopefully
meaning (as opposed to the extreme difficulty in retrieving information and
meaning from images) is that a digital text can only be expressed through a finite
and well-defined set of symbols, the letters available on the user’s keyboard,
which are mostly combined to form tokens (words) from a finite set (the diction-
ary). In this sense, users have already provided a form of ‘coding’ by adopting
strict linguistic standards.
This has two important consequences for the researcher. First, tokens (that
is, words) provide an elementary unit of analysis that is countable—and then
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easily quantifiable—without any additional layer of coding. Second, because
the meaning of words can be assumed to be independent of those who actually
typed them, I can equate tokens that are made of the same letters every time they
are produced by people sharing a common language. That is, although certainly
the meaning of a word is not totally context independent and different words
sometimes have the same spelling (homonyms), any two people talking the same
language will necessarily need to adopt the same dictionary, in which tokens
are almost univocally mapped to words and then to meanings. Of course, the
fact that the correspondence of token to meaning is mostly—but not always—a
one-to-one relation is the single most relevant limitation of any frequency based
approach to text analysis.
The assumption that a token will maintain the same relation to meaning
(or meanings) when used multiple times, either by the same user or by more
users, is on the basis of the majority of quantitative methods for text analysis.
From this assumption derives one of the foundational ideas of most of the
methods to retrieve information from text: the inverted index. Given a corpus of
n documents, a corpus being everything from a series of tweets to the collection
of Shakespeare’s plays, information on the content of documents and on the
corpus can be represented by a dictionary of tokens, each mapped to indices
representing the document in which the tokens appear. In this way, the position
of the token within a sentence and within a document—something that is clearly
important to convey meaning—is sacrificed in favour of a compact representation
of information—an unordered ‘bag of words’—which can be easily processed by
a simple information retrieval algorithm responding to queries such as: which
documents contain the token ‘cat’?
A reverse index allows one to assign to each document in a corpus a binary
value for each token in the dictionary; a document can either contain a token or
not. Although the reverse index is extremely simple in its implementation it is
largely applied as a social research tool. For example, a number of studies have
used it to retrieve documents from large corpora of news articles (see Boykoff,
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2007) or tweets (see O’Connor, Balasubramanyan, Routledge, & Smith, 2010) with
the aim of estimating the dynamics of attention dedicated to some topic defined
by one or more search terms. In the cited studies, the researcher determined that
a newspaper article was about climate change if (and only if) it contained the
ordered sequence of tokens climate change or global warming while a tweet
about the 2008 US presidential election if (and only if) contained the tokens
obama or mccain. Incidentally, as in most of the cases with digital content that
is proprietary, the two studies did not have direct access to the entire corpora
of interest (all articles and all tweets ever published) and had to rely on search
engines (respectively owned by Lexis Nexis and Twitter) and their reverse indices
to search and extract matching articles and tweets.
Although the reverse index approach is intuitively effective in navigating large
corpora, it also has evident limitations due to the fact that the importance of
words within a document (in relative or absolute terms) is not assessed. That
is an article of 500 words that mentioned global warming once is equated to an
article of the same length that mentioned the same term more frequently. To
address this problem, it is common to adopt a term frequency (tf) approach which
adds to the inverse index, mapping tokens to documents, information on the
frequency of each token in each document. Information on the term frequency
is generally displayed in the form of a bidimensional matrix, where every term
found in the corpus is represented by a row (or a column), each document of
the corpus is represented as a column (or row) and entries of the matrix indicate
a value representing the frequency of the each term in each document. The
term frequency does not necessarily need to be represented as the number of
occurrences of the term. In some cases, especially if documents varies in length,
it might be advisable to weight the frequency of a term. In this sense, there are
different ways to proceed (for a more extensive introduction to the topic see
Manning, Raghavan, & Schütze, 2008).
The most elementary approach is to weight a term based on the length of the
document that contains it so as to have a relative frequency because intuitively
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as we add words to a document, the relative importance of each instance of a
particular token decreases. But a second approach is to weight terms based on the
number of documents in which they appear within the entire corpus (document
frequency). This responds to the intuition that terms that appear in only one
document are probably more relevant in describing that document than terms that
appear in every document (then the name of inverse document frequency or idf5).
The resulting weighing formula, which is one of the most popular, is then named
term frequency - inverse document frequency or tf-idf.
The term frequency approach to text analysis has the advantage of reducing each
document to a vector of frequencies (weighted or not) with a length corresponding
to the number of terms in the dictionary of interest. As noted, these vectors
are bound together to reproduce the term-document (or document-term) matrix
of the corpus. In other words, each document can be represented as a vector
(a document vector) within a common vector space. This representation allows
comparing documents that are mapped into the same vector space by calculating
the dot product (the sum of the pair multiplication of the two vector entries) of
their respective vectors. Two documents with a high number of terms in common
will tend to have a high dot product. But the dot products alone will not be able
to identify similar documents if they vary considerably in length because ‘the
relative distributions of terms may be identical in the two documents, but the
absolute term frequencies of one may be far larger’ (Manning et al., 2008, p. 111).
A commonly applied approach is then to normalise for the difference in lengths
of two documents by dividing the dot product by the product of the Euclidean
lengths of the two vectors6. The resulting equation is referred to as the cosine
similarity.
5Because, as observed by Zipf as early as 1935, the frequency of use of words is nonlinear the
common equation to calculate the inverse document frequency weight for a term t is l log Nd ft ,
where N is the number of documents in the corpus and d ft is the number of documents containing
the term t.
6The Euclidean length of a vector ~V of N components is calculated with
√
∑ Ni=1~V
2
i
123
Chapter 3. Methods and challenges for a new kind of data
4.3. Topic analysis
Term frequency and the different approaches to weighting allows one to efficiently
and effectively compress information of documents and corpus, offering a tool
to find documents that match a specified pattern of search terms or to rank each
pair of documents in a corpus according to their (cosine) similarity. But term
frequency in itself is not an analytical tool, that is, it does not really allow one
to infer from the underlying textual data but is, in fact, an exercise of summary
statistics.
An interesting research and analytical problem when confronting a large
corpus of documents is to classify the documents according to their content. With
the massification of Internet technologies and the consequent explosion in the
volume of textual data constantly produced by users, the interest in automatic
classification of texts cannot be overstated. Especially in the last decade, the
NLP literature has produced an enormous number of methods of classifying
documents according to topics (and more recently also to sentiments, which
possibly has more immediate commercial applications).
In general, the problem of topic classification can be approached in two
different ways: through supervised or unsupervised classification. Supervised
classification implies that a random sample of documents is manually classified by
the researcher to then train a classification algorithm. Unsupervised classification
instead does not involve any manual labelling and generally the only necessary
parameter that is required by the classification algorithm is the number of topics
to be identified.
Possibly the simplest supervised classification method applies a probabilistic
approach. Intuitively, given the term frequency encountered in the training set,
we can estimate the probability of finding each term in one of the classes that we
have manually defined. For example, if we classify the documents in the training
set into two classes (e.g. ‘environment’ and ‘party politics’) which we assume to
represent the totality of documents in the corpus, we can estimate the probability
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of observing a term (e.g. ‘pollution’) in each of the two classes. That is, again
assuming each document can only belong to one of the two classes after the model
has been trained each term will be assigned the expected probability to find it in
one class (and consequently not in the other). The statistical classification of the
corpus will then proceed by assessing the overall probability of each document
of belonging to one of the two classes based on the individual probability of the
terms that composed it.
The unsupervised approach is especially interesting if we do not know what
topics might be contained in the corpus. Classification algorithms will take care
of clustering documents into classes or alternatively to assign to each document
a probability of its belonging to any of the underlying classes. An example of
partially unsupervised classification is the popular latent Dirichlet allocation
algorithm (LDA, Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003, For a more detailed description on
LDA see Section 3.2 in Chapter 5). LDA describes each document by a vector of
probabilities, with each entry of the vector corresponding to one of the topics.
In this sense, a topic is conceptualised as a distribution of words—that is, as a
function generating words based on specific probabilities—and the LDA algorithm
defines a function for each topic through a series of iterations of the documents of
the corpus. In addition, assigning to each document a vector of topic-probabilities,
LDA also assigns to each topic a vector of word-probabilities. And intuitively the
words that are most likely to be found in one topic can be used by the researcher
to understand the meaning of the topic (if any) and then to label it.
The main limitation of the LDA approach is that topics are not semantically
defined and they are only probabilistically determined based on the terms that
appear in the corpus. In this sense, topics generated by LDA can be totally
meaningless. For this reason, I also apply in this thesis an approach to topic
analysis that leverages a dictionary of concepts that are compared to documents
from my data. The explicit semantic analysis (Gabrilovich & Markovitch, 2007)
I carry out in Chapter 6, assumes the existence of a concept space in which
each of the documents under analysis can be located. Indeed, the dictionary of
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concepts is a corpus where each document represents a concept. To construct
the dictionary I use selected articles of Wikipedia. In this sense, each article
represents a concept assuming that—because of the encyclopaedic aspirations
of Wikipedia—articles describe something. By comparing the term frequency
of articles (concepts) with the term frequency of documents, I can obtain for
each concept-document pair a weight that can be represented as a concept matrix
with documents as rows (or columns) and concepts as columns (or rows). The
semantic analysis allows me not only to identify the most important concepts
(which in this case are meaningful Wikipedia articles) for each document but also
to measure, within the concept space, the (cosine) distance separating each pair
of documents.
4.4. Application of text analysis
Textual—that is, expressive—data is one of the main primary sources of this
research. Text analysis is applied throughout the thesis to measure the frequency
of use of specific words or set of words. In Sections 4.3 and 5.1 of Chapter 4, I
conduct a frequency analysis of news articles to assess the attention dedicated
by news outlets to Grillo in 2013, relative to the attention dedicated in 1994 to
Berlusconi, based on the occurrence in the articles of their respective names. The
analysis was conducted based on results returned by the search engine of the two
major Italian newspapers and the weekly frequency of hits normalised for the
number of hits returned by searching for the word ‘politics’.
In Chapter 5, I code documents based on specific set of terms (or dictionaries)
to track the evolution in time, on the Forum and on Grillo’s blog, of the four
issues (GMI, immigration, common currency and confidence vote after the 2013
general election) that will be the subjects of subsequent network, topic and
semantic analysis. Analogously, in Section 3 of Chapter 6, I analyse the evolution
of attention for the GMI issue by searching news articles and parliamentary
documents against the same dictionary used in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, I conduct
an LDA topic analysis of all the posts published by Beppe Grillo between 2005
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and 2015 and of a random selection of 50,000 postings published on the Forum
over the same period. In Chapter 6, I conduct a semantic analysis of postings
from the blog, the Forum and of parliamentary documents to understand the
evolution of the framing of the debate on GMI.
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Chapter 4
(Self)organising mobilisation and
participation
Se qui pensiamo che Facebook è la città non
abbiamo capito un cazzo né della città né di
Facebook
Matteo Orfini
La libertà non è star sopra un albero
non è neanche avere un’opinione
la libertà non è uno spazio libero
libertà è partecipazione
Giorgio Gaber
In line with a broad European trend and in parallel with the weakening of
mass parties, the number of Italians who declare a strong attachment to a specific
party has declined from 46% in 1978 to 39% in 2014 (Della Porta, 2015a, p. 91).
Nevertheless, this trend did not translate into the recurrent emergence of new
strong parties, at least not explicitly linked to the tradition of some previous
party, which remain to this day a rare event. After 1948 only two (genuinely)
new parties obtained more than 20% of the national vote in a general election,
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Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 1994 and Beppe Grillo’s M5S in 2013. Similarities
between the two political experiences have been identified in the literature and
can be summarised in the presence of a charismatic leader (Pasquino, 2014),
a political crisis fuelled by economic malaise and political scandals (Giugni &
Lazar, 2013) and the expert exploitation of media consumption patterns (D’Arma,
2015). The role of the new media in the political enterprise of Beppe Grillo and its
interplay with what is usually referred to as the legacy media (mainly television
and newspapers) is the focus of this chapter.
The literature analysing the rise of the M5S is generally cautious in weighting
the net effect of the Internet in the 2013 electoral results. If the Internet has
significantly changed the media diet of Italians, Italy still remains a ‘TV-centric
country’ (Norris, 2000) where the large majority of voters (70.9% according to the
electoral survey conducted in 2013, see Associazione Itanes, 2013) still looks at
television as the primary source of information. In fact, the prevalent view is that
the effect of the use of new media in the success of the M5S is mostly indirect.
According to Diamanti (2014), one of the most distinguished students of Italian
politics, Grillo, through his blog posts and Internet videos ‘has succeeded [...] in
being visible and making news even without being directly present’. In a similar
vein D’Arma (2015, p. 109, but see also Cepernich, 2014) writes that ‘Grillo the
showman has proved highly skilled at gaining indirect visibility on mainstream
media, creating media events and using provocative language feeding the media’s
quest for audience-catching stories.’
And yet the attention dedicated by the legacy media before the election of 2013
to Beppe Grillo and the M5S is significantly lower than the attention dedicated to
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 1994, and even to other major parties in 2013. In other
words, based on the archive of the two major Italian newspapers and the air time
dedicated to parties and their leadership in the 1994 and 2013 election by the
major TV channels, I argue that if the role of the legacy media is as relevant in
moving votes towards newcomers as it was in 1994 it is difficult to explain how
the M5S scored so well even when receiving so little attention.
130
Francesco Bailo
Based on the data I present in this chapter, I argue that the advent of new
media and their use as political tools has dramatically complicated how political
information actually reaches citizens. If broad access to legacy media probably
had been a survival issue for parties—evinced by the fact that two laws, in 1993
and 2000, were enacted to guarantee equal access to airtime—the election of 2013
demonstrated that traditional media is now a less relevant explanatory variable
for electoral outcomes than argued in the literature.
In this chapter, I provide an introduction to the political trajectory of Beppe
Grillo, from his blog to mass mobilisation and the creation of the Five Star
Movement (M5S). The interest in this political experience is dual. First, the
mobilisation effort of the M5S was unprecedented because of the absence of
organisational and financial resources to sustain the campaign and because of the
outsourcing of crucial movement and party organisational functions to Internet
services (communicating, publishing, mobilising, campaigning, participating
and—at least aspirationally—deliberating and governing). Second, the use of
Internet services by millions (sympathisers, voters, activists but also opposers,
interested citizens and trolls) left behind a vast array of digital traces that can
inform the macro analysis of collective behaviours and the micro analysis of
individual attitudes towards political participation.
In the first section, I introduce the reader to the enterprise of Grillo and
offer an analysis of its historical and political meaning in the Italian context.
In the second section I provide an analysis of secondary data on the political
identities of the Movement’s (online and onsite) activists and voters and then
test the association between votes obtained by the M5S, participation through
Meetup.com and activities on local Facebook pages linked to the Movement. In
the third section I present the evolution and the different components (which I
call platforms) of the media system orbiting around Grillo’s blog. In the fourth
section, I present the data on legacy media attention to parties in 1994 and 2013.
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1. Beppe Grillo’s political enterprise
January 2005 Beppe Grillo publishes his first post on beppegrillo.it.
June 2005 First meetup is created in Milan.
July 2005 Grillo invites his people to use Meetup to organise onsite meetings.
January 2007 Grillo discusses for the first time the possibility of participating in
municipal elections.
September 2007 Grillo organises through his blog the first V-Day in different
Italian cities.
January 2008 A page on beppegrillo.it is created to coordinate the organisation
of municipal lists for the upcoming elections.
April 2008 The movement participates for the first time in elections with 22
municipal lists ‘certified’ by the beppegrillo.it.
October 2009 The ‘Five Star National Movement’ is officially created following
the first national meeting of municipal lists early the same year.
March 2010 The M5S competes, for the first time with its symbol and name, in
five out of 13 regional elections obtaining about 3.5% of the popular vote.
May 2012 The M5S participates in 20 out of 27 municipal elections organised
in major cities, obtaining about 8.9% of the popular vote and winning the
mayorship of Parma.
February 2013 The M5S obtains a surprising 25% in the general election, about
the same percentage of the party with the most votes, the Democratic party.
May 2014 The M5S obtains 21% of the votes in the election for the European
parliament.
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1.1. Blog
The origin of the M5S has to be traced back to Beppe Grillo’s bursting onto the
Italian media landscape in 2005 as an influential blogger and political activist.
Before starting his blog (www.beppegrillo.it) in January 2005,1 Beppe Grillo
worked as stand-up comedian on television for about twenty years, up to 1993,
then moving to organise his shows in theatres and sport arenas. In December
1993 in an interview with the newspaper la Repubblica, days before his very last
show was broadcasted on television and 12 years before launching his blog, Grillo
declared that he was not just doing ‘satire’, but ‘I do politics, in the sense that I
talk about human relations, about the relationship that we all have with the rest
of the world’ (Fumarola, 1993).
The decision of creating a blog—Grillo never hid his suspicion of towards
new technologies and on a few occasions actually smashed a computer on stage
with a sledgehammer—followed Grillo’s encounter with new media entrepreneur
Gianroberto Casaleggio, who approached Grillo in 2004. Casaleggio’s character is
important in picturing the drivers that resulted in the creation of a new medium
of communication from Grillo to the public, a medium that nevertheless only a
fraction of the public could access at the time. In 2004 the weight of the Internet
in the media diet of Italian was relatively low: only between 9 and 11 percent
of Italians used the Internet every day and only about 1 in four at least once a
week (Istat, 2014a, 2014c). At the beginning of the same year, Casaleggio had
created a consulting company (‘Casaleggio Associati’) specialised in new media
strategies. Grillo’s blog was a product of the association between Grillo and
Casaleggio, who would both later co-found the M5S. The creation of the blog
was in line with the vision of Casaleggio for the future of information described
1Although the domain was registered in 2001 (Italian registry of dot it domains, 2014) the
Internet Archive Wayback Machine indicated that the first posting on the site appeared only on 29
January 2005 (Internet Archive, 2015). This is confirmed by the blog’s own archive which records
the first sign of activity on 16 January 2005 (Grillo, 2005e) and the first proper post on 28 January
2005 (Grillo, 2005c)
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in a YouTube video titled ‘Prometheus - the media revolution’ published by his
company in 2007 (‘Prometeus - La Rivoluzione dei media’, 2007). In the video,
which provides a chronological description of future events following the ‘media
revolution’ and the advent of the Internet, is explained in English that ‘blogs
[will] become more influential than the old media [and] the concept of static
information, books, articles, images, [will] change and transform into knowledge
flow’. This ‘revolution’ will also change the way contents can be monetised
since ‘[a]dvertisement [will be] chosen by the content creators, by the authors
themselves, and become information, comparison, experience’. After creating
a blog, Casaleggio and his company would also be in charge of developing all
the communication strategies of the movement that would rise out of it. In fact,
as detailed in the next section, the blog quickly become a gateway to a wider
media system mostly curated by Casaleggio Associati. According to Casaleggio’s
strategic vision Grillo would have played the role of the ‘influencer’—a term often
used by Casaleggio—steering the attention of his readership to selected news
that he would create or integrate mashing together different news sources; in
Casaleggio’s own words ‘when we access the Net to obtain information, we access
an information that usually is integrated by the influencer or created directly by
the influencer’ (see Orsatti, 2010).
1.2. Meetup
Grillo’s activity as blogger quickly acquired a movement dimension by touching
ground in cities throughout Italy thanks to the social networking website Meetup.
com, which facilitates organising real-world face-to-face meetings. The first group,
created to debate the issues and topics blogged by Grillo, was established in
Milan in June 2005 (only five months after the first blog post), in July Meetup
groups were created in other nine major cities and by the end of the year 37
groups had been created across the country (see Figure 4.1).2 Importantly Meetup
2Data collected through Meetup API (http://api.meetup.com) in March 2015. The groups
related to Beppe Grillo and the M5S were identified through an API request of type /find/groups
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was not spontaneously adopted by blog’s readers as a mobilisation tool, but
openly advocated by Grillo himself. On 16 July 2005 Grillo posted on his blog:
I thought about how to give all my blog followers the opportunity
to meet to discuss, take the initiative, see each other in person. To
transform a virtual discussion into an opportunity to change. I discussed
with my collaborators and I decided to use MeetUp. MeetUp is a site
that allows organising in a simple way meetings among people interested
in a topic. [...] I will try to meet with the groups around the country during
my tour and every time I participate in an event. I don’t promise
anything, but I will do my best. Let’s try it. (Emphasis of the author,
Grillo, 2005h)
Meetup.com was first adopted as political mobilisation tool by the Howard
Dean US presidential campaign in 2003 and is identified as one of the key
elements in Dean’s rise in popularity. According to David Karpf ‘[t]he Howard
Dean presidential campaign was a watershed moment for the Internet and
American politics. Throughout 2003, the former Vermont governor’s insurgent
“Internet candidacy” attracted nationwide attention, fuelled by an outpouring of
volunteer support at local Meetups around the country and record-setting online
fundraising’ 2012, p. 77. The Meetup-mediated mobilisation allowed Dean’s
campaign to quickly translate political enthusiasm into palpable action on an
unprecedented scale but in the end, did not translate into votes. Casaleggio was
familiar with Dean’s presidential campaign. In a video published by Casaleggio
Associati in 2008 and titled ‘Gaia - The future of politics’ (‘Gaia - The future
of politics’, 2008), the role of Meetup.com in Dean’s campaign is described as
crucial ‘to create a worldwide network of supporters’. It is then reasonable to
assume that Casaleggio had an important role in suggesting to the movement the
adoption of Meetup.com.
with the following parameters: category=13 (for ‘Movements and Politics’), country=IT,
radius=global, text=beppe+grillo.
135
(a) Meetup groups connected to Beppe Grillo and the M5S
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Figure 4.1: Development of Meetup groups and membership
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In a second blog post published a week later, in the first call to mobilisation,
Grillo—acknowledging having received questions on what the groups should do
in practice—keeps a vague profile but interestingly also avoids setting scope and
purpose limits for the network of local groups then starting to emerge. He writes
Dear Bloggers [he refers to his readers as ‘bloggers’], it has been a
week since my post on Meetup. Since then many groups have been
created, also out of Italy. [...] I was asked what these groups should
initially do. Have fun, stay together and share ideas and proposals
for a better world, beginning from [your] own city. And discuss and
share, if you believe, my posts (Grillo, 2005i).
The data that is made publicly available by Meetup.com on the groups and
members linked to the Beppe Grillo and the M5S allow following in detail the
growth in groups, membership and meetings organised across Italy. Importantly
Meetup.com public data was collected in June 2015 and includes only groups
and members still registered with the service on that date. That is, groups and
members that cancelled their profiles from the Meetup.com at any point between
2005 and 2015 are not accounted for.
As evident in Figure 4.1, between 2005 and 2015 the pace of growth of the
movement changed significantly after three major public events: the V-Day in
2007, the local elections in 2012 and the general election in 2013. To have a sense
of the change in the growth rates it is useful to compare the average number of
people who registered for the first time with one of the groups linked to Grillo or
the M5S every day in the four periods separated by the three events. Based on
the data before the V-Day an average of 7.8 people registered every day with one
of the groups and 11.7 between the V-Day and the local elections in 2012. After
the local elections of 2012, membership of groups increased dramatically with
an average of 57 new people every day—that is, almost five times the growth
rate of the previous period—although not linearly, since during 30 days before
the general election, the growth more than doubled with an average of 125 new
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people per day. But it is immediately after the unexpected success in the polls
when the membership grew faster: in the 30 days after the election 357 people
registered on average every day. In the final period between the general election
in 2013 and the European Parliament election in 2014, membership grew on
average by 76 people per day. In absolute terms, if between July 2005 and May
2012 the movement mobilised 30,000 people, it then took less than 24 months
to mobilise an additional 60,000. As of June 2015 91,785 people were registered
with M5S-related groups, which is only slightly higher than the figure of 87,656
members officially registered with the Movement (Grillo, 2014).3
1.3. V-Day
The Vaffanculo Day or V-Day—‘vaffanculo’, literally ‘fuck off’, was addressed
quite indiscriminately to the entire political class—is the first public appearance
of Grillo’s movement and is symbolically organised on 8 September 2007. On
his blog, Grillo explicitly recalls the ‘atmosphere’ of 8 September 1943 when the
Italian government, after abandoning Rome, signed an armistice with the Allies
and threw the country into chaos.
Politics smells the storm that is coming. They are preparing. Italy had
its chance to change in 1992. It failed. Lobbies, criminal gangs, mafias
have won. The second republic [born out of 1992 corruption scandals]
died in the cradle. After mafia bombings every where in Italy and the
assassination of Falcone and Borsellino [two anti-Mafia judges] it’s all
over. [...] Italy is a pressure cooker, and if this time explodes it will
bring down everybody. Possibly also the Nation. [...] The V-Day is
going to be a day of information and popular participation. (Grillo,
2007d)
Grillo—who was, of course, a show man—would repeatedly use a theatrical
3Becoming member of a Meetup did not require any formal approval or consent while
membership to the M5S had to be approved by the staff of the Movement
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(but also biblical) tone in his analysis, and posit his movement against a society
that was collapsing economically, culturally and morally. The V-Day was formally
launched to collect signatures for a citizen’s initiative proposing to prevent anyone
with a criminal record from accessing Parliament, to limit how many times any
MP could be reelected and to reintroduce the possibility of expressing a vote of
preference on the ballot. The law proposal was short (5 articles) but symbolically
targeted towards the political establishment or—to use the terminology popular-
ised by an extremely successful book of investigative journalism published the
same year— the ‘caste’ (Rizzo & Stella, 2007). It touched on two crucial themes
that would have accompanied the development of the M5S: popular democracy
and public morality.
The Internet was the main mobilisation, organisational and informational tool
for the V-Day. A website (‘8 settembre 2007’, 2007) allowed registration for the
event (and according to the same website 243,190 users did), to obtain logistical
information on how to follow the event (online, on TV and in person), to obtain
information on the citizens’ initiative, to donate and finally to ‘share’ the event
by downloading its logo or—quite interestingly—by embedding with few lines
of HTML code the logo (and a link to the beppegrillo.it) into a blog or websites.
The success of the V-Day surpassed every expectation—about 350,000 sig-
natures were collected—and put the Grillo’s anonymous movement on Italy’s
political map for the first time. As I describe in the next section, it attracted signi-
ficant media attention, it signalled the relevance in the public opinion of the issue
of criminal records of MPs (in 2012, after more two years of debate, Parliament
finally approved a law banning MPs with criminal convictions from office), but
also directly triggered the process that would transform a movement into the
Five Star Movement and convince its supporters to participate in elections.
1.4. Municipal lists
The first mention of the possibility of participating to elections was mentioned
on the blog in January 2007 (Grillo, 2007a) in a post titled ‘5 stars Municipal-
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ities’, which incidentally was also the first formalisation of the ‘5 stars’ of the
movement—‘A star for [renewable] energy, a star for [Internet] connectivity, a
star for [public] water, a star for waste management, a star for social services’.
Grillo wrote on his blog inviting his followers to ‘propose a municipal list in
every municipality. [...] Do not permit that a single decision is taken without
consulting you’. The tool of municipal (or civic) electoral lists, which are common
in Italian local elections, was clearly suggested to stress the neutrality of the lists
from any national party. In a later post, Grillo wrote
Last year I proposed to limit to two the number of electoral mandates,
to ban the election of convicts, to allow a citizen to vote for a person
and not a party [the same proposals that the movement would put
forward in the V-Day]. Proposals that move politics closer to reality.
That allow to a change the blood in Parliament. Now I don’t believe
this anymore. I don’t think it is possible to scratch this class, the
only true class in Italy, with a referendum or a law proposal. A self-
referential corporation that doesn’t want to lose any of its privileges.
The only possibility is to isolate them, to empty it of any meaning,
taking control of local realities. A step at a time. Replacing parties
with movements and civic lists. (Grillo, 2007c)
If the idea of directly entering the electoral arena—although only at local
level—was first considered by Grillo in January 2007, it is only after the success of
the V-Day that the idea turns operational. The V-Day took place on 8 September
2007. On 10 October 2007 Grillo published on his blog the first in a series of
posts dedicated to the organisation of municipal lists: ‘I spent the last two weeks
with lawyers to get something of these civic lists. [...] Civic lists, the virus of
participatory democracy, are a great possibility to reform, maybe refund, the Nation.
I already wrote, and I restate it, that I don’t mean to create political parties. My
commitment in the next months will be to promote through my blog and with
a symbol civic lists that will have the requirements that I state along with the
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commitments that will need to make [emphasis of the author]’ (Grillo, 2007b).
Grillo outsourced to the militants the responsibility of creating these lists; his role
will be to act as guarantor of the movement. In this way, the movement is not
required to set up the heavy organisational and bureaucratic infrastructure of
a national party, nor to open a headquarters or branches. This was a practical
solution since Grillo did not have the resources to do this, as much as a a symbolic
one to maintain a clear distance between we, the people and they, the old parties.
In January 2008 Grillo announced on his blog that a page dedicated to the
organisation of the civic lists had been created. The page (‘Liste civiche - Per
un Nuovo Rinascimento’, 2008) allowed to create, certify and search for existing
lists. To support the creation of the list, the page provided detailed information
on the forms needed, the number of signatures required and where to file
the documentation. Once created a list could request a certification from the
blog—that is, the blog was the certifying agency, not the Movement. Interestingly,
requirements for the certification, which would have resulted in being listed on
the blog, were not the endorsement of a specific program that at the time had
not yet been formulated (on the contract to be signed by the candidate there was
no mention of any policy to which the candidate would commit) but only the
absence of criminal convictions and not being a member of any ‘party or political
movement’.
The local elections of April 2008 took place on the same day as the general
election. This contemporaneity played well into the rhetoric of Grillo; since the
movement did not compete in the national election, Grillo could again stress the
novelty of the enterprise and its distance from the old. ‘There is no difference
between PD and PDL [the two main parties running in the election]. The election
on 13 and 14 April doesn’t exist. It’s choreography. [...] Not voting for the
general election is the response to this regime. It is the last democratic weapon
left’ (Grillo, 2008). Instead, Grillo invited to people to vote for the lists certified
by the blog, indicating the name of Sonia Alfano for President of the Sicilian
Region, who would obtain 46,396 votes (1.72%), and Serenetta Monti for Mayor of
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Rome, who would obtain more than 40,389 votes (2.64%). In total, the movement
presented its lists in 22 municipal elections and 1 regional election, obtaining in
the major electoral competitions about 2% of the votes. Only one candidate was
elected into office, David Borrelli elected with 4% of the votes to the city council
of Treviso (Veneto).
1.5. To the Five Star Movement
In 2009 the movement, which so far had been a loose network of Meetups (131 in
January 2009) and Civic Lists kept together by Grillo’s certifying agency, gave
itself a program, a symbol and finally a name. In January 2009 Grillo wrote on his
blog that the movement’s objective was ‘to arrive at the meeting of 8 March [2009]
in Florence with a Program of Reference and an extract in the form of a manifesto:
“the Chart of Florence”’ (Grillo, 2009a). The program would be developed in
five thematic areas ‘the Five Stars [...]: Water, Energy, Development, Environment,
Transportation [emphasis of the author]’. Importantly Grillo explicitly asserted the
participatory contribution of the crowd of readers and militants in developing
the program, in the same blog post where he mentioned for the first time the
intention of formalising the movement’s program, beginning with
In 2006 [this] blog collected your suggestions for a new develop-
ment model for the Nation through the ‘Citizens’ Primaries’. Tens of
thousands of people participated. Proposals were summarised in a
document that I presented to our former-employee Prodi [Grillo often
referred to politicians as ‘our employees’], at the time Prime Minister.
The document of the ‘Citizens’ Primaries’ is from many points of view
still relevant and can be the starting point for a discussion open to the
Five Star Municipalities [the Civic Lists]
With this introduction, Grillo seemed to imply that whatever program the
movement should adopt in Florence, its political legitimacy would have come
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from the multitude of ‘tens of thousands’ of online commenters who contributed
to determining its shape.
The first national meeting of the movement took place in Florence in March
2009 in the presence of Beppe Grillo. According to Grillo’s blog, seven meetups
and 15 Civic Lists participated to the meeting (Grillo, 2009c). The meeting ratified
the Chart of Florence, an agenda with 12 policy proposals for cities’ administrators
(Grillo still had not considered explicitly the possibility of running in national
elections). Eight of the twelve points were related to environmental issues (water,
waste management, urban parks, solar panels, public transportation).
The foundation of the ‘Five Star National Movement’ is announced on the
blog in September of the same year (Grillo, 2009b). Grillo justified his decision
to create a national movement by citing the unresponsiveness of the political
establishment to the proposals developed within the movement and supported
by ‘hundred of thousands of signatures’.
Two formal reform proposals had been produced by the movement so far;
the first, launched during the 2007 V-Day, regulating the election to Parliament,
and the second, with signatures collected during the second V-Day in 2008, to
reform the rules regulating news media. The two proposals used the only two
institutions of direct democracy designed by the 1948 Italian Constitution: the
citizens’ legislation initiative (‘The people may initiate legislation by proposing
a bill [...] signed by at least fifty-thousand voters’, ‘Constitution of the Italian
Republic’, 1948, Art. 71) and the abrogative referendum4 (‘A general referendum
may be held to repeal, in whole or in part, a law [...] when so requested by five
hundred thousand voters’, ‘Constitution of the Italian Republic’, 1948, Art. 74).
It could be argued whether the citizens’ initiative defined by the Italian Con-
stitution is truly an instrument of direct democracy—or ‘direct legislation’ as
defined by G. Smith (2009, Chapter 4)—since its output is not binding (while the
result of the referendum is): although Parliament must discuss it, it has no oblig-
ation to vote it into law. Indeed, if the institution of abrogative referendum has
4A confirmative referendum is defined by the Constitution only for constitutional laws.
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been used for important deliberations in the history of the Italian republic—most
notably in support of divorce in 1974, abortion in 1981 and to oppose production
of nuclear energy—the institution of the citizens’ initiative has been virtually
non-consequential, with only a small fraction of initiatives being converted into
law.5
For Grillo, representative democracy, and especially the institution of parties,
had failed citizens. Symbolically the first political battles of his movement were
fought with the instruments of direct democracy. If the movement had supported
electoral lists, it did so only in local elections, where the distance between voters
and elected is at a minimum. In the blog post announcing the creation of the M5S,
Grillo was careful in stressing, first, that the creation of a national movement
was a direct consequence of the inattentiveness towards people’s initiatives
(‘thousands of people’ and ‘hundreds of thousands of signatures’) formulated
with the instruments of direct democracy and, second, that he was not creating a
party:
Parties are dead, I don’t want to found a ‘party’, an apparatus, a
structure of intermediation, but create a Movement with a program.
Those who subscribe to the program can present themselves to voters
and ask for their vote. So it happened with Luigi De Magistris and
Sonia Alfano [candidates of the party Italy of Values], elected by the
Net, voted en mass by the Net, who speak and will speak to their
voters, in a direct way, through the Net (Grillo, 2009b).
The founding event of the Movement took place in a theatre in Florence in
October 2009. During the event, Grillo presented the symbol of the Movement—
which included, possibly an unicum for a national political movement, the Internet
5Of the 88 citizens’ initiatives in the database of Chamber of Deputies (dati.camera.it) presented
between 2008 and 2016, for which their current status was available, no one was listed as
‘conclusively approved. The Association Openpolis, which monitors the activity of Parliament,
analysing a larger time window concluded that of the 260 citizens’ initiatives presented between
1979 and 2014 only three were converted into law (Associazione Openpolis, 2014).’
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Figure 4.2: The first symbol of the M5S (‘Logo MoVimento 5 Stelle’, 2013).
address of the blog of the founder—and its program. In the blog post announcing
the program of the Movement published a few days later, (Grillo, 2009d), Grillo
embedded a 20-minute YouTube video (Grillo, 2009e) from the Florence event
in which from the stage he talked the audience through the program, in his
own way. As of May 2016, the 20-minute YouTube video was viewed more
than 500,000 times, which is quite impressive for a political leader presenting
a political program.6 The program expanded the original themes listed in the
2008 Manifesto—environment, sustainability, local economy—to include, as the
first point, major institutional reforms with the objective to fill the gap that,
according to the Movement, had been growing between the citizens and the
state. Along with proposals to set limits to MPs’ mandate and to reduce the
redundancies in the state administration, the Movement also aimed at introducing
procedures to make legislation more transparent (online video streaming of public
meetings happening at every level of the administration, online publications
of law proposals months before their approval to allow citizens’ comments)
and increase citizens’ participation by strengthening the institutions of direct
democracy (introduction of referenda to propose legislation, make compulsory
for Parliament to discuss and vote any citizens’ initiative) (Movimento 5 Stelle,
2009b, p. 3).
6For matter of comparison, the most popular video published in the same period by the leader
of the Democratic Party (PD) inviting to vote for the PD, notwithstanding the fact that was only 2
minutes long, reached fewer than 90,000 views (Youdem, 2009).
145
Chapter 4. (Self)organising mobilisation and participation
1.6. The electoral trajectory of the M5S
Between its foundation in October 2009 and the general election of 2013, the
M5S participated with its symbol and name in every round of local and regional
elections. In 2010, the M5S competed in five out of 13 regional elections, obtaining
390,902 votes and the election 4 regional councillors. In electoral terms, because
the regions where the M5S competed in 2010 represented about half of the Italian
electorate, this was probably the first result that can be projected on a national
scale. In the five regions, the M5S obtained 3.5% of the valid votes, which in the
general election of 2008 would have made the M5S the sixth most voted party.
In the local elections of 2012, the diffusion of the Movement increased sig-
nificantly and it participated in 20 out of 27 municipal elections organised in
administrative centres in almost every region, obtaining the election of its can-
didate as Mayor of the city of Parma. Assuming the 20 municipalities were
representative of the broader Italian electorate (of which they represented about
13% of the voters in the general election), something that is reasonable since
the municipalities were geographically quite homogeneously distributed from
North to South, the M5S gained 8.83% of the valid votes cast in the municipalities
where the Movement participated (a figure that is in line with opinion polls
administered before and after the elections, see Figure 4.17). That is, on a national
level in the local elections of 2012, the M5S gained more percentage votes than
the third most voted party in the general election of 2008. But it is with the
vote in the regional election in Sicily that same year that the movement obtained
the most impressive result where the candidate to the presidency of the region
obtained 18.17% of the votes.
If the results of the 2012 elections were relevant, collocating in terms of
preference the M5S below the two major parties of centre-left and centre-right
but above all other parties, what is difficult to explain (and unprecedented) is the
growth of the Movement’s electoral support between May 2012 and the general
election in 2013; between these two dates, the M5S grew from 8.83% to 25.56%.
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As observed before (see Figure 4.1), the electoral results of 2012 corresponded
to a boost in the creation of new meetups related to the Movement and new
memberships. It could then be interesting to observe in detail the variations
in the daily number of first-time registrants to Meetup.com who then joined
one of the M5S groups. The top panel of Figure 4.3 shows the number of
daily new registrations between April 2012 and April 2013. The vertical lines
indicate major public events: the dotted lines indicate events related to the
activity of Grillo and the M5S, and the dashed lines elections. The blue line
indicates the 30 days moving average. Clearly, all electoral events (all relevant
successes for the Movement) did cause a sharp and instantaneous increase in new
membership; with no exception, on the day after each election the number of
members significantly surpassed the average for the period. In cumulative terms
(bottom panel), it is interesting to observe that membership increased almost
linearly between the events but those electoral events, especially the first and the
last, contributed to change the slope of the growth curve.
The increase in membership after the election have been significantly less
sustained than the increase in votes. In numerical terms, meetups’ membership
between the two elections of May 2012 and February 2013 grew by 64%, from
29,748 to 48,954 members on the day of the general election, but votes (estimating
national votes based on the 2012 local elections) grew 189%, from 8.83% to 25.56%.
But of course, this difference in growth rate between membership and actual
voting was necessary for the electoral success of the Movement. The interesting
question is whether the expansion in the membership base did contribute in a
measurable way to the (more than proportional) growth in electoral support. In
other words, is there a positive and statistically significant association between
voting for the M5S and the number of members in the same area?
By comparing electoral data from three periods, the regional elections of 2010
(which involved approximately half of the electorate of the general election), the
general election of 2013 and the election for the European Parliament in 2014,7 it
7Since the elections of 2012 were contested on municipal level and involved only around 12%
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Figure 4.3: Number of new members registered by date they joined Meetup.com for the first time
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is possible to infer an answer. As the geographical unit of analysis, I have chosen
the provinces, administrative divisions of second level. A province is in general
sufficiently small to allow a person to travel and maintain recurrent (daily or
weekly) interactions with other people also living within its limits but sufficiently
large to register the presence of at least one meetup of the M5S. In the elections
of 2010 the M5S competed in 37 provinces (within five regions), while in the
elections of 2013 and 2014 in all the 110 provinces. To test the association I applied
a regression model to three log-transformed variables (since the population varies
significantly from province to province): the number of votes gained by the M5S,
the number of voters in the election and the number of meetups’ members who
joined before the election.
Results suggest that in fact participation through meetups might have had
a significantly positive effect on the number of votes that the M5S eventually
obtained in both elections, although with a different level of strength (for the
regression tables see Section 1 in the Appendix). And the effect was not negligible.
On average, an increase of 10% in membership was associated with an increase
of about 1.9% in the number of votes in 2010, 0.7% in 2013 and 0.9% in 2014.
For example, in 2010 the median province in terms of memberships had 174
members and cast 12,211 votes for the M5S: in this case the model would predict
that the first extra member is associated with approximately 14 extra votes in
2010, 5 extra votes in 2013 and 7 extra votes in 2014. Further research should
be conducted to better delineate the relationship between the two variables
of interest—membership and votes—by possibly exploring their association
with other variables. Nevertheless, even without control variables (with the
exception of the size of the province), I argue that the analysis provides significant
information on the relationship. It is possible to hypothesise that two set of
variables might influence voting for the M5S in a specific area. The first set
includes variables describing the activities that the Movement conducted in the
of the national electorate, they were not considered in testing the association between votes and
meetups’ memberships.
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Figure 4.4: Votes and meetups’ members as percentage of total voters.
area (e.g. targeted political ads, campaigning by national leaders). The second
set includes variables describing the electorate of the area; the same political
message can be relatively more or less effective depending on local receptivities
(e.g. past voting patterns, unemployment, wealth, Internet access). Nevertheless,
the assumption of importance of these variables does not decrease the interest
of the uncontrolled relationship between membership and voting. In fact, even
assuming an effect of variables from both sets on voting and an interaction with
membership, it is on the relationship between Meetup membership and voting—
either significant and positive or insignificant—that finally points to the electoral
relevance or irrelevance of Internet-mediated mobilisation.
The decline in the strength of the effect between 2010 and 2014 can be ex-
plained by at least three possible concurrent factors. First, members who joined as
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early as 2010, before any major electoral success of the Movement, were possibly
more active and effective than later members in campaigning for the movement
within their own social networks. Second, it is clear from Figure 4.1 that the
electoral successes since the 2012 elections did preceded (and likely caused) an
increase in membership. It is reasonable to postulate the existence of a positive
feedback loop, in which membership positively influences votes that in turn pos-
itively influences membership. But as elections accumulate and the Movement
consolidate its basin of support and electoral weight, the effect of membership
on votes (as well as that of votes on membership) necessarily diminishes. Third,
as the Movement gained in national media attention after 2012 (see Figure 4.17),
the territorial effect of local meetups decreased since voters were exposed to the
Movement ideas also via the legacy media and independently of their location.
It is not difficult to understand why a strong membership base might be
effective in generating votes. In the case of a party or movement running for
the first time, the ground work of members can be particularly valuable during
a political campaign to generate attention towards and knowledge of the new
political subject, because members can be actively engaged in the campaign but
also because they can leverage—and influence—their personal networks (family
members, friends, colleagues).
To complement the analysis I also added a set of variables that measure the
activity on Facebook pages linked to the Movement. Unfortunately, contrary to
Meetup, the API of Facebook does not allow a search of public pages. It is then
not possible to ensure a complete list of all public pages that attracted comments,
likes and attention of sympathisers and potential voters of the M5S. To complete
a list of public Facebook pages that was sufficiently comprehensive, I followed
this procedure. First, I searched a database of 1602 M5S groups registered with
Meetup (as of October 2016), for a possible indication of a link to a Facebook
page either in the dedicated field that Meetup assigns to this scope or in the short
description that appears on the page of the group. Of the 1602 groups, 707 (44%)
indicates on their Meetup profile a Facebook page. This already is an indication of
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the importance that Facebook plays in the ecology of the M5S. Starting from these
707 Facebook pages, I then used a snowball sampling to expand the list. For each
of the Facebook pages, I requested through the Facebook API the complete list
of pages liked by it. This returned 4841 additional pages that were all manually
checked to exclude pages not related to the M5S. The final list included 2475
Facebook pages: 80% pages groups and 20% pages of public figures linked to the
Movement.
Finally, in order to assess whether the activity on Facebook correlated with the
votes received by the M5S at the provincial level, I tested whether pages could
be geolocated. When the geographic coordinates of a page were not explicitly
indicated, geolocation was conducted by comparing each token contained in
different fields of the page’s metadata to a dictionary of Italian geographic
entities compiled by geonames.org.8 This allowed assigning a latitude and
longitude to 85% of the pages. Clearly, it was not possible to assess whether a
page had only a national scope or a local scope (or whether instead had a mixed
scope), that is if the attention generated by a page was dependent or independent
from the geographical location of users (who I assume to be also voters). For
example, it is clear that the page of Beppe Grillo has a national scope, although it
provides as location Grillo’s home city—Genoa. In order to only include in the
analysis pages with a more local scope, I proceeded as following. Assuming that
a page with a national scope tends to receive likes from users independently from
users’ location and a page with a local scope tends to receive likes dependently
on users’ location, I constructed a network mapping the relation among pages
based on the co-occurrence of liking from the same user (that is, I draw an edge
between two pages when the same users liked a post on both), then measured the
geographic distance between each pair of pages and finally calculated the mean
of the distances connecting each page to other pages weighted by the number of
co-liking users. With this approach, pages with a national scope were assigned
8Specifically, in the case of person the fields that were searched (in this order) were
location.city and about while in the case of groups location.city, name and about.
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a higher weighted mean than pages with only a local scope. I fixed a threshold
at a distance of 409km (the mean of the distribution of weighted means) and so
excluded from the geographic analysis 282 pages that were inferred to be national
in scope.
Figure 4.5 indicates that there is correlation (confirmed by a significance
test) between the electorate of provinces, measured in terms of the number of
voters in the 2013 general election, and both the number of geolocated Facebook
pages in the final sample and the cumulated number of likes they receive. This
would suggest that indeed the sample is comprehensive: no province seems to be
underrepresented in terms of the number of pages included in the analysis.
Figure 4.5: Location of the 2094 Facebook pages and, grouped by province, correlation between
voters in the 2013 general election and number of geolocated pages and their total
number of likes.
Based on the activity recorded on 2094 Facebook pages during the 90 days
preceding the general election of 2013 (of which only 2085 were active), there
is no significant correlation (although it is positive) between users’ presence
on social media, either by commenting or by liking, and the votes for the M5S
in the 2013 general election (see results of the regression analysis in Section 1
of the Appendix). When controlling for the number of unique users liking
or commenting on local Facebook pages against the vote received by M5S in
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the same provinces, the Facebook activity is insignificant while membership of
meetups remains significant. There are of course important limitations in using
social media data to control for local votes. First, contrary to membership data
from Meetup, users’ data from Facebook does not contain information on where
they actually live and the location of users is then inferred from their visible
activity (liking and commenting). Second, Internet activity—as will also appear
in the next chapter—tends to feature preferential attachment tendencies. That is,
users will tend to comment and like very popular pages (that are mostly national
in scope) instead of being attracted by peripheral pages. Nevertheless, even after
excluding pages with a more national scope, the activity on the remaining pages
is significant and well in proportion with the broad population of the provinces
(see Figure 4.5). This would imply that if the strengthening of the mobilisation on
Facebook and voting for the M5S are truly correlated, a significant and positive
(even if weak) correlation should appear nonetheless.
In conclusions, meetups seemed to have had an important role in the ex-
traordinary electoral success of the M5S in the 2013 general election but not parti-
cipation on Facebook, which had no directly measurable role. This is relevant and
testifies that Internet technologies, by wiping out the costs of coordination and
spreading information, might have significant and lastly political consequences
on the entry barriers to new political subjects aspiring to trigger mass mobilisa-
tion. Meetups required no investment of resources from the leadership of the
Movement—Grillo only published a link to Meetup.com and passed entirely to
the networking site the burden of coordinating the activities of militants. This
is clearly not easy to replicate (it took years for Grillo to reach a critical mass of
supporters) but possible. Still, the Movement had to invest resources in creating
and curating content to keep the audience of supporters engaged. In the next sec-
tion, I explore how the media system gravitates around the blog and its different
components.
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2. The political identity of the M5S
2.1. The program of the M5S
To talk about the political identity of the Five Star Movement (M5S) is not only
politically contentious but also practically challenging because of the different
axes (at least three) along which the M5S has been developing: the vertical
top-down axis from Beppe Grillo to his followers (and sympathising voters), the
horizontal axis connecting thousands of militants across the country to local,
flexible and loosely organised meetups, and finally the cloudy axis linking
Internet users through the different online communicative platforms pertaining
to the Movement.
The results of the 2013 general election raise questions on the characteristics
of the electoral base of the M5S and more generally on the characteristics of the
Movement itself: what does it represent for the Italian party system and where
can it be situated within the European left-right political tradition? To try to
answer these questions I propose in this section the analysis of the program of
the M5S, and in the next section, of electoral flows from other parties to the M5S.
The program of the M5S appeared online as early as 20099 and only minor
changes have been introduced over the years: the seven sections of the second
version of 2009—state and citizens, energy, information, economy, transportation,
health, education—are maintained in the version accessed in 2015 (Movimento
5 Stelle, 2015), which is identical to the version published before the general
election of 2013.10 The quantitative analysis conducted by the Manifesto Research
on Political Representation (MARPOR) project (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel,
& Werner, 2014) on the 2013 program collocates the Movement on the extreme
left of the political spectrum: in fact, based on the coding of 167 party positions
9Version ‘2.0’ published in October 2009 is still available online on the Internet Archive (Movi-
mento 5 Stelle, 2009b)
10The 2013 version is maintained on the website of the Manifesto project (Movimento 5 Stelle,
2013)
155
Chapter 4. (Self)organising mobilisation and participation
between 1946 and 2013, it is the most far-left program ever presented by an Italian
party.
This result does not necessarily reflect how voters perceived the Movement.
Data from surveys conducted among M5S voters clearly pointed to an electoral
base that was almost equally represented by right-wing and left-wing voters.
Moreover, the coding of the program is heavily influenced by the significant and
certainly not accidental absence of any mention of issues such as foreign policy,
immigration policy, taxation and importantly the European Union (which by
itself would have moved the barycentre of Movement much more to the right).
Still I argue that the program (even if not a comprehensive program) is important
to characterise the genesis of the Movement, to trace its political evolution from
its origin as movement centered on the environment and social protections and
to understand the identity that the Movement likes to project: as of July 2017
the same program (with only minor edits) is still linked to the homepage of
the M5S11. Finally, the fact that the Movement is clearly off-chart relatively to
all the major parties of Republican Italy points to the extraordinariness of the
new movement and to the limits of describing it through traditional systems of
reference.
The upper panel of Figure 4.6 shows the density distribution of 167 positions
of Italian parties coded on a -100 (left-wing) to +100 (right-wing) scale. The
median of the distribution (also indicated) is close to zero while the position of
the M5S - with -49 - is 29 points below the second most left-leaning party running
in the 2013 election. The bottom panel of Figure 4.6 tries to understand on what
such an extreme position is based by comparing the position of the M5S in three
different dimensions: planned economy, market economy and welfare (the M5S
did not express any foreign policy position in the program). Accordingly, the
Movement scores low (higher scores represent more favourable positions in that
dimension) in terms of market economy positions (although not too far from the
median), is in the right tail of the distribution for welfare and totally out of the
11http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/
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distribution for planned economy.
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political position on a left-to-right (negative-to-positive) scale, on planned economy, market
economy and welfare. Source: (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, & Werner, 2014)).
Figure 4.6: Quantitative content analysis of the 2013 program of the M5S
Although it can be debated whether the position of the program of the
M5S was indeed so extremely on the left of the political spectrum if compared
with other Italian parties, it is a fact that all issues raised in the program were
compatible—virtually with no exceptions—with positions expressed by tradi-
tional left-wing parties. Indeed in the left-wing tradition, the program seemed
more interested in defending the common good and the state from special in-
terests instead of defending citizens from the state. The program demanded strong
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state intervention in the economy; the provision of a thick net of public services
(basic income, free university education, free health care, free Internet); stringent
rules for the protection of the environment; and political reforms towards a more
ethical and more democratic representative system. In general the style of the ana-
lysis of current economic problems mixed anti-establishment and anti-capitalist
rhetoric: according to the program the roots of Italy’s problems were the large
monopolies (both public and private) protected by a corrupt political class. The
solution offered by the Movement was to provide on the one hand support to
small, local, and non-profit enterprises and on the other to bust big businesses
and their clienteles (which of course are not incompatible with right-wing views).
The program was silent on issues that are traditionally linked to right-wing
parties. Safety (being related to the economy, the environment or personal health)
concerns were central to the program as much as security concerns were totally
missing; moreover, no mention was made of foreign, migration and crime-control
policies. Interestingly taxation—which almost every party, whether right or
left-wing, must promise to reduce to favour economic growth—was also never
mentioned in the program.
2.2. Electoral flows
A number of studies have been published offering an analysis of the dynamics of
the electorate of the M5S. Bordignon and Ceccarini (2012) describes the electorate
of a movement that at the time of the study was estimated to attract around
9% of votes in local elections but that was also already projected to potentially
reach 20% of votes. According to Bordignon and Ceccarini, the electorate of the
M5S was at least originally inclined towards the left of the political spectrum
and it was mainly ‘young, educated, a resident of medium-large cities’ and
more connected to the Internet than the average. Referring to a survey study
conducted between 2010 and 2012, they argue that the political profile of the
electorate had been changing: during this period the percentage of potential
M5S voters who self-identified as right-wing or centre-right-wing grew from
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11% to 28%. In a more recent study, Pedrazzani and Pinto (2015) observed that
the same trend continued after 2012: an analysis of opinion polls conducted
between 2012 and 2013 confirmed that the fraction of electorate inclined towards
the M5S that voted centre-right in 2008 grew from 27.6% before the 2012 local
elections to 42.1% during the 2013 national election. Diamanti (2014) described
the Movement as a bus driven by Grillo: the Movement initially took on board left-
wing supporters mobilised around traditional environmental issues, subsequently
stopped opening the doors to right-wing voters dissatisfied with the leadership
of their parties, and finally - just before the 2013 general election - attracted
supporters of Matteo Renzi (Italy’s current prime minister) who had been recently
defeated by Bersani in the primaries of the Democratic Party. According to
Diamanti ‘the M5S offered hospitality and citizenship to all those dissatisfied
and frustrated with the combined ethical, political and economic crisis [...] the
Movement became a vehicle for anti-political protest’. But this position would
imply a conscious strategy deployed by the Movement to attract right-wing voters.
It instead entirely possible that the electoral flows that finally brought voters to
the Movement from different political parties were due more to the weakening of
these parties than to the actual political offer advanced by the Movement.
In any case, data produced by a national electoral study conducted in 2013
after the general elections (Associazione Itanes, 2013) confirmed that the electorate
of the M5S was indeed extremely composite and almost specular along the axis
separating the left and right hemispheres. The first interesting result (Figure 4.7)
concerned how the M5S voters self-identify: more than 60% refuse to take a
position between right and left, 20% declare themselves as left-wing and 8%
right-wing. According to these figures, the M5S electorate is less left-wing than
the overall sample (3 percentage points difference), less right-wing (5 percentage
points) and more uncomfortable with traditional left-right labelling (10 percentage
points).
To understand which party is better represented among M5S voters, I compare
in Figure 4.8 the percentage of 2013 M5S voters according to their declared vote
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Figure 4.7: Self-identification of people who voted for the M5S in the 2013 general election.
in the 2008 general election and the national results of the same parties in 2008
(ordered left to right on the horizontal axis from far-left to far-right). Clearly,
no party is strongly overrepresented and the 2008 preferences of M5S voters
seem to closely map the actual result of each party in that election. The only
parties to be somehow overrepresented are SA (the Left - the Rainbow) and
IdV (Italy of Values); most of the other parties show very limited differences
including the two major parties: the PD (Democratic Party, with a difference
of less than 4 percentage points) and the PDL (the People of Freedom, with a
difference of less than 3 percentage points). The LN (Northern League) on the
far-right shows a difference of only 1.3 percentage point. If we group parties in
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two broad coalitions (although not the actual coalitions of the 2008 election which
were highly fragmented) we observe that 47% of M5S voters voted in 2008 for a
centre-right party while 53% a centre-left party.
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Figure 4.8: Party voted in 2008 by people who voted M5S in 2013.
2.3. Trust of M5S voters
The level of trust towards representative institutions (parliament and parties) is
low across all respondents to the electoral survey. But the opinion of M5S voters
appears less dependent on party voted for in the previous general elections.
Distrust towards parliament and parties is—as expected—noticeably higher
among M5S voters than among people who did not vote for the Movement in
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2013 (including non-voters): 82% of M5S voters distrust parliament (11 percentage
points more than non-M5S voters) while 94% distrust parties (again 11 percentage
points more than non-M5S voters). When controlling for vote cast in 2008 by M5S
voters, left-wing voters are only slightly less likely to distrust parliament (3.6
percentage points difference with 2008 right-wing voters) while the difference
among non-M5S voters is not only stronger (8.6 percentage points difference) but
also the association between direction of vote in 2008 (left or right-wing) and trust
towards parliament is statistically significant (p-value is 0.04). In their opinions of
parties, the difference among M5S voters disappears (left-wing voters are actually
more likely to distrust parties by 0.7 percentage points) while it is maintained
although it loses statistical significance among non-M5S voters: right-wing voters
are more likely to distrust parties by 3.7 percentage points.
The fact that M5S voters have (low) opinions towards representative insti-
tutions that are independent from their past voting behaviour is confirmed by
Figure 4.9 where level of trust towards parliament and parties is mapped to the
vote cast in 2008. In the lower panels, opinions of left and right-wing voters are
aggregated.
In conclusion, even though a sentiment of deep distrust is common among
all respondents, a difference seems to emerge: the behaviour in the 2008 gen-
eral election is less effective in predicting the level of trust among M5S voters
than among the rest of the sample. This, along with the indeterminacy—and
unpredictability—of the association between political opinions and voting be-
haviour illustrated before, may support the hypothesis that up to a quarter of
the Italian electorate chose the Five Star Movement (M5S) not only as a form of
protest against the political establishment but also because their set of political
preferences was not accurately represented by any of the other parties present on
the traditional right/left political spectrum.
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3. A new media ecology, and a new media actor
3.1. ICTs diffusion in Italy
With the beginning of the 21th century and the mass-marketing of ICTs, the media
landscape of the more economically developed countries (MEDCs) was progress-
ively transformed by the spread of Internet access into offices and households;
an additional item was added to a news media market composed then of only
newspapers, radio and TV. In 2002 the relative importance of TV and newspapers
in Italy was dissimilar to the average of European countries, with TV playing a
more important role than newspapers in terms of diffusion of political news: in
Italy 20.5% of the population did not read about politics in newspapers against a
European average of 14%, while only 5% did not follow politics on TV against a
European average of 6%.12
12Survey (n =42,359) conducted in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia
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The rise of the Internet corresponded in Italy (as generally in MEDCs) to
a progressive but steady decline in newspaper readership. According to the
survey of media habits conducted every year by the Italian National Institute
of Statistics (Istat), the percentage of Italians reading a newspaper at least once
a week declined by 10 percentage points in 20 years: from 59% in 1993 to 49%
in 2013. TV daily audience did also decline over the same period—although
less sharply—from 96% to 92%. The percentage of Italians using the Internet at
least once a week, measurement of which began in 2001, increased in 13 years
by 31 percentage points, from 21% to 51% (see Figure 4.10). It is possible to
argue that the Internet, in fact, caused the decline of newspaper readership and
TV viewership13, but whether or not a causality mechanism kicked in, with the
addition of a new medium—the Internet—the media ecology most certainly
changed.
From a news media perspective the Internet embedded the very same tech-
nologies for the mass distribution of audio, video and textual contents of older
media, but it critically also democratised them by lowering their cost to zero. It
was not just the cost of broadcasting the content that has almost disappeared (at
least once the cost for an Internet-connected device has been paid), but also the
cost of producing it, both because the Internet opened access to vast informational
resources, which could be consulted and meshed to form original content, and
because it compressed the costs of obtaining hardware, post-processing software
and skills. Indeed, the Internet must be also be thought as a huge repository
of shared technical knowledge which can be easily and (mostly) freely tapped
to learn not only content-producing and content-distributing skills, but also
techniques such as photo and video-editing or web and graphic design.
(Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2002).
13As noted by D’Arma (2015, pp. 69-71) newspapers in Italy were able to gain online readership
through their websites more effectively than broadcasters
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The percentage of the Italian population over three years old using Internet at least once a week,
over six reading a newspaper at least once a week, over three watching TV. (Source (Istat, 2014a,
2014c)).
Figure 4.10: Media use in Italy (1993-2013, n = 100)
3.2. Blog as medium and message
In the first half of the 2000s, the breeding ground of the blog of Beppe Grillo
was a community disempowered by traditional institutions but fundamentally
empowered by a new generation of tools: a wary and mistrustful culture that
embraced a personalised (see Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2008; Bennett & Segerberg,
2013), projected-oriented and do-it-yourself (see Bimber, 2003; Bang, 2004) approach
vis-à-vis modernity’s challenges. Out of a profound distrust toward traditional
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economic, political, media and in general civil institutions (whether this was a
party, the Church, a monetary authority, a multinational firm, a media conglom-
erate or a university) grew the awareness that independence from everything that
was distrusted was not only conceivable but also affordable.
Grillo with his blog seemed to totally embrace this do-it-yourself mentality.
Even the interface of the blog, which barely changed between 2005 and 2015, gave
the impression of distance from the professionalism of politics and the media:
the design of the blog was not only extremely rudimentary but also chaotic, with
flashy ads, text, images, videos being meshed together and scattered over the
page. The language used by Grillo was simple and vulgar, but also extremely
clear, entertaining and rarely boring. Almost every blog post contained an image,
introducing its content, often grotesque and funny, sometimes a childish collage
of photos and slogans, always characterised by an amateurish style.
But notwithstanding this unprofessional style that still remains, Grillo’s blog
did maintain a stream of content produced and published with a constant fre-
quency. Figure 4.11 plots the frequency of blog posts; the regularity in the number
of posts published by Grillo’s blog is impressive and more akin to a professional
content agency than a personal blog: between May 2005 and January 2015, if we
exclude 13 days, at least one blog post was published every day. It seems likely
that the blog was never a one-man show and that an editorial team helped Grillo
to post so frequently. Still it is interesting that even after years and millions of
views the blog chose not to lose the visual style of a personal self-produced blog.
This might be a precise editorial decision of those beyond the blog because the
design of the blog and not only its content was an important part of the message
and a reason for its success.
The very first blog posts to appear on beppegrillo.it attacked the political-
economic establishment but also offered ‘a way out’: the Internet. On 28 January
2005, Grillo wrote a series of short posts almost in the form of aphorisms: ‘Energy
is civilisation. To leave it in the hands of pyromaniacs/oilmen is a crime’ (Grillo,
2005d); ‘The Net is the only way out’ in a post titled ‘The Net will save us’ (Grillo,
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2005k); ‘What’s politics? Nobody knows it anymore. Does it still make sense to
talk of Right, and Left and centre? Maybe it makes more sense to talk of above
and below. [...] In politics we don’t need a leader, we are grown up people. We
need a vision of the world [...].’ in a post titled ‘Politics disappeared’ (Grillo,
2005j).
The blog was immediately political and the fact that only seven months after
he started blogging, Grillo is ready to call his followers to meet and mobilise
seems to support an early political scope of his acts. In the first two months of
blogging Grillo targeted oil companies, the political party system, the Catholic
church—although not the Pope (Grillo, 2005f), the ruling party (Grillo, 2005g),
the economists (Grillo, 2005o), the US, an Italian defence conglomerate (Grillo,
2005a), the leading opposition party (Grillo, 2005n), the major Italian automotive
company, the major Italian telecom company and the major Italian media com-
pany (Grillo, 2005l). But he also showed he had practical ideas against economic
decline (‘We will try to convince Heineken to keep the factory of Pedavena open
and to close one in China’ (Grillo, 2005m)) and car pollution (Grillo, 2005b).
The blog was far from only a mobilising and motivational medium for Grillo’s
movement. From the very beginning, it was conceived as a source of information
that was an alternative to the mainstream news media.
Indeed, Grillo did not only play the role of political commentator or satirist
but also of news producers. He created news content, not because he claimed
to be a professional journalist (he would keep reminding his audience he was
neither a journalist, a scientist, a politician nor an economist) but because he
maintained that the media was not providing the content it should. Italian news
media companies, both public and private, were among the most recurrent targets
of his attacks. Grillo used his blog to provide coverage of news content that was
already somewhere in the news media sphere—he frequently embedded into his
posts links to the source of the news—but that was not reported by traditional
media. Although in most of his posts Grillo simply exposed a problem (whether
pollution, economic decline or political decay), he also espoused solutions to
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improve cities’ liveability, public health, the economy, thus playing since the
beginning a hybrid role of comedian, journalists and also of politician, in the
sense of ‘influencing the actions and policies of a government’ (‘Politics’, 2016).
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Figure 4.11: Weekly frequency of posts and comments on beppegrillo.it (January 2005 - December
2012)
3.3. From blog to community
The blog enterprise turned Beppe Grillo into a media actor and a highly relevant
node in the Italian media sphere: according to Alexa, a firm tracking web traffic,
in December 2005, only 12 months after the first post, beppegrillo.it was the
76th most visited Italian website (Internet Archive, 2005), and less than two
years later it was the 49th (Internet Archive, 2007). Of course, the blog was
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crucially different from traditional media since it also became a hub for an active
community discussing Grillo’s posts and themes: between the creation of the blog
and the first V-Day an average of 7980 comments were published every week. The
online community showed itself to be highly involved with the offline activities
of the emerging movement since the days following the V-Day—which all data
seem to indicate as the foundational event for the movement—the number of
weekly comments peaked at 74,246.
A future analysis of the content of comments will offer the chance to under-
stand motivations behind the raw numbers, but a merely quantitative analysis
already offers the contours of a community which not only was receptive of
Grillo’s published content but also ready to engage with the content—or with
what the content represents for them—and respond to Grillo’s mobilisation calls
by moving the conversation from screens to squares. Thus looking back at
Grillo’s enterprise, from 2005 to now, it appears that the network of postings,
users, people, members, groups, meetings and mass events that emerged around
his blog has been hybridising by progressively assuming the traits of news media,
social movement and party organisations (see Chadwick, 2007, 2013), not only by
adding nodes (see next section) but also by defining and redefining scope and
functions of the network itself.
If the blog was born out of Grillo’s desire to communicate with the audience
of his shows while on tour, the large response from the very same audience (but
maybe also from people who never directly attended his shows) turned it into
something different: a forum for debate, where Grillo’s voice was, of course, the
most important but in quantitative terms represented only a small fraction of
the volume of words being published. In fact, the ratio of words posted in the
comment section to the words published by Grillo himself is 84 to 1. This interest
in the blog also strengthened the role of an (alternative) news media agency that
since his first steps Grillo had tried to assume.
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3.4. The media system
It may be difficult to determine whether Grillo (and those counselling him)
deployed a media strategy that was crafted in advance or whether he oppor-
tunistically adapted to unexpected circumstances. Yet it is clear that Grillo’s
media system progressively expanded into new roles (communicating, publish-
ing, mobilising, campaigning, participating, deliberating and finally governing)
and forms (blog, news agency, forum, social movement, party), complicating the
task of comprehensively defining its final nature.
Figure 4.12 illustrates the chronological evolution of an integrated media
system that progressively added complementary modules to the blog . The
first module, Meetup, increased the mobilisation capacity of the community by
adding a dedicated tool to help members coordinate meetings and activity on
the ground. The second step, in 2006, was the creation of a YouTube channel,
to facilitate broadcasting video content. The video was immediately an obvious
choice for a person who grew up professionally on the TV screen. Even before
the opening of a YouTube channel, videos of Grillo’s monologues, shows, but
also mesh-ups of interviews to others, were available on the blog. Interestingly,
given the professional experience of Grillo, the production quality (audio, video,
editing) of the video content, at least at the beginning, was poor and amateurish.
It is certainly possible that presenting the content through low-quality interfaces
was (and possibly still is) a choice to stress the traits of the initiative of an ‘active
citizen’ (see Bang, 2005) and differentiate it from the production of professional
traditional media institutions.14 The third step was the creation of Grillo’s
Facebook profile in 2008 as a presence in the most rapidly growing social media
14The design of the blog itself still maintained in 2016 an amateurish flavour, very different
from highly sophisticated web-interfaces that are certainly available to a blog which could attract
up to 600,000 daily unique visitors and possibly generate, according to estimates based on the
number of visitors, between $ 7.5 and 15 million in revenues from ads (Di Salvo, 2014; see also
Marone, 2014).
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Figure 4.12: The integrated digital media system of Beppe Grillo and the M5S
community in Italy.15 Notably Grillo’s Facebook page, which in 2010 was also
flanked by the Facebook page of the M5S, is often used to repost the same content
15According to estimates the number of Italians using Facebook grew from 0 in January 2008 to
26 million in January 2014 (Cosenza, 2014)
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of the blog (or links to it), and yet the frequency of activity generated on the page
by users commenting, liking and sharing content is larger than the activity on the
blog. Thus Facebook, in terms of media functionalities, plays a role similar to the
blog, broadcasting messages and facilitating discussion, but the node’s existence
is crucial to tap into the huge network externalities provided by the Facebook
platform. The presence on social media services was finally completed with
Twitter in 2009 (again a broadcasting service which leverages a large network of
users) and most recently Google+.
In 2009 Grillo enriched his blog with a new service: a forum open to registered
members to publish and discuss policy proposals and the political strategy of the
movement. The forum was a public service (certified and legitimised by being
within the domain beppegrillo.it) to facilitate participation but also to publicly
testify the open, democratic and innovative character of the movement. Somehow
the forum reproduced a weak public sphere (see Fraser, 1990; Mansbridge, 1999)
playing a Habermasian deliberative role by shaping the opinion of the movement16.
Indeed the forum did not embed any formal mechanism to sanction the position
of the movement, such as a voting system, and crucially did not enforce the
closure of any discussion; that is, when a proposal was published, it would be
indefinitely kept open for the community’s comments.
In 2013 Grillo created again within his inner domain the strong public sphere of
the movement: the ‘Operative System of the M5S’, later rebranded ‘Rousseau’,
which was in charge of approving, with an online voting system open to all
members, the official position of the movement with implications for the parlia-
mentary activity of the 144 MPs of the M5S. Interestingly the ‘Operative System’
was the only module of the M5S media system not openly accessible: registered
16According to Habermas ‘there are contexts of action that do not primarily serve the carrying
out of communicatively harmonised plans of action (that is, the purposive activities of the
participants) but make communication possible and stabilize it—for instance, chatting, conversing,
and arguing—in general conversation that becomes an end in itself’ (Habermas, 1981/1984, p. 327).
Thus deliberation for Habermas is not only defined by the production of authoritative decisions
and deliberation may also happen without producing any formal decision.
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users were the only ones authorised to view the propositions, vote and access
the voting results. The creation of the Operative System palpably reduced the
attention attracted by the Forum (see Figure 5.7).
Between 2010 and 2013, additional news media items entered the orbits of
Grillo’s blog. In 2013 Grillo created on his blog a webTV channel (‘La cosa’)
dedicated to stream professionally edited video content in the form of short news
stories and live-streams of Movement events. Finally, there was the addition of
two news aggregators, which although not part of the domain beppegrillo.it,
were strongly integrated with the blog through the presence of links. These two
news aggregators, tzetze.it and lafucina.it, published a constantly updating list of
news items selected by users and supportive of the positions of the M5S.17
At the end of 2013, the Movement had 144 MPs voted into office, multiple
and sophisticated news media channels and an active crowd of engaged ‘users’
meeting regularly across the country and on the Internet. Without compromising
the overall coherence and stability of the political enterprise, the M5S demon-
strated to be effectively able to synthesise the traits of a news media organisation,
a social movement organisation and party organisation, simultaneously operating
different organisational forms, with injection of rigid hierarchy and procedural
rules in regions of what may appear as a fundamentally acephalous body. But
of course the long-term sustainability of the project is far from assured since the
media system, being constitutionally unfit to exercise preventive control on users’
behaviour, can only rely on ex-post repressive measures18 to maintain internal co-
herence which must necessarily be perceived by the users as exceptional—instead
of ordinary—system maintenance measures.
17Notably, the two websites are owned by Gianroberto Casaleggio, the architect of the media
strategy of the movement.
18As of December 2015, 37 MPs of the M5S have been expelled from or have left the Movement
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4. Legacy media and the success of the M5S
4.1. The general elections of 1994 and 2013
The M5S, with over 8,800,000 (25.6%) votes obtained in the 2013 Italian general
election, is at the time of writing the fifth most popular party ever in a general
election in the history of the Italian republic. Although the M5S trajectory is
certainly impressive for a newcomer party—having conquered one-quarter of the
Italian electorate in its first major electoral contest—it is not unprecedented in
recent years: in 1994 a political outsider, Silvio Berlusconi, gained 8,100,000 votes
(21%) in the Italian general election with his party brand-new party, Forza Italia
(see Figure 4.13). The most disruptive political innovations of the last twenty
years of Italian history were created by two charismatic leaders who both owe
their pre-political success to the very same thing: television broadcasting.
The Berlusconi and Beppe Grillo political movements were exceptional in the
Italian political tradition because they were the only two electoral parties since
1948—the date of the first general election after the abolition of the monarchy and
the fall of the fascist regime—with no historical connection to any other party to
obtain more than 20% of the national vote and in fact, together with the Northern
League in 1996 that nevertheless was created by federating different regional
parties, to obtain more than 10% of the national vote. All the other parties that
have gained more than 10% of the national vote between 1948 and 2013 were
direct heirs of the legacy of the Christian Democracy (DC in the Italian acronym),
of the Italian Communist (PCI) and Socialist Parties (PSI) and the post-Fascist
Italian Social Movement (MSI) (see Figure 4.13).
The general elections of 1994 and 2013 have been described as ‘turning points’
in the history of the Italian Republic (D’Arma, 2015, p. xi). The election in
1994 saw the disintegration or profound transformation of all the major parties
that had occupied the political scene since 1945 and—thanks to a reform of the
electoral law—the party system transitioned to a bipolar setting characterised
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Lines join same parties or different parties with common tradition across time.
All data refer to election results for the Chamber of Deputies, except for 2006 data, which refers to results
for the Senate.
DC: Democrazia Cristiana; FDP: Fronte Democratico Popolare; PCI: Partito Comunista Italiano; PSI:
Partito Socialista Italiano; PDS: Partito Democratico della Sinistra; FI: Forza Italia; AN: Alleanza
Nazionale; PPI: Partito Popolare Italiano; LN: Lega Nord; DS: Democratici di Sinistra; M: la Margherita;
PD; Partito Democratico; PDL: Popolo della Libertà; M5S: Movimento 5 Stelle.
Source: (Ministero dell’Interno, 2013)
Figure 4.13: Vote distribution in Italian general elections (1948-2013)
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by two broad centre-right and centre-left coalitions. The general election of 2013
again shocked the party system by undermining, with the introduction of a third
major party, the bipolarity that had characterised every general election since
1994. In both cases since neither party could count on the infrastructure of a mass
organisation to mobilise electoral support, media were crucial in delivering their
message to the electorate. And television played the workhorse role.
4.2. The rise of Forza Italia and the role of television
In January 1994 Silvio Berlusconi founded, funded and shaped his political
creature, Forza Italia, in the image of his own company, Fininvest (which might
have directly lent to the new party up to €11.70 million19), and leveraged its
financial capacity, human resources, and—critically—mass media infrastructure
(Hopkin, 2004). Although Berlusconi’s communication and political skills did
play a fundamental role in an almost unprecedented electoral success for a new
party, the corporate backup crucially provided the resources to broadcast the
party’s message and reach voters (see McCarthy, 1996): in 1994 Silvio Berlusconi
demonstrated that the Italian party system was open to new players that could
mobilise mass support by deploying the resources of a €9.96 billion corporation.20
It is interesting to compare the development of what was to become the M5S
with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Meetup membership appears to be a good indicator
for the actual membership of the M5S since the two numbers are relatively close—
as of January 2014 there were 76,764 Meetup members against 87,656 people
registered with the M5S (Grillo, 2014)—and it is reasonable to assume that the
two memberships grew similarly. In quantitative terms, the mobilisation effort
of the M5S through Meetup was slower than the mobilisation of Forza Italia.
Accordingly, Forza Italia was conceived in mid-1993 but already in March 1994,
19At current value. The figure of 14.40 billion Italian lire was published in a report by the
auditing firm KPMG (Bonini & Fedrizzi, 2001)
20At current value. The New York Times reported Fininvest to be worth US $ 7.20 billion in
January 1995. (Tagliabue, 1995)
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just before the General Election, the ‘Associazione Nazionale dei club “Forza
Italia!”’ had 14,200 members who signed up paying € 20.25 (at current value)
(Poli, 2001, pp. 47-48). It took 3 years and 3 months to Grillo’s ‘meetups’ to
mobilise the same number of members.
The rapid rise of Forza Italia and the election as Prime Minister of Berlusconi
only a few months after creating his political movement—significantly both
Berlusconi and Grillo refrained from the use of the term ‘party’, an institution
that both men accused of being part of the problem—has been largely attributed
to television. Berlusconi was not only the owner of the three major private TV
channels but also an unmatched TV communicator and TV salesman. In fact,
according to Ginsborg (2004), the electorate that voted Berlusconi into office in
1994 was shaped during the 1980s by his TV shows. In the words of Bobbio
(Bobbio, Bosetti, and Vattimo, 1994, p. 36 as cited in D’Arma, 2015, p. 8):
I believe that television has played a decisive role, but not because
Berlusconi has enjoyed greater visibility than his political rivals. It is
rather that the society created by television is naturally a society of
the right. [...] It is not Berlusconi as such who won; it is the society
that his media and TV commercials have created that won.
Indeed, survey data confirm that television had been since 1968 by far the
main source of information for voters. Figure 4.14 based on electoral surveys
conducted between 1968 and 2013 (Associazione Itanes, 2013) shows the longit-
udinal evolution in the answer to two survey questions: whether the respondent
followed political programs on TV and their primary source of information
during the campaign. Television has clearly maintained a net predominance as
informational medium during the campaign although in 2013 it declined slightly
for the first time due to the growth of the Internet, which in any case is the
primary source of information only for about 8% of respondents.
177
Chapter 4. (Self)organising mobilisation and participation
Figure 4.14: Relevance of TV as source of information (source: Itanes, 2013)
4.3. Media attention
If affinities in the trajectory and historical context of the rise of Forza Italia
and the M5S have been widely discussed in the literature, the actual media
attention catalysed by the two leaders has attracted considerably less attention.
The fundamental role of legacy media in determining the electoral success of the
two movements in 1994 and 2013 has never been disputed. If Berlusconi was
directly present in the media, Grillo appeared indirectly (but still frequently)
since the leader of the M5S refused to participate in political programs (Diamanti,
2014).
But media data presented in Figure 4.15 suggests instead that the level of
attention dedicated to Berlusconi and Grillo was significantly different. By
comparing the normalised frequency of articles mentioning the two figures in the
two major Italian newspapers (Corriere della Sera and Repubblica) during the weeks
around the elections of 1994 and 2013, it clearly appears that, if the attention
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dedicated by the two newspapers to the two leaders before the campaign was
somehow similar, Berlusconi attracted much more attention than Grillo in the
weeks preceding the election while Grillo managed to increase his presence only
after the unexpected electoral result.
The number of articles mentioning Berlusconi and Grillo is normalised against the number of
articles returned by searching the term ‘politica’ (Italian for politics) in the corresponding week.
Figure 4.15: Presence of ‘Silvio Berlusconi’ and ‘Beppe Grillo’ in the two major Italian newspapers
in the 71 days around the elections of 1994 and 2013.
Grillo and the M5S also received considerably less TV attention than other
parties running in the 2013 general election. Figure 4.16 presents the percentage
of airtime dedicated to four parties on the six major TV channels as measured
by Italy’s Authority for Communications Guarantees (AGCOM, 2016). The four
parties are the M5S, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), the centre-left Democratic
Party (PD) and the centrist Civic Choice (SC). The two networks, publicly owned
RAI and privately owned Mediaset, followed similar behaviours, dedicating
179
Chapter 4. (Self)organising mobilisation and participation
approximately the same time to the four parties, with the only notable exception
of Mediaset (owned by Berlusconi), that unsurprisingly dedicated relatively more
airtime to FI. What is quite surprising is that the airtime dedicated before the
election to the M5S is lower than that dedicated to any other party. It is clear
that, even if television was certainly relevant in distributing political information,
airtime did not translate proportionally into votes. In the 180 days preceding the
2013 general election, the M5S received on average 4.2% of the airtime dedicated
to parties, while Civic Choice (also a new party) received 16%, the Democratic
Party 24% and Forza Italia 34%. Still the M5S obtained more than 25% of the
national vote, Civic Choice under the leadership of Prime Minister Mario Monti
obtained only 8%.
(1) Local elections of 2012; (2) General election of 2013; (3) European election of 2014. as measured
by Italy’s Authority for Communications Guarantees as percentage of time dedicated to all parties.
Figure 4.16: Time dedicated to the three major parties during newscasts. (Agcom, 2016)
But the level of media attention dedicated to Grillo and his movement was
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low even before the electoral campaign of 2013 began (Mosca, 2014, pp. 41-42).
The level of attention dedicated by the press and TV from the creation of the blog
until the local elections of 2012 was stable and relatively low (see Figure 4.17).
In the two major Italian newspapers, the number of articles mentioning Beppe
Grillo and published between January 2005 (when the blog was created) and
February 2013 (just before the general election) was on average one fifth of the
number mentioning the leader of the major opposition party. Data from articles
published in Corriere della Sera would suggest that the media seemed not to be
particularly interested in the new movement until its first electoral success; the
media did not provide the visibility and exposure that are usually indispensable
to political parties especially during their first electoral campaigns, when they are
unknown to most of the electorate. Even during the electoral campaign preceding
the 2013 general election, the attention of news media towards Grillo was low
compared with the attention dedicated to all the other candidates: in the 90 days
preceding the election, ‘Grillo was present only in 7 per cent of front-page news
and in 5 per cent of the time dedicated to information TV. As a term of reference,
the leader of the PD, Pierluigi Bersani, had 18 per cent and 13 per cent of the
space in newspapers and on TV respectively; Silvio Berlusconi 35 per cent and
19 per cent.’ (Legnante, Mancini, Mazzoleni, and Itanes, 2013 cited in Tronconi,
2015c, p. 216).
Interestingly the M5S succeeded in creating a totally new experience in Italian
political history—a political organisation rising to national relevance without the
support of any significant financial or organisational resource—largely thanks to
the fact that ICTs brought the cost of reaching, organising and mobilising mass
audiences down to zero (see Shirky, 2008; S. Coleman, 2012; Karpf, 2012). Yet
traditional public and media events still had to play a (fundamental) triggering
role to motivate people, by nurturing a sense of empowerment (Rainie & Wellman,
2012, p. 219), to participate on a scale that eventually made the difference between
political relevance and irrelevance.
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(1) V-Day in 2007; (2) Local elections of 2012; (3) General election of 2013; (4) European election
of 2014
Figure 4.17: Media attention attracted by Beppe Grillo and the M5S
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5. Conclusions: The citizen-user
5.1. The Internet as medium, identity and redemption
The mobilisation and eventually the organisation of the M5S was started and
directed by Beppe Grillo from his blog. Since his early postings at the beginning
of 2005, Grillo placed the Internet at the centre of its discourse; as a tool to
communicate, inform and organise but also as a metaphor for a new way to see
society as a decentralised, non-hierarchical, continuously deliberating, informed
and efficient polity; as an instrument brandished against the establishment,
the political class and the party system, but also the economic elites and the
legacy media. A community of Internet users quickly formed around his blog
and message. As much as they felt economically disempowered and politically
disenfranchised in a dysfunctional system permeated by economic and moral
corruption, they also felt distant from traditional political ideologies. But they
were not without an ideology. In fact, the community embraced early an ideology
defined by the system of ideas and ideals represented by the Internet and the
unprecedented capabilities enabled by its technologies.
The Internet was a powerful (and, as I argue, essential) communication
channel for Grillo and its nascent Movement but was never only a medium for
communication. The citizens that populated the early online-only community,
later mobilised in the networks of meetups and finally in the Five Star Movement
(M5S), idealised their status of user of the Internet—as meta-institution to bring a
revolutionary change to other institutions of society (state, economy and media)—
and envisioned their role as users as an essential complement to their role as
citizens. In fact, only their being users could re-empower them as citizens of an
atrophic political system, that is, as relevant agents to bring about change.
We do not have a demographic picture of the community of citizen-users
that created the conditions for the success of the M5S, but based on M5S voters
responding in 2013 to ITANES electoral survey (2013, see Figure 4.18) we can
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assume that they were probably younger (significantly, according to the electoral
survey) and more highly educated (although not significantly). This, of course,
makes sense if we consider that education and age strongly correlate with use
the Internet, which was (and is) essential to participate in the M5S.21 We can also
assume that there are two attitudes that mostly define the community around the
M5S: distrust towards representative institutions, expressed by almost the totality
of M5S voters (see Section 2.3), and economic anxiety, felt by almost 70% of M5S
voters (and by 46% of non-M5S voters, see Figure 4.18). That is a strong feeling
of both political and economic disempowerment.
The profound and multilevel feeling of disempowerment permeating the
community of activists indicates that the Internet must be intended, in the case
of the M5S but also in the case of other anti-establishment movements, as an
instrument of redemption and re-empowerment for the citizen-users. Grillo
engaged people through his blog and his shows, but it was the Internet that gave
them a voice and the possibility of meeting, discussing and organising. In fact, I
argue, it was the sense of empowerment that citizen-users kept regularly receiving
from their participation (in different forms, but always Internet-mediated) in
the movement that sustained the movement between 2005 and its first electoral
successes in 2012. It is no coincidence that the first boost in membership happened
after the success of the rallies organised in September 2007 (see Figure 4.1). The
Internet-based organisation delivered not only an event with high participation
levels but also succeeded in attracting the attention of the legacy media (see
Figure 4.17) which placed the movement on its radar.
Grillo’s movement was not the only protest movement to emerge in the 2000s
from the same milieu (anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, anti-corruption, see
Della Porta, 2015b). But it was the only one to sustain its activities long enough
21At the time of writing, although the Movement is the second group in Parliament party for
size, registration to the M5S, to local meetups and deliberation are only possible online, which
excludes members of more than 30% of Italian households that have no Internet connection (Istat,
2016).
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to consolidate. This happened because of the charisma of the leader but arguably
also because the movement effectively rewarded its members with a sense of
empowerment, derived from an organisational success certified by the attention
of legacy media, and with a sense of community maintained by a web of relations
that took place on social media (which I will explore in the next chapter) and in
person in thousands of meetings organised via Meetup.com.
5.2. Evidence of electoral impacts
The relevance of the M5S does not stop at its organisational trajectory, which could
mobilise and reach, depending on the definition of mobilisation, between 92,000
(those who have registered to a meetup of the M5S between 2005 and 2015) and 2
million (those who liked at least one post on the Facebook page of Beppe Grillo).
The Movement participated in the general election of 2013 and gained almost
8.8 million votes. There are two observations possible based on that result. First,
the size of its electorate must cast into doubt the definition of M5S as an Internet
party. As indicated in this chapter, based on the electoral survey conducted
after the 2013 election, 27% of the M5S voters have no Internet access and only
44% accessed any political content on the web during the campaign. Second,
the proportion of membership to vote obtained in the election is historically
low. If we consider only the membership of the Movement on the eve of the
election (43,000), for each member registered to a meetup the M5S obtained
204.5 votes. To put this number into context it is useful to compare the ratio
of votes received/membership by the M5S in 2013 with data collected about
Italian parties for the period 1980-2007 (Mair & Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen, Mair, &
Poguntke, 2012). In this period a linear regression analysis (in which ‘year’ is a
control variable since Van Biezen et al. (2012) have empirically demonstrated that
membership has been declining across Europe during the last decades) indicates
that the association between membership and vote is strongly significant and that
for an increase of one member there was an expected increase of 7.2 votes (see
Figure 4.19). Interestingly, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI)—also a party strongly
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Figure 4.19: Association between membership and vote (1980-2007, R2 = 0.81) (Mair & Biezen,
2001; Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012)
invested in media communication—is the party with the most similar proportion
to that of the M5S with 55 voters for each member in 1998 and 22 in 2007,
although Forza Italia was significantly less effective in ‘converting’ members into
votes than the M5S.
The territorial analysis of the distribution of meetup members at the level
of the 110 Italian provinces and vote gained by the M5S in those provinces in
three consecutive elections indicates that, if limited in size in terms of traditional
party standards, membership has a significant association with votes. This alone
does not establish a direct causal relation running from membership to vote.
Indeed more research is needed to investigate the dynamical relation between
voting and local activism, a relation that is possibly influenced by confounding
characteristics of the territory. But especially in light of empirical findings
presented in this chapter on air time on national television dedicated to the M5S,
which was significantly lower than air time dedicated to any other major party, a
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causal relationship between membership and vote is reasonable especially since
membership is captured before the election thus excluding a possible inverse
causal relationship from this specific analysis.
The M5S message was easily communicated through short slogans that Beppe
Grillo skilfully shared on his blog and social media channels. Television played a
role in delivering his message but it is difficult to overestimate the importance of
social networks, partially or totally Internet-mediated, reaching out to potential
voters. As seen, although the Internet has grown in importance, only less than
50% of the M5S voters in 2013 used it to obtain information. But Internet access
and use are not geographically determined as much as demographically determined.
That is, although I do not present data on face-to-face interactions, it is plausible
to assume that voters who are not exposed to the message of the M5S because
they are not connected, might be easily exposed to someone who is.
The Internet crowd of citizen-users has played a crucial role in multiplying the
reach of the forming movement in the early days, has sustained the movement
during its first years of consolidation and finally contributed to the electoral
campaign of 2013 by disseminating pro-movement talk on social media and by
bringing it into communities of friends, coworkers and families throughout Italy.
With their actions and dedication, citizen-users contributed to give credibility
to a movement that self-identified as distant from professional, economic and
political elites and to shape the public identity of a movement that to this day is
still portrayed as empowered only by people and Internet resources.
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Online deliberative system
Writing is thinking.
Diedre McCloskey
Digito ergo sum
Because something is happening here
But you don’t know what it is
Do you, Mister Jones?
Bob Dylan
If the previous chapter has described citizen-users and their relevance as
agents of political mobilisation, shaping the identity of the M5S and crucially
reaching beyond the borders of the Internet to promote its message, this chapter
focuses on citizen-users as Internet users. It leverages the quantitative analysis
of digital traces to map interactions and behaviours of users across the online
platforms of the M5S with the aim of describing the inner functioning of the
web of online interactions that have sustained the Movement over 10 years. It
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Variable Measurement Coding
Permanence Distance between first and last
posting
Statistical
Frequency Average number of postings
published each day, week or
month
Quantitative analysis
Scope Number of topics discussed Quantitative analysis
Gender Gender inferred from user’s first
name
Quantitative analysis
Style (neg-
ative)
Relative frequency of rude or of-
fensive terms published
Quantitative analysis
Style (pos-
itive)
Use of facts, expression of dis-
agreement/agreement
Qualitative analysis of sample
Opinion Opinion expressed on specific is-
sue
Qualitative analysis of sample
Political
orienta-
tion
Binary position on specific issue Qualitative analysis of sample
Table 5.1: Variables and their measurements
wants to provide a quantitative description of the deliberation process, from
tiny, low-threshold forms of participation (Van Laer & Van Aelst, 2010; Margetts
et al., 2015) to more expressive forms of participation such as commenting in the
online forum or registering for an onsite meeting. First, the chapter provides
a quantitative description of the frequency of participation and flows between
the different platforms of the M5S (i.e. Meetup, Facebook, Grillo’s blog and
the Forum). Second, the chapter describes through network analysis how users
practically engaged with one another as they discuss three issues.
To operationalise the analysis I develop and code a set of variables. Table 5.1
describes the variables of the analysis and how they are estimated. By exploring
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and testing variation over time and association among these variables I perform
an empirical analysis to better understand patterns of political participation
and deliberation. For example, a pattern indicating a general increase in the
frequency of activity and scope of discussed topics over time would signal that the
Forum—and the social network of (visible and invisible) participants behind it—is
successful in sustaining users’ online participation and expanding their interests.
On the contrary, if permanence is generally limited in time or sustained only
around major events (rallies and elections covered by the media), the argument
of a positive effect of online participatory tools would necessarily lose ground.
Also, how balanced is participation in the discussion? What role does gender
play? Does gender help predict the scope of interest of the average user? Do male
users tend to be more argumentative and aggressive in their wording?
The same set of variables is then used to conduct a network analysis to
map relations among users and postings. Exponential random graph modelling
(Lusher et al., 2013) allows the statistical analysis of presence (or absence) of ties
among nodes controlling for given attributes of the nodes. It could then estimate
whether the structure of the observed network among users indicates that users
tend to prefer interacting with similar users (for gender, political orientations,
permanence on the forum) or which relations tend to favour positive (use of
argument) or negative (aggressive wording) deliberative behaviours: are users
significantly more aggressive when interacting with female users or with users of
different political orientation, and conversely what favours positive behaviours?
In the first section, I describe the theoretical framework that guides the
interpretation of the data analysis. The concepts of everyday political talk and
networked self-help characterise and describe the activities of the users I track
through the online media system of the M5S. In the second section, I provide a
quantitative analysis of the behaviour of users across four platforms: Facebook,
Forum, blog and Meetup. The interest will be in mapping how users move across
the different platforms and what behavioural and demographic features are
possible to infer from the traces they left behind. In the third section, I describe
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the coding of the textual content of the Forum and map the evolution of topics
over time. In the final and fourth section I use network analysis to describe and
model the characteristics of the interaction among users in the discussions around
three politically relevant issues.
1. Everyday political talk
The mapping of online interactions on the different platforms of the M5S and
their relations with a broader ongoing political debate is framed around the
concepts of everyday political talk (Mansbridge, 1999) and networked self (Rainie &
Wellman, 2012).
1.1. Everyday political talk
The influential idea of public sphere elaborated by Habermas (1962/1989) is ef-
fective in drawing a demarcation line to contain the intricate threads of talks,
debates and thinking, which unfold publicly and shape what arguably is ‘public
reason’. Mansbridge’s formulation of the concept of everyday political talk helps in
appreciating the political importance of the discussions that occur out of formal
deliberative rules and without the goal of producing binding decisions. Follow-
ing Habermas’s theoretical conceptualisation of a division of labour between a
public sphere in charge of ‘opinion-formation’ and state institutions in charge of
‘will-formation’, Mansbridge defines a deliberative system that encompasses both
formal and informal deliberative procedures (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 227)—or, by
using the categorisation of Joohan Kim and Eun Joo Kim (2008), instrumental
deliberation and dialogic deliberation respectively. Indeed, according to J. Kim and
Kim (2008) ‘deliberative democracy involves two dimensions of deliberation. One
is instrumental deliberation, through which experts in the political system and
rational citizens in the public sphere make collective decisions based on public
reasons and shared values. The other is dialogic deliberation, through which
citizens, without specific purposes and goals, freely interact with one another
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to understand mutually the self and others, resulting in the production and
reproduction of rules, shared values, and public reasons for deliberation’ (p. 53).
Thus informal talk that happens to occur in the kitchen, online or in the cor-
ridors of parliament all contribute without any coordination to shape meanings,
understandings and ideas which then permeate the institutional public decision-
making process. This notion of a broad deliberative system which also includes
chatter that, in the words of Mansbridge, ‘is not always self-conscious, reflective,
or considered’ (1999, p. 211) rejects the narrow definition of liberal individualists
(Chadwick, 2012, p. 46) of a deliberative democracy based on strict preconditions
such as those defined by ‘an ideal deliberative procedure’ formulated by Cohen
(1989/1997; as cited in J. Kim and Kim, 2008, p. 55) or requiring ‘reasonable and
rational agent[s]’ with well defined ‘plan’ and ‘ends’ as argued by Rawls (1997,
p. 93). Moreover, Habermas stresses the fundamental importance of informal
political discussions in his theory of communicative action (1981/1984) because
‘reason is not given from outside the society nor does it preexist in individuals’
subjective minds; rather, reason is to be produced by nonpurposive, nonstrategic,
nonsuccess-oriented social interactions’ (J. Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 54).
I argue that the concept of everyday political talk is useful to interpret the role
and rationale of online political debate, and also to locate and frame it within a
broader deliberative system, which exceeds the Internet, which will be the focus
of the next chapter; on a continuum that moves from the bedroom to the halls
of power and intersects different actors moved by different motivations. That is
to say, I argue that even if the snapshot of an exchange of a few uncoordinated
online textual comments may at the micro-level appear inconsequential, it is
neither meaningless for society nor for participants. Indeed in the Habermasian
tradition, dialogue is not only transformative for the issue being talked about
but is also transformative for the participant’s self—‘which allows for changing
and being changed’ (Cissna & Anderson, 1998, p. 10; as cited in J. Kim & Kim,
2008, p. 57); and interestingly the effects on the self, as result of the dialogue, are
possibly deemed as more important by participants than the impacts on others
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(Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002; as cited in J. Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 58).
1.2. The networked self
In light of the exponential increase of the opportunities of communication ex-
perienced by the quasi-totality of the population of developed and developing
countries, thanks to both the ‘Internet revolution’ and the ‘mobile revolution’
(Rainie & Wellman, 2012), everyday political talk is much less constrained by time
and space, and—it is reasonable to assume—it increases in complexity and relev-
ance. Rainie and Wellman further developed the emergence of a networked self
who is simultaneously part of ‘social networks that are more diverse and less
overlapping than [...] previous groups’ (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 9); a self who
does not dissociate in distinct online and offline selves but ‘a single self that gets
reconfigured in different situations’ (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 126). Thus I
argue that the conversations on online forums do not need to differ from offline
everyday political talk in terms of the significance they assume for participants or
in terms of the intrinsic motivations they provide, which are mostly ascribable to
a sense of empowerment (Ekdale, Namkoong, Fung, & Perlmutter, 2010, p. 227;
as cited in Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 219) and a sense of collective identity.
2. Participation on the M5S media system
The different components of the M5S media systems allow an unprecedented
granular analysis of the activity behaviour of participants. Through web scraping
and API services1 I have collected public data for a period of more than ten years
from the forum, the blog, Meetup and 981 public pages related to the Movement
(including the official Facebook page of Beppe Grillo and of the M5S). Although
digital traces left by users do not allow one to infer any socio-demographic traits,
1An API, or application programming interface, allows to programmatically access the re-
sources of a web site, which are returned in a structured form (contrary, for example, to the data
displayed on a web page, which is generally unstructured) based on specific queries.
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it is still possible to use the data to observe the frequency of activity across the
different platforms and to infer the gender of individual users by their first name.
Each platform plays a different role for the Movement and for the participants
who navigate across and between them. Beppe Grillo’s blog is the cradle of the
Movement and the channel through which the leader communicates (unilaterally)
with his followers. The comment section of the blog has collected since January
2005 more than 5 million comments. The Facebook pages of the Movement
are the broader gate to enter into contact with the M5S and other social media
users interested in it: since 2009 almost 3 million users have been active on
the pages. The Forum is the space where registered members can post their
proposals and comments and engage horizontally with the rest of the community
of M5S. Finally, Meetup is the platform where participants can organise and meet
onsite across the country (for the complete map of the M5S media system see
Figure 4.12).
In this section, I try to understand the role of the different platforms and
especially the relationship between different online forms of participation (from
‘liking’ a picture to articulately discussing the positions of the Movement) and
onsite participation. As the Internet is adopted by participants in politically mo-
tivated actions, a discussion has emerged on how to integrate Internet-mediated
forms of participation with the traditional repertoires of political participation.
An influential framework for analysis is proposed by Van Laer and Van Aelst
(2010) that differentiates between ‘Internet-based’ and ‘Internet supported’ forms
of participation respectively, indicating forms that are intended to be entirely
concluded online and forms that are instead meant to be deployed in their final
acts onsite. Whether a clear distinction can still be supported as larger and larger
segments of our lives are in some way Internet-mediated—the impact of an onsite
protest cannot be measure without accounting also for the impact of its online
counterpart, in the forms of the cloud of tweets, likes and comments about the
same event—is debatable. But the interest here is in providing an empirical ana-
lysis of what happens in practice within a large and diverse political community
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populated by tens of thousands of users based on the relations observed between
different Internet platforms.
In order to identify whether the same participant was active multiple times
within the same platforms and across different platforms I restricted my analysis
to users with unequivocal names: I identified all names (a string composed of
first and last name) that belonged to multiple users in a single platform and,
successively, dropped all users with these non-unique names from the data of
every platform. In other words, I assumed, first, that a name (again, intended
as combination of first and last name) can belong to more than one person,
second, that a few names are much more common than others and, third, that
people tend to register to platforms only once under their actual name (something
that Facebook actually requires and enforces through suspension of ‘illegitimate’
accounts). Consequently, in order to identify common names, I searched the
list of names registered with the same platforms for non-unique names and
assumed they belonged to different people. This set of non-unique (or common)
names was then removed from all lists to create a set of names that could be
assumed to belong to only one person possibly active on multiple platforms. In
doing so, I created a sample of 2.3 million users from an original population of
approximately 3.5 million users.
2.1. Where users enter the media system
The first questions I tried to answer based on the data is where users land first in
the media system and how they successively move across the different platforms.
The interest is in understanding what platform attracts most of the users to the
Movement and whether users then move to a different platform. If we assume
a degree of ‘specialisation’ between the different platforms (with the Forum
and Meetup being more operational and dedicated to policy formulation and
membership organisation) thus it is interesting to understand whether users
focus on only one platform or instead search for a more faceted participatory
experience. The integration of different platforms is common since the online
196
Francesco Bailo
footprint of a political organisation is on one side determined by preexisting
preferences of users—in this case, the popularity of Facebp.com was initially
suggested and linked by Grillo in an early blogpost. In this sense, interplatform
flows measured by users’ timestamped activities are relevant because they suggest
the relative contribution to the Movement’s online popularity across the different
platforms. Consequently, given the presence of Facebook among the platforms
used, they might suggest the relative importance of personal networks (Facebook
friendships) as opposed to the relative importance of political messages that are
not mediated by personal networks (i.e. the Forum and Grillo’s blog). Importantly,
the analysis is necessarily based only on traces left by the public activity of users
(posts or likes) since no data is available for views.
Figure 5.1 illustrates for each of the four platforms the percentage of users
that arrived at it directly or indirectly after landing on a different platform. Most
of the users active on a platform are ‘native’ to that platform (that is, they did
not previously appear on another platform) but if on Facebook and the blog the
percentage of native users is above 95% and 97% respectively, for the Forum
and Meetup the percentage of users that reached the platform only after visiting
another is significantly higher: almost a quarter and third respectively. Looking
at the bilateral exchange of users among each pair of platforms, or the fraction
of native users moving to a different platform, it emerges that Facebook plays a
predominant role in attracting users from other platforms: between 20 and 30%
of users who originally landed on blog, Forum and Meetup successively also
appeared on Facebook. Bilateral exchanges between Meetup, blog and forum
are limited if we consider the fraction of users moving out of each platform but
in general, native Meetup users appear to be more active on other platforms,
followed by Forum users and blog users. Native Facebook users show a very
limited interest in other platforms if we look at the outgoing fraction of users.
When the percentage is translated into the actual number of users of the original
population of 2,934,377 Facebook users, we can estimate (based on the sample
data) that 8216 Facebook users successively moved to Meetup, 9977 to the blog
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and 4695 to the Forum, which is still significantly lower than the inverse flow
of 27,746 users from Meetup, 73,833 from the blog and 20,021 from the forum
based on their estimated total user population. This can be explained by a
(growing) relative importance of Facebook at the core of the M5S media system.
Indeed, in a media system in which the fora for debate are distributed across
different websites, it might be problematic for a user to understand where the
effectiveness of involvement is higher. As Facebook draws the attention of users
and of personalities of the Movement (e.g. MPs and mayors), it turns into the
medium where important information is shared and where—since everybody is
there—it might more convenient to be active to get attention.
2.2. Users’ copresence across platforms
In order to check whether the behavioural data collected from the Internet
is compatible with data collected through different means, I used responses
provided in the 2013 electoral survey (Associazione Itanes, 2013). I test first
whether the percentage of Meetup users also active on Facebook corresponds to
the percentage of M5S voters who declared in the survey having participated in
onsite demonstrations or meetings (as proxy of Meetup participation) and have
visited the official pages of parties or politicians on social media (as proxy of
activity on Facebook). The variables are not totally equivalent and the number of
respondents is only 48. The survey question on participation is much broader
in scope, qualifying onsite participation as presence at a rally, political debate
or meeting while the survey question on social media is not only limited to
Facebook but it also explicitly mentions Twitter and YouTube. Moreover, in
the data collected from the Internet, presence on Facebook is intended as active
presence through likes or comments. Even considering these differences the two
percentages are compatible: 44.5% of Meetup users are also active on Facebook
while, according to the electoral survey, 52.3% of voters of the M5S have visited
at least once the page of a party of a politician on social media.
In general, the data from the Internet indicates that more than half of Meetup
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Figure 5.1: User behaviour between blog, Meetup, Facebook and forum
users (53.1%)—which I all assume to be onsite participants since Meetup.com
offers only limited social media services apart from those related to organising,
publicising and participating in onsite meetings—are also active on other plat-
forms and 42.5% have posted a comment on other platforms. If compared to the
electoral survey, the fraction of onsite activists also actively commenting online
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overshoots the fraction of onsite participants declaring in the survey also having
take part in online discussions (31.8%). A possible explanation for this difference
is that the technological barrier to browse a website (to read an article or watch
a video) is considerably lower than the barrier to actively engage with a website.
Thus a Meetup user might differ from the average onsite activist because they
necessarily own not only the capacity but also the dedication to actively engage
with the technology of website.
The number of sample users commenting on any platform also present on
Meetup is expectedly limited (1.8%). This is probably due to the fact that
Facebook pages of the Movement are accessible for comments to all Facebook
users (estimated in Italy alone to be around 26 million2). If we restrict the analysis
to only those participating in the Forum, thus it is assumed to people closer to the
orbit of the Movement, the percentage rises to about 9%. This proportion might
appear low since it indicates that less that a tenth of users active on the Forum,
which was intended as an operational interface for policy proposals, are also
involved in onsite participation. This is even more surprising since meetups had
real power within the M5S (for example, they had great autonomy in selecting
candidates for elections). But it might also indicate that only a minority of
users of the Forum feel the need to complement their participation with onsite
participation. In this sense, to see onsite participation as a natural next step for
someone involved in online participation might not only not reflect the actual
behaviour of the large majority of users but also assign a higher value to onsite
(and higher threshold forms of) participation that most of the users active online
simply do not perceive.
The fraction of users active on one platform who are also active on other
websites is important to understand how the platform is integrated with (or
open to) the rest of the media system. Given one the total number of users on a
platform, Figure 5.2 shows the fraction of users also active on another platform.
2The figure of Italian users on Facebook is provided by Facebook through its Create Adverts
page where the audience for each selection of demographic traits is estimated.
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The concentration of the distribution is estimated computing the Gini coefficient.
The fact that most of the users who appear on one platform do not appear
anywhere else is also due to the fact that 38% of users left only one trace on just
one platform and only one-third of the sample left more than five traces in total.
Meetup and the Forum were demonstrated to be the most integrated platforms
with similar Gini-coefficients, followed by the blog and finally by Facebook.
The copresence analysis offers interesting insights into the dynamics of online
users and political participation. The four platforms clearly play very different
roles in the everyday lives of their users. Facebook is not a platform dedicated to
political participation and it is therefore possible to imagine that users who ended
up liking or commenting on a post published by the Movement might have found
it in their timeline because of the behaviour of their Facebook friends or simply
because the Facebook algorithm assessed that the post might have some interest
for the user. In other words, on Facebook users do not necessarily need to search
for a particular content—and most of the time they probably do not—but instead
they see the content that is proposed to them by the service. And in this sense,
the style of the Movement (simple and usually entertaining) might have played
well with the Facebook algorithm, which certainly selects content based on its
potential to keep users longer on the site. Then it is not surprising to find that
Facebook users very rarely reached other platforms. Yet because of the huge user
base of Facebook, its contribution to the other two platforms, Meetup and the
Forum, is important.
The flow of attention towards Meetup is the most relevant for the question of
whether online participation might have an effect on offline participation. As we
noticed, since Meetup does not offer traditional social networking services (like
messaging or picture sharing) it is reasonable to consider all its users as interested
in organising or participating in offline meetings. The fact that of the 43,500 users
in the Meetup sample, about one-quarter of users has been active previously
on other platforms, indicate that indeed online participation might trigger an
interest in onsite political action. And in this sense probably the most interesting
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participants are those that landed on Facebook first and later reached Meetup to
register with a group. If we take the 43,500-large sample as representative of the
entire Meetup population of 92,500 users registered with a group of the M5S, this
translates to a total flow of more than 11,000 people who moved from interacting
on Facebook to some level of onsite participation.
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The Gini coefficient measures the dispersion of users across the different platforms.
Figure 5.2: Percentage of users of each platform also active on other platforms
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of users active on each platform in their first, second, third and fourth
activity
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activity
2.3. The role of gender
Gender in political participation is explored in a survey of about 50,000 Italians
conducted in 2013 by the Italian National Institute for Statistics (Istat, 2014b).
The figures confirm that although an interest in politics is almost equal between
males and females—of the 70.8% of respondents declaring that they ‘talk about
politics’, 53.3% are male and 46.7% female—joining a party is predominantly a
male activity: of the 1.1% of respondents declaring that they have joined a party
more than 70% are male. In a different survey on Internet access (Istat, 2014c), the
gender gap appears to be virtually null: male Internet users represent 52% the
population aged 6-65. In terms of the gender split, the survey figures on interest
in politics are remarkably close to the data of actual behaviours (see Figure 5.5).
Name matching identifies 76.4% of Meetup users as male (70.6% in the 2013
survey) and among Facebook users liking the pages of the Movement 43.6% as
female (against 46.7% female respondents declaring an interest in politics). But
the data also point to a growing gender gap in commenting behaviour. Of the
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1,812,876 online sample users assigned to a gender, only 39% are female. This
figure is compatible with the Itanes electoral survey of the entire population in
which of the respondents declaring themselves to be active online3 37.2% are
female. When we instead focus on actual comments (thus excluding liking) the
percentage of female participants drops to 20.1% in the blog and to 13.3% in the
Forum. The gap is particularly apparent on Facebook where we have behaviours
regarding comments as well as likes. The liking of female participants testifies
that they are in fact present and interested in the page in almost equal number
to male users—in Italy female users are only 46.15% of the total according to
Facebook and 48.12% according to the electoral survey. And yet when it comes to
commenting, female participation in the observational data drops by almost 29%
(these results are consistent with Bode, 2017).
Results from Facebook have important implications for the actual access of
citizens to political participation because they are generated by a population
which approximates in terms of gender representation the broader polity popu-
lation (that is, approximately 50% male and 50% female). First, from the liking
behaviour we can assume that women are as interested as men in politics. In other
words, the data help us in ruling out that women are not politically active because
they are less interested than men. Second, there is a clear barrier to women’s
participation as the level of engagement increases but also as the engagement
turns public (although likes are public, the name of the user is not immediately
visible out of their network of friends).
A recent multi-country research on Facebook and political engagement con-
ducted through questionnaires and focus groups (Vromen, Loader, Xenos, &
Bailo, 2016) clearly indicates why some users might refrain from being too public
about political arguments. A female user put it this way: ‘After Obama won his
second term I definitely had some cheery tweets about it, but nothing that could
really piss anyone off. I try to express my views more in real life than online
3The survey question does not specify the type of activity broadly referring to ‘Participating in
online discussions on political issues [...]’
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because I don’t think people are able to handle those conversations maturely and
people end up getting in fights that have nothing to do with politics and a lot
more to do with name calling’ (Vromen et al., 2016, p. 12). Are female users more
concerned about this than men, thus creating a bias in the participating crowd?
The data from the Facebook pages of the M5S seems to support this.
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Figure 5.5: Female and male users
2.4. Users’ permanence
The data also allows a precise understanding of the time spent by each user
online. The upper panel of Figure 5.6 maps the density distribution of the
permanence online of the sample’s users (that is, the difference between the
first and the last activity). As expected a high number of users (45.26% of the
sample) shows only one activity before dropping out of the datasets. The density
line does not proceed linearly but it draws two bumps: one between 0 and 500
days and one between 500 and 1000 days. The datasets collect data up to 31
January 2015; the first bump represents users entering the system at about the
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time of the 2014 European election and still active at the end of January while the
second bump represents users landing at the time of the 2013 general election
(see also Figure 5.7). The bottom panel shows how behaviour differs between
the four platforms and helps characterise how the different websites are used.
Not surprisingly Facebook users appear to be more volatile, highly concentrated
on the left of the distribution (that is, towards very short periods). Also, they
demonstrate much more responsiveness to electoral events, with the density line
drawing very stark bumps around the two elections. The density for very long
attendances is finally lower than for all other platforms. The behaviour of Forum
and Meetup users is remarkably similar indicating that the two platforms might
attract users with a similar level of commitment to the Movement: they are less
volatile than Facebook users and they show a higher density for attendances
between 250 and 1800 days than blog users. Blog users are the most constant
in their behaviours: they are not affected by elections and they outperform all
other user sets for attendances over 2000 days (their density line reaches a local
maximum around 2700 days, corresponding with the V-Day, the national rally of
2007).
2.5. Frequency of activity across time
The final analysis looks at the correlation between the presence of users on differ-
ent websites. After exploring the flows of users among the different platforms, the
idea is to test whether an increase in user presence on one platform significantly
correlates with an increase, after a lag of one week, in another platform. Figure 5.7
maps the number of users active every week across the different websites and
for Facebook the number of users actively commenting, liking or posting every
week. Five dates are marked: the V-Day, the 2012 local elections, the 2013 general
election, the 2014 Sardinian regional election, and the 2014 European election.
Not surprisingly all events draw sharp increases in the number of users active
on almost every platform, a pattern that was also identified in Figure 5.6. The
2013 electoral event is peculiar though because the election was also followed by
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The upper panel the density distribution of time spent by all sampled users calculated as difference
between the first and the last occurrence in the dataset. The bottom panel the distribution of users
with more than one activity for the four platforms.
Figure 5.6: Time spent in the media system by users
intense activity on every website–something that did not happen for the less suc-
cessful election in Sardinia (the Movement failed to present a candidate) and the
European election. Meetup activity (either a user joining a group or a user joining
an event) is clearly seasonal (with drops in activity during summer and winter
holidays) but also less volatile than other online activities; moreover although the
number of active users gently declined after the general election of 2013, it seems
to have been relatively more stable.
A simple comparison of the standard deviations of the different time series
allows us to rank platforms according to how stable and constant the commitment
of users is. The least volatile website is the Forum (SD=588.43) followed by
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Figure 5.7: Number of users active every week
Meetup (SD=868.92), the blog (SD=1843.61) and Facebook (SD=54,134.60). Even
comparing only commenting, the standard deviation of Facebook (11,020.95) is
more than 18 times the standard deviation of the forum.
A formal statistical hypothesis test for ‘causality’, or whether a time series is
helpful in predicting another time series one week in the future, is conducted
among all time series. Figure 5.8 shows the results of the Granger-causality tests
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(Granger, 1969). According to the direction and significance of possible Granger-
causal links, presences on blog, forum and Facebook pages are all found to be
significant predictors of a presence in the other two platforms the following week.
This is not surprising since we saw that external events (such as elections) play an
important role in determining online activities. The more interesting results are
instead the Granger-causal links from Facebook to Meetup and from Meetup to
the Forum. The link between Meetup and the Forum could be explained by the
fact that onsite discussions are followed up online in the forum (more than 10% of
Meetup users are also active on the Forum and 8.5% of Forum users on Meetup)
but multiple confounding variables are possible. To complicate the analysis of the
link from Facebook to Meetup is the fact that the significance of the effect fades
when only comments or posts are considered. That is, what is really affecting
the activity on Meetup is liking. As we observe in Figure 5.7, spikes in liking
volumes are powerful indicators of external events. In fact, more than for other
activities, likes abruptly rise and fall close to the event without any subsequent
tailing off trend (or, symmetrically, any smooth increase ahead of the event). Thus
what the Granger-causality tests may indicate is that, independently of where
the activity takes place, commenting, liking and meeting respond differently
to external events. Likes are instantaneous expressions of participation which
concentrate—for a political community—close to major political events such as
elections. Comments are also triggered by elections but are additionally fuelled,
especially when elections are successful, by other comments; indeed users cannot
reply to likes but can reply to comments. Participation in onsite events follows a
third kind of trajectory: successful political events (such as the V-Day or the 2013
general election) do help mobilisation, but the organised commitment of activists
is less temporally limited by the event itself and is actually sustained over time.
The analysis of platform and cross-platform behaviour of 2.3 million users
delivers a picture where Facebook plays—not surprisingly—the most vital role
in terms of users reached. The Movement itself, through its pages managed by
local meetups, activists and elected members, dedicates considerable resources
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Figure 5.8: Granger-causality test for active users across platforms
to posting on Facebook, publishing after the election of 2013 an average of ap-
proximately 500 posts per week, clearly an indication of its importance. Facebook
allows reaching with content (news, pictures, links) users who are not searching
for that specifically. And if Facebook users tend to generally spend less time
on the pages of the Movement, still a significant minority is observed engaging
in other platforms after being active on Facebook. This indicates that indeed
engagement on Facebook may lead to further engagement online, on the Forum,
but also offline through Meetup.com. Finally, gender is a significant predictor of
engagement. Although women are as active as men in liking of Facebook political
posts, they are much less likely to comment on a post.
3. Issues, topics and style on the Forum
After presenting data on the behaviour of users across four different platforms,
Facebook, blog, Meetup.com and the Forum, I will carry out a textual analysis of
the multithreaded discussion developing in the Forum. The interest is in under-
210
Francesco Bailo
standing not only the dynamics of the discussion itself but also how users interact
in the online debate. More specifically the interest is in the role that difference of
opinions plays in the debate. A recurrent question of online deliberation studies
is whether the Internet increases the propensity of users to engage in political talk
(or for that matter in any other talk) to fragment into communities of like-minded
people, thus reducing exposure to difference to a minium. The predominant
answer is that in indeed the Internet, and social media in particular, does create
‘bubbles’ where users are segregated according to their opinions. Nevertheless,
whether this also happens in well defined and strong political communities such
as the M5S, has not been explored. I noted before that the sense of empowerment
and community might have played an important role in sustaining the activity
of citizen-users and in fact they might be strongly correlated: citizen-users feel
empowered because the Internet has enabled them to organise their community
into a powerful political organisation. But if this is true, maintaining the unity of
the community is important to avoid being disempowered into numerical (and
electoral) irrelevance, thus creating a deliberating context that might see a clear
incentive in engaging with those with a different opinion to convince them, or to
menage their differences.
In this sense, the Forum constitutes a clearer case of a deliberating community
than the other websites in the M5S media system. The Forum has fewer com-
menting users than Facebook or the blog and they tend to be more ‘dedicated’,
returning more often to the debate. Moreover, the Forum is dedicated to the
political discussion while politics is clearly only one of the multiple arguments
discussed on Facebook, increasing the risk of threads of discussions that are not
relevant to the main topic under analysis. Finally, the Forum is managed by users,
who create and comment on the Forum’s threads (although clearly this does not
exclude some form of external control by the site’s administrators) while on the
blog and on the Facebook pages in the dataset, users will always comment under
some postings published by Grillo or by some public figure.
Postings were coded based on three categories: issues, topics and style. Issues
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are narrow in scope and are defined by the presence or absence of key terms in
the text. Topics are defined by large sets of words which can appear with different
degrees of probability in a posting on a topic. Style, which is independent of
both issues and topics, aims to qualify the fashion of the posting in terms of how
opinions are expressed. More generally, topic analysis, conducted by statistically
clustering 50,000 randomly selected texts, aims to take a picture from afar of
the broader discussion. Issues analysis is instead conducted on a more limited
(and different) set of texts, selected based on four dictionaries and then manually
coded. I will now provide more details on how issues, topics and style are coded.
3.1. Coding of issues
The issues I selected for the analysis are immigration, guaranteed minimum
income (GMI), the European single currency and Parliament confidence vote. A
post is considered to discuss an issue if it contains at least one word that matches
a regular expression related to the issue;4 a post can be labelled as pertaining to
multiple issues since labelling is not exclusive. The four issues were identified
because of their relevance to the national debate, because of their importance in
the internal debate of the M5S and also because of their diversity.
Immigration concerns the spheres of national identity, human rights and the
economy, and is a traditional and passionate issue in the political debate. The GMI
is a measure of the welfare state which—although periodically discussed in the
public sphere—never received strong political support. The debate over exiting
the European common currency involves considerations of national sovereignty
and the economy. Finally, the discussion after the general election of 2013 on
the role of the M5S in the negotiations to form a coalition government with the
centre-left Democratic Party is relevant for it historical importance—being the first
4For immigration the corresponding regular expression is immigr,
for GMI is reddito (di cittadinanza|minimo), for the European
single currency is \bdall(.)euro\b, for Parliament confidence vote is
(?=.*(vot(.*?)|dare|diamo)\s(di|la)\s(fiducia))(?=.*bersani).
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political decision of the M5S—but also because it casts light on the relationship
between the public and politics.
Figure 5.9 shows the relative frequency of postings judged to be discussing
the four issues published on the Forum (line) and by Beppe Grillo on his blog
(heatmap). The Figure already confirms that the debates on the four issues had
different temporal dynamics. Not surprisingly the debate on providing support
or not a government in coalition with the Democratic Party through a confidence
vote in parliament is limited to a few weeks after the 2013 general election.
Immigration is a recurrent issue across time and also seems to concentrate at
specific moments, when the frequency of occurrences is possibly triggered by
public events. The GMI and the common currencies issues are campaigning
issues for Beppe Grillo and the Movement; this is confirmed by the intensity of
occurrences of the two issues on Grillo’s blog, with the moment of initiation of
the campaigns clearly visible in the heatmap of Figure 5.9.
3.2. Coding of topics
Postings were clustered with a topic model algorithm in 15 groups. Topics
were fitted with the LDA model originally proposed by Blei et al. (2003) and
implemented in the R package topicmodels (Hornik & Grün, 2011). The LDA
model does not determine the number of groups to identify and the number of
15 is in this case estimated with a trial-and-error process. The algorithm clusters
postings according to the frequency of their words independently from the actual
words’ position within the text: postings containing a relatively more similar
set of words will have more probability of being grouped together. The LDA
model, once the number of topics has been predefined and the text prepared
for the analysis—common words (stopwords), numbers and punctuations are
removed—proceeds in three steps.
1. A term-document matrix is computed listing all words that appear in the
corpus (the collection of postings under analysis) and their frequency in
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Figure 5.9: Relative weekly frequency of users’ and Beppe Grillo’s postings respectively on the
Forum (line) and on the blog (heatmap) containing terms referring to immigration,
GMI, exiting the Euro and parliamentary confidence vote.
postings;
2. Each word will randomly be assigned temporarily to one of the topics; if a
word appears more than once in the corpus it will be randomly assigned to
one or more topics;
3. The probability of each word of each document (or individual posting)
belonging to a topic will be iteratively tested and updated according to
how frequently other occurrences of the word under analysis appears in
different topics and how frequently topics are represented in the document
containing that word. This final step will be repeated multiple times.
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The algorithm will estimate for each document, based on the words it contains,
the probability that it belongs to every one of the set of topics. It is then possible
to assign each document to the most probable topic or instead to all the topics
above a certain probability threshold. Analogously for each topic, the algorithm
will estimate the most likely words that it contains.
Of the 15 topics used by the LDA model to cluster 50,000 randomly sampled
postings of the Forum of the M5S, 13 produced interpretable results and were
manually labelled based on the most likely terms that appear in each topic.
Figure 5.10 presents the number of postings assigned to each label. The topic
labelled as ‘undefined’ contains postings assigned to two different topics by the
LDA model but equally uninterpretable.
undefined
liberalisation − drugs and prostitution
local institutions
rights − personal, family, cultural
law−making
employment and education
environment
microeconomy
macroeconomy
M5S − needs and change
M5S − national politics
M5S − election and representation
M5S − online participation
0 2000 4000 6000
Number of postings (n = 50,000)
Figure 5.10: Number of postings for each topic identified through Latent Dirichlet allocation
Based on a qualitative analysis of the results, the LDA topic modelling tech-
nique seems to successfully identify the major discussion themes that animated
the existence of the Movement since its inception. Importantly of the 15 topics
sought by the algorithm, 13 present a coherent set of words that allows the
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labelling of the topic. The relatively high number of postings (13%) clustered in
the two incoherent topics are possibly explained by the fact that many postings
do in fact discuss multiple topics. Two topics dealing with law-making activities
were assigned the same label. Four topics were focused on the M5S itself with
the word ‘movement’ appearing among the most likely terms.
Table 5.2 displays the 10 most likely terms to appear in each topic. One
topic (labelled ‘needs and change’) stands out since it does not seem to deal
with a specific thematic, instead the words used in these postings pertain to an
aspirational sphere such as ‘necessary’ (literally: ‘it is necessary’), ‘change’, ‘we
can’, ‘ideas’, ‘need’, ‘problem’.
Not surprisingly the fact that the word movement appears often among the
most significant words (LDA identified terms should not only interpret as the
most frequent relatively to other topics but also as the most representative) in four out
of 15 topics signals the importance of the Movement for the community of citizen-
users active on the Forum. Based on the copresence of other significant words
(see Table 5.2), I labelled the four topics as ‘Online participation’, ‘Election and
representation’, ‘National politics’ and ‘Needs and change’. Words’ copresence
indicates that the discussion around the Movement was not only focused on the
construction of the Movement as a national political organisation competing in
elections but also quite interestingly on the internal democracy of the Movement,
with discussion on the role of online participation within the M5S and on the
practical functioning of the Forum. More than 10% of the samples posted
discussed the ‘online participation’ topic.
The topic of online deliberation is of particular interest because it testifies
to the aspiration for self-organisation of citizen-users to be reached by lever-
aging Internet tools and technologies. In this topic, users discussed why online
deliberation was a foundational issue for the movement. In June 2012 a user
wrote:
The web platform to discuss and vote proposals in real time and to
certify participants to the vote for me is ESSENTIAL. This not only
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ation
Law-making Law-making Election and
representation
energy movement law [act] law [act] movement
products forum state citizens stars
water proposal problem state rome
production proposals house [home] art [section] state
waste site rai [public TV] activity list
businesses program country public president
cost post proposal article group
costs blog saw public beppe
products net pay constitution grillo
collection stars money rights candidates
Undefined Local institu-
tions
National polit-
ics
Needs and
change
Rights - per-
sonal, family,
cultural
grillo city movement people persons
said territory government persons man
understand municipality vote country state
people municipalities parties movement sons
post police grillo politics world
understood streets elections necessary right
saw [public] trans-
port
electoral change rights
beppe citizens politics ideas social
outside areas parliament problem country
you say car to vote we can society
macroeconomy liberalisation
- drugs and
prostitution
employment
and education
undefined microeconomy
euro com work important euro
debt youtube school coluor taxes
banks watch workers hover state
state state youth mania pay
currency play hours padding money
europe video businesses you know income
bank prostitution schools forum work
billions use business and taxation
public drugs to work button pension
economy health state cta expenses
Table 5.2: The 10 most likely terms (translated) in the 15 topics identified by the LDA model
clustering 50,000 postings from the Forum
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to formulate the program and select candidates but also to anchor
the action of those who will be elected as our representatives to our
feedback.
For another user, only online deliberation could guarantee transparency in
the deliberation process. In late 2014 he wrote that
Meetups are not a platform to propose and vote. Since they require
a fee, who pays govern it and self-nominate to represent others [...].
Meetups need to be abolished as soon as possible and replaced with
an online platform for proposals and for voting that is transparent
and free.
This is interesting because it testifies to a tension between a traditional form
of political participation (although Internet-mediated)—which since it takes
place onsite is easily manipulable and will tend to replicate traditional power
structures— and the Internet, again idealised as the place of total transparency
and equality. This vision, a sort of Internet fundamentalism in which every
representative institution (paradoxically also the meetups) is replaced by an
Internet technology or service, is recurrent in Beppe Grillo’s rhetoric, throughout
the Movement and, I argue, is based on a fundamental lack of trust for every
traditional political institution that defines citizen-users and that motivates them
into action, to begin with.
Internet-based solutions and technologies to problems faced by the communit-
ies are sometimes the actual subjects of the discussion. A number of postings
lamented the inefficiency of the Forum as a deliberating platform. In April 2012,
a user wrote ‘I noticed that many proposals of the Forum that are potentially
interesting quickly lose visibility in favour of others, maybe not that interesting,
inserted after’. The apparent lack of reasonable criteria for maintaining the visib-
ility of postings that are in most cases submerged by other more recent postings
attracted a number of complaints from users and some proposed the adoption of
applications specifically designed for online deliberation, which usually included
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also the possibility of voting. Among the most popular platforms proposed
for adoption by the Movement were LiquidFeedback (see Bertone, De Cindio, &
Stortone, 2015), already adopted by the Pirate Party in Germany, and Airesis, a
platform that combined social networking and online voting features. Notably, a
number of meetups adopted the two platforms (which were both open source)
but eventually Beppe Grillo opted for a property solution—the ‘Operative system’,
later called ‘Rousseau’—as the official national online deliberation platform.
3.3. Coding of style and expression of opinion
In order to deepen the understanding of the qualitative aspects of the online
exchanges among users, I also coded variables on how comments were formulated
based on the coding scheme proposed by Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2007). In
particular, I coded for the style of the comment and whether and how a user
embedded an opinion in the posting.
In terms of style, I distinguished between a negative style and a positive style.
A quantitative variable assessing the negativity of the style was computed by
counting the relative frequency of vulgar or offensive terms that appeared in
each posting. For this purpose, a dictionary of vulgar and offensive terms was
compiled expanding on the words listed under the category Parole_volgari-IT
of the Italian version of Wiktionary.5.
The positivity of the style was instead based on how reasoned the expression
of an opinion was. It was manually coded in four binary variables based on
whether the post actually expresses a personal opinion (‘I think we need to be very
careful not to make the mistake of blaming immigrants rather than politicians
who...’); whether the user explicitly expresses agreement or disagreement with
another user’s posting (‘I agree, and also add that we of the Movement are
contributing to this...’ or ‘Understandable idea but very superficial...’); and finally
whether the posting mentioned a fact—independently from the veracity of fact
5https://it.wiktionary.org/wiki/Categoria:Parole_volgari-IT
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itself (‘I both read act 94/2009 (a.k.a. bossi-fini) and decree 25 July 1998, n. 286 ...
sections 13 and 16 ...’).
Additionally, each user was also binary labelled (again, manually) based on
the political position inferred from the totality of his or her comments posted
debating one of the three issues analysed in this chapter. A binary labelling of
a position (which in the three debates is generally intended as being in favour
or against some action) is a necessary simplification because users might not
express their position in a full or coherent way or because they might have a more
multifaceted position. More details will be provided in the section dedicated
to each debate. A user’s political position, although simplified, is nevertheless
important because it allows understanding of the degree of fragmentation due to
homophily in the online debate.
3.4. Evolution of topics and users’ interest
Between February 2009, when the first posting appeared on the Forum, and
January 2015, the community of users animating the Forum significantly grew in
numbers (see Figure 5.7): during its first week online the Forum had a minium
of 23 unique users posting on its pages while during the last week of January
2015 the minimum number of users was 357. It is also reasonable to assume that
the community of users did not only increase in volume over the years but also
changed in terms of its composition and possibly interests.
As described in the previous chapter, the electoral survey (n = 1508) conduc-
ted after the 2013 general election indicated that the political spectrum of M5S
voters was bipolar, with approximately 53% of the voters being drawn from a
centre-left party and 47% from a centre-right party. Nevertheless, this bipolarity
was certainly not a trait of the original community which grew out of Beppe
Grillo’s blog to constitute the M5S. The 11-pages manifesto of the M5S published
in October 2009 (Movimento 5 Stelle, 2009b)—the same year the Forum went
online—dedicated about 40% of its contents to explain the Movement’s proposals
for environmental conservation. The content analysis conducted by Volkens et al.
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(2014) of the 2013 electoral manifesto—which simply expanded by 3 pages the
2009 version—confirms that the Movement strongly and significantly leaned—at
least at the beginning—towards the left of the political spectrum for its positions
on the environment, welfare state and the economy. Two previously cited studies
(Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2012; Pedrazzani & Pinto, 2015) have assessed through
surveys conducted at different times that among sympathisers of the Movement
those who declared themselves as centre-right voters were in 2010—one year
after the Forum was launched—only about 11%. Two years later, in 2012, the
percentage was 28%. As a consequence, it is probable that as the M5S gained
support among right-wingers, the number of right-wing users active in the Forum
also increased but less than proportionally since, according to the Itanes electoral
survey, right-wing voters tended in 2013 to engage less in online commenting
(see Figure ??) than others.
To understand whether the data from the Forum reflects any evolution in
terms of the interests of its active users, it is useful to quantify the relative
frequency of the different topics in the first and second halves of the Forum’s
life, that is, comparing the online talk from the period January 2009-January 2012
with talks from the period January 2012-January 2015. The results are shown in
Figure 5.11.
Quite surprisingly the Forum shows a constant level of interest for most of
the topics in the two periods and their relative positions vary only slightly. The
exceptions are ‘environment’, ‘national politics’ and—although less dramatically—
‘online participation’. The environmental thematic—which as seen was at least
initially a strong identity item for the M5S—clearly lost over the years consid-
erable interest, declining from third most discussed topic to one of the least.
The analysis of the activity of uniquely identified users also points to the strong
importance of discussion on the environment in the first months of existence of
the Forum if compared with later periods. During the first six months (between
February and August 2009) in 24% of the cases, the first posting of a new user
discussed the environment, between August 2014 and January 2015 the same
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Figure 5.11: Difference in percentage frequency of posting on the Forum between the first (2009-
2012) and the second period (2012-2015)
topic was discussed only in 4.5% of cases in first postings of new users. If the
environmental topic (defined by words such ‘energy’, ‘water’, ‘waste’, ‘gas’, ‘car’,
‘consumption’, ‘pollution’) lost traction, politics instead gained dramatically, mov-
ing from the least discussed topic (2.6% of the all postings published during the
first 6 months) to the most discussed (10.3%). This is at least partially explained
by the fact that two terms that are likely to appear on the topic (‘movement’ and
‘star’) are derived from the name of the Movement itself (the name was adopted
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only a few months after the Forum went online and therefore the terms could not
appear in the first months of the Forum’s existence), and many other terms relate
to elections, which the Movement started to run only in 2010 and during which
the volume of postings always strongly increased. Yet the increase in attention
to national politics is also justified by the transition of the M5S from a social
movement with specific interests to a political party competing in elections and
to govern the country.
Interestingly this adjustment from the environment to politics is not only
apparent from what was published on the Forum but also from the posting
frequency of Grillo himself. To compare the relative frequency of topics discussed
on the Forum (as identified by the LSA algorithm) with the relative frequency
of the topics discussed on the blog, I ran the same algorithm previously used
with 50,000 randomly selected postings of the Forum with the entire corpus of
postings published on the blog and identified in both results the topic environment
and national politics.6 Figure 5.12 maps with a LOESS curve the evolution of the
relative frequency of weekly postings on the environment and national politics
both on the blog and the Forum.
Although Beppe Grillo’s progressive disengagement from postings on the
environment was less pronounced in relative terms, it certainly did progressively
occur between 2005 and mid-2011. On the blog, postings on national politics
6The two processes clearly identified slightly different sets of words pertaining to the topics
of national politics and environment in the two corpora. Nevertheless, the two topics were
easily identified in both. For the topic environment the intersection between the two sets of the
20 most significant words derived from the two corpora included 7 words (35%) while for the
topic national politics the intersection included 8 words (40%). Words not present in both sets
of the 20 most significant words were still unambiguously related to the topics. For the topic
environment they were: ‘prodotti’ [goods], ‘aziende’ [businesses], ‘costo’ [cost], ‘costi’ [costs],
‘prodotto’ [good], ‘elettrica’ [electric], ‘produrre’ [to produce], ‘gas’ [natural gas], ‘auto’ [car],
‘consumo’ [consumption], ‘lavoro’ [work], ‘mercato’ [market], ‘prezzo’ [price]; while for the topic
national politics: ‘governo’ [government], ‘voto’ [vote], ‘grillo’, ‘elettorale’ [electoral], ‘votare’ [to
vote], ‘partito’ [party], ‘votato’ [voted], ‘fiducia’ [confidence (as in vote of confidence)], ‘voti’ [votes],
‘pdl’ [PDL (Berlusconi’s Pary)], ‘berlusconi’, ‘maggioranza’ [majority].
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Figure 5.12: Fraction of posts on environment and national politics between 2005 and 2015
(LOESS curve)
became more frequent than postings on national politics in the second half of
2010. 2010 is a crucial year for the Movement because in March it participated
for the first time in local elections, which resulted in the election to office of
some of the Movement’s candidates. On the Forum, postings on national politics
became more frequent than postings on the environment two years later, in July
2012 between the unexpectedly positive results in the local election of May and
the extraordinary outcome of the Sicilian election in October, when the M5S
became the most voted party. In other words, the relative frequency of the two
topics seems to indicate a significant shift in the focus of the online discussion
away from traditional topics and towards more practical goals: party politics
and elections. If in the case of the blog’s posts, the shift happened because of
one person’s decision—Beppe Grillo—on the Forum the shift was either caused
because new posters with new sets of preferences hit their keyboards entering
the discussion or because old posters changed their preferences. As a matter of
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fact, as shown in Figure 5.7, the number of users active on the Forum strongly
increased from 2012. Nevertheless, this does not exclude that older users might
also have contributed to the trend by changing their posting habits. Observing
only the postings of 182 long-term users, active both before July 2011 and after
July 2012, the pattern that emerges is indeed almost identical: environment is
discussed in 13% of the postings between 2009 and 2012 and down to 3% between
2012 and 2015, national politics over the same two periods moves from 3% to 9%.
A clear pattern in online behaviour, whether watching a video or commenting
in discussion threads, is what is usually referred to as ‘preferential attachment
process’ or cumulative advantage (see the Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 on network
analysis). That is, online users will tend to concentrate their attention on items
that are already very popular. The political discussion growing on the Forum
of the M5S is no exception. Between 2009 and 2015, 106,285 new discussion
threads were created on the Forum and successively commented on 780,617 times.
Nevertheless, comments are far from equally distributed across the different
threads. Simply, a few discussion threads attract most of the attention and
most of the threads attract almost none. The 5% most commented on threads
(5314 threads) attracted 47% of the overall comments on the Forum and the
50% least commented on threads (53,142 threads) attracted 10% averaging 1.5
comments each. On the Forum a preferential attachment process can be triggered
for different reasons. First, the graphical user interface of the homepage of the
Forum promotes at top of the page the most up-voted threads (for the week,
month or in absolute), which for the fact of being more visible receives more
clicks from users landing on the homepage. Second, users willing to participate
in the discussion might be attracted to the most commented threads because
they perceive them as potentially more interesting—since they were selected by
many other users already—or because they estimate that a comment in a crowded
thread will be more likely to be read and eventually replied to.
Although few threads stay active for years—and not necessarily the most
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commented one,7 attention towards threads decays quickly: of those threads that
received at least one comment, only 14% received comments for more than a
week and only 7% for more than a month.
Preferential attachment and rapid decline in interest in individual threads
necessarily impact how topics evolve on the Forum. First, a user—assuming that
each comment pertains to the same topic of the other postings of the threads—
will be more likely to discuss topics that are frequently discussed at that moment
in time. That is, temporarily proximate comments will concentrate on a limited
number of topics. Second, the intensity of the debate around an individual topic
does not guarantee that the activity around the same topic will last as attention
towards threads drops off quickly. By comparing with a linear regression analysis8
the distribution of comments over topics posted during a day by a user with
the distribution of all comments posted during the same day on the same topics
shows that—not surprisingly—the effect of the general discussion on individual
choices is strong and significant. Conditional on the fact that user a on a given
day d1 has decided to comment on any of the 12 topics listed in Figure 5.10 (thus
excluding the three topics labelled as undefined), an increase of 1 percentage point
in the proportion of comments dedicated to topic X over the total number of
comments published on any topic by any user that same day d1, results in an
increase of 0.3 of a percentage point in the proportion of comments user a is
expected to dedicate to topic X. Interestingly, if we take into account the number
of days between d1 and the day of the very first comment published by user
a, the results is that seniority will increase (significantly but not strongly) the
independence of the user from the choices of the crowd: assuming a general
attention of 20% to topic Y on a given day, a new user (with 0 days of seniority)
will be expected to dedicate to the same topic 6.1% of his comments, a user with
7Surprisingly, the correlation between the number of days between the first and the last
comment is only weakly correlated (0.07) with the number of commentes actually received.
8The fitted model is a fixed effect model, estimated with the R package plm (Croissant & Millo,
2008), where users are assumed to have some unobserved behavioural characteristics which are
fixed in time.
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100 days of seniority 5.8% and a user with 1000 days of seniority 3.2%.
Finally, it is interesting to explore whether the number of topics touched on by
users increases linearly with the permanence of users on the Forum. Clearly, a user
that spends more time on the site is more likely to engage in more topics. This
is also because as we saw, topics discussed by users are not independent from
what is simultaneously discussed on the Forum since the discussions that appear
on the home page attract a higher volume of comments simply because they are
more visible. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 5.13 the relation between permanence
and the number topics discussed is not linear. As users spend more time on the
Forum the number of topics discussed typically stabilises around 3-4. This is
compatible with a general trend, which we will repeatedly find in the analysis
of the discussion networks, to concentrate attention; on topics as on threads and
users. But it also seems to suggest that users have predefined sets of preferences
(as it would be reasonable to assume) and will not engage with every topic under
discussion.
Figure 5.13: Relation between number of topics and permanence
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4. Discussion networks
Topic analysis based on the frequency of terms published in the postings offers a
picture of the long-term evolution of the discussion on the Forum. During its first
three years, the Forum discussed the environment and the online participation
infrastructure of the expanding movement, through words such ‘blog’, ‘forum’,
‘internet’, ‘members’, ‘web’, ‘program’. Progressively, and alongside the constitu-
tion of the political and electoral machine of the M5S, a prominent topic emerged
both on Beppe Grillo’s blog and on the Forum, characterised by words such as
‘movement’, ‘parliament’, ‘government’, ‘vote’ and ‘confidence’ (referring to the
confidence vote).
In this section, I apply network analysis to describe the networks formed by
the interaction among participants in the discussion to highlight the topology, or
the particular form, taken by networks of deliberating users and the characteristics
that help to predict the formation of these networks.
4.1. The shape of discussion networks
The data on interactions among users in the Forum is well suited to representation
in network form. The Forum of the M5S is designed following a traditional
multi-thread structure: each new thread (defined as a proposal by the Forum’s
designers) appears in a new page and is open to comments, which grouped the
posting describing the proposal. That is, each posting is unequivocally related
by construction to a thread. Moreover, few comments are explicitly posted in
response to another comment (a user has the option to click on the ‘reply to’
button at the bottom of each comment). Finally, based on the analysis of users’
names I was able, as described in the previous section, to relate comments to a
unique set of users.
Given the relational structure of the data, it is possible to represent it as
different typologies of networks. The primal network representation would have
three types of nodes—threads (or the page where the postings appear), postings
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(comments but also the posting opening each thread) and users—but also three
types of relations. Indeed, each posting is necessarily related both to a thread (it
has to appear on a page) and to a user (it has to be posted by someone). But a
posting additionally to be related to a thread can be optionally also related to
another comment.
In order to more intuitively describe the relations in the dataset, I proceeded
by defining two network representations, which necessarily simplify the relational
structure of the data but also allow to better focus on key characteristics of the
deliberation under analysis.
The first network representation is a binary network, where nodes are of two
types (binary): either a user or a thread. The relation described in this network
are instead of only one type; a user is connected to a specific thread if he or
she has posted in that thread. This binary network representation offers an
intuitive mapping of the distribution of the users’ presence across the multitudes
of threads. Two preliminary networks statistics can be calculated out of the binary
network representation of the conversation: the outdegree of each user’s node
(how many times he or she posted) and the indegree of each thread’s node (how
many comments each thread received).
The second network representation focuses instead on the direct interaction
among users. The resulting network, a direct-reply network, will consist of
only one type of nodes (users) and one direct relation between two users when
someone replies to somebody else’s post. Similarly to the binary representation,
the two preliminary statistics that can be calculated from the direct-reply network
are the outdegree and indegree of each user-node. The outdegree represents the
number of postings in reply to something a user published while the indegree
is the number of replies a user received. A high outdegree would signify that a
node has been particularly active while a high indegree signifies that a user-node
has been central to the conversation.
Given that what we observe is a political deliberation within the official forum
of a highly relevant political movement with—based on what I describe in the
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next chapter—measurable effects for the national policy debate, the two network
statistics are descriptively as well as normatively important. A deliberation that
is numerically dominated by only a few voices cannot be perceived as truly
representative of the public engaged in the discussion. Similarly the fact that
only a few users receive a reply to their postings might mean that most of the
postings are in fact ignored. This is important especially in light of the democratic
potential of online political deliberation envisaged not only by scholars of political
participation and deliberation but also—and probably more relevantly in political
terms—by movements such as the M5S in Italy or Podemos in Spain.
In order to help the interpretation of the network statistics of the bipartite
and direct-reply networks of the forum of the M5S, I modelled the data from the
forum of Germany’s Pirate Party, which has the same multi-thread structure of
the forum of the M5S although with a much lower participation, into the same
type of networks. Figure 5.14 compares the indegree and outdegree of the four
networks on a log-log scale. The log-log scale is necessary because of a pervasive
characteristic of the degree distribution, which we observe in each one of the
four networks both for indegree and outdegree. This characteristic, which is
observed in human-generated networks as well as in naturally-occurring networks
is generally being referred to as the phenomenon of preferential attachment or
Matthew effect, which takes its name from the Parable of the Talents narrated in
the Gospel of Matthew where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
According to the data from the two fora, we observe a very similar distribution
for both indegree and outdegree in the two different networks (bipartite and
direct-reply) and both in the forum of the M5S and in the forum of the Pirate
Party.9 The distribution of the out and indegree tends towards a power-law
9There were three reasons to compare the forum of the M5S with the forum of the Pirate
Party. First, both forums were developed approximately around the same time, with the same
thread/comments structure and the same user interface (with the most recent and most popular
threads appearing on the homepage). Second, both forums were open to comments from
everyone. Third, the relationship (both ideological and practical) between the two movements
and the Internet were very similar, resulting in both cases in a pronounced centrality of online
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distribution (although mathematically speaking it is not a perfect one) typical
of scale-free networks (Barabási & Albert, 1999; Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman,
2009), in which there are many more nodes with a very low degree than nodes
with a very high degree. A scale-free distribution has the property of forming a
straight line when plotted on log-log scale. The distribution of the indegree in
the bipartite network as well as in the direct network can be easily explained by
the fact that the average user is more likely to comment on the most commented
thread or user because, first, by design, highly commented nodes (either thread
or users) are usually more visible on the page, second, because a user might be
more inclined to target a node that is relatively more active because it is also more
visible to other users. The explanation behind the distribution of the outdegree
is instead less trivial. In fact, if it is reasonable to assume that in general there
will be few very active users, it is still open to question why the distribution
would approach so closely a power-law distribution, thus tracing so closely the
distribution of indegree. In other words, if it is clear why users will tend to have
different levels of involvement, it is not clear why the difference in involvement
between those less active and those more active is so extreme and its distribution
non-linear.
A tendency towards a scale-free distribution is not only observed in degree
distributions. Figure 5.15 shows the permanence of users in the two fora, that
is, the difference in days between the last and the first posting. A very high
number of users (66% and 82% respectively in the fora of the M5S and Pirate
Party) posted only once. And again we have very few users with a very long
presence on the fora and most of the remaining users skewed towards a shorter
stay.
If the power-law (or scale-free) distribution does not perfectly describe10 the
debate.
10In fact all observed distributions did not pass the formal statistical test proposed by Clauset
et al. (2009) possibly because of the fluctuations occurring in the tail of the distribution and
observable in the figures as the cone-like shape that the distributions take as the value of the
x-axis increases.
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Figure 5.14: Degree distribution in the fora of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Pirate Party
(PP)
distribution of degree and permanence, they all nevertheless show an extreme
disparity in how the activity is distributed across nodes. And the fact that
this property is found in two fora used for political discussion in two different
countries is certainly troubling for those who foresee the Internet as a tool to
level the differences in access to the public debate.
Finally, Table 5.3 compares the statistics of the M5S’s direct reply network
with the other three networks described in the previous section. Again most of
the statistics presented in the table indicates that the two fora, either if described
as a bipartite network of users and thread or as a direct reply network, have very
similar characteristics, pointing to some general rule in the development of a
conversation network.
We observe that, first, a ‘giant component’ (Newman, 2003) of connected
nodes tends to emerge in all networks—a property observed in many random
and naturally occurring networks—containing between 86 and 97% of all nodes.
Second, although the sizes of the two bipartite networks are 1 to 11, we observe a
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Figure 5.15: User permanence in the fora of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and Pirate Party
(PP)
similar (and very low) average number of users per thread, which again suggests
that most of the threads go unnoticed by the community of users. Third, in both
direct-reply networks we observe a very strong correlation between indegree and
outdegree; a user that posts a lot will tend to receive a lot of comments, which
seems to indicate a possible strategy for obtaining the attention of the community.
As I mention throughout this thesis, the extreme distribution of participation
and attention in different deliberating systems has profound implications for the
ideals of online deliberation. For large polities, the only mechanism of direct
deliberation that has resisted and demonstrated success through history is clearly
voting. Voting allows compression and aggregation the opinions of a crowd by
counting. Counting is clearly a democratic principle since the value of a vote is
totally independent of any characteristic of the actual voter and in a fair system
each person is eligible to cast the same number of votes. But when we transpose
counting (or for that matter any other statistical averaging) to a distribution that
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n e c N (%) U (mean) D (mean) T D cor
M5S direct reply 87913 424516 10913 86.05 4.42 0.01 0.89
PP direct reply 10729 225854 174 97.82 3.40 0.14 0.91
M5S bipartite 198317 780617 7756 91.07 0.87 1.00 0.00
PP bipartite 17320 227588 149 97.90 1.63 1.00 0.00
Table 5.3: Statistics of the discussion networks (n = nodes; e = edges; c = number of components;
N = percentage of nodes in the largest component; U = user per discussion thread
(mean); D = shortest path length (mean); T = transitivity; D cor = indegree/outdegree
correlation)
is non-normal, such as those distributions that depend on the activity of Internet
users in which participation is not only different across the population of users
but extremely different, the result is that we disregard the contribution of the large
majority of participants.
Two numerical examples based on activity on Facebook pages of the M5S and
on the Forum of the German Pirate Party can hopefully clarify this. The forum of
the Pirate Party has a distribution of activity that is very similar to those found
in the Forum of the M5S but, contrary to the Forum of the M5S, assigns a unique
identity to each user11. In the period under consideration, there were 10,729
active commenters on the forum of the Pirate Party but the 536 (that is, less than
5%) most active commenters were responsible for 90% of the comments. If the
average commenter posted about 21 comments, 77% of commenters posted only
one comment (8299 in total) while the most prolific user posted 7280 comments.
This distribution voids averages of any real significance and more importantly
undermines the practical value of the contribution of the large majority of users.
But the problem does not stop at expressive actions such as comments. Indeed,
even the Internet activities that more closely resemble voting such as liking,
up-voting and sharing (that can generally be posted only once) are possibly
even more problematic in democratic terms. Let us consider the 24.5 million
11In the case of the Forum of the M5S whether the same username belonged to the same person
was estimated based on the frequency of names.
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likes distributed across 560.00 posts published on Facebook pages of relevant
figures of the M5S by about 1.37 million users between 2009 and 2015. From
a crowd-sourcing perspective, likes are extremely relevant because they do not
only aggregate the opinion of the community but also filter in what it is worth
discussion (and possibly submitted to a vote) and filter out what is not. But if
a filtering mechanism is clearly essential to avoid clogging a mass deliberative
system, one that is respectful of basic democratic principles should at least
guarantee that the largest possible number possible of arguments is heard by the
crowd. But as a matter of fact, we observe in the data that 40% of the posts do
not receive any likes (with the consequence that they are not shared throughout
the community), 50% of the posts receive fewer than 40 likes and about 0.03%
of posts received more than 10,000 likes. As seen, the problem with extreme
distributions does not only involve the indegree (number of likes received by each
post) but also the outdegree (number of likes posted by each user). Each user
can only express one like and still the 647 most active users (an extremely tiny
fraction within a crowd of up to 1.37 million users) were responsible for 10% of
all likes, thus acquiring a disproportionate relevance in steering the conversation.
This extreme difference in how preferences (and consequentially attention)
are distributed is problematic because it is fundamentally antidemocratic. And
this is not a problem that emerges only because of Facebook-specific design and
its proprietary and secret filtering algorithm. The exact same distribution of
attention emerges also from the forum of the Pirate Party. The core of the issue
is that within an online deliberating community, the array of opinions to which
any user is exposed are dependent on the preferences expressed by users who
have logged into the system previously. And as the number of users grows,
the probability of each opinion being presented to the crowd is progressively
more skewed in favour of only a few, selected through mechanisms that are
questionable in terms of established rules of democratic proceduralism. This
is quite paradoxical because crowd-sourcing tools are indeed empowering for
citizen-users since they make participation not only easier but also more effective
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(and the M5S testifies to this). Nevertheless, although they have the potential to
perfect democracy, they are far from perfectly democratic tools since they tend to
distribute attention and influence in ways that are not compatible with the ideals
of democratic equality.
4.2. The discussion network of the M5S
The mapping of the discussion network of engagement among users (that is, a
direct-reply network) will be the object of the analysis developed in the remainder
of the chapter. The following analysis aims to understand if any pattern emerges
in how users interact with each other. If the analysis of topics indicated that
the discussion tended to converge and draw on the most discussed topic of the
day, it did not show whether users tended to prefer to engage more with some
users and less with others. By modelling the network structure to measure the
effect of specific characteristics, it is possible to query the discussion network to
understand whether some configurations are more likely to appear than others
given what we observed on the Forum. In particular, it will be possibile to test
for the presence of homophilic tendencies among users—a question that has
attracted considerable attention among researchers interested in online political
discussion—and for the relative importance of users who were eventually elected
to parliament. In this section, the analysis covers all the interactions among users
on the Forum over a period of more than one year. In the following sections,
the analysis will cover instead shorter periods and focus on exchanges around
selected issues (i.e. immigration, confidence vote, and common currency).
The analysis of topics suggests that the political organisation of the Movement
progressively gained in importance in the online discussion. By comparing
names declared on the Forum by the users with the names on the electoral lists
of candidates of the M5S to the 2013 general election, I labelled 359 users as
candidates (85 were successively elected). The interest is to understand whether
in the run-up to the election and immediately after the election, the position
within the network of users who ended up playing a public (and political) role
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was significantly different from the position of other users. Because the 2013
electoral law did not allow voters to directly express a preference for a candidate
but only for a party, the M5S organised in December 2012 (a few months before
the election) an online consultation to allow registered members to indicate their
preferred candidates. The ordered list of candidates of the M5S in each electoral
district was then compiled based on the preferences received from members in
the online primaries. The network analysis was performed on three temporally
contiguous network slices: the first network contains all users active in the online
discussion (either because they replied to someone or because someone replied
to them) between June and December 2012, when the online primaries took
place, the second network comprises all interactions between the primaries and
the general election in March 2013 and the last network covers a period of six
months after the election (the sets of active users include members, candidates
but also simple users commenting on the Forum). For each period, the network
is fitted into in an exponential random graph model (Lusher et al., 2013) to
quantify the importance of a set of characteristics in generating connections (that
is, replies) among members. Table 5.4 displays the effect of each configuration
on the likelihood of finding a connection between a pair of users. The gender
of users inferred from their name and whether they are a registered member of
the M5S (only members can open a new discussion thread on the Forum but
commenting is open to anyone) are also controlled for. In the Table, homophily
indicates the likelihood of observing a relation between two users who share the
same attribute. Sender and receiver indicate instead the likelihood of observing a
connection respectively from and to a user with that attribute.
Membership of the movement does seem to have an effect on how the discus-
sion develops. In fact in all the three periods, one is significantly more likely to
observe relations between users who do not share the same membership attribute
(that is, one is a member and the other is not). This pattern, along with the
fact that non-members are more likely to send a reply and members to receive
one, is certainly reinforced (if not integrally caused) by the Forum’s rule that
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Jun ’12 - Dec ’12 Dec ’12 - Feb ’13 Feb ’13 - Aug ’13
active users 13,420 14,777 40,306
connections 28,719 27,344 91,091
Network effect Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
edges
              
       
9.879(0.023)∗∗∗ 0.441(0.008)∗∗∗ −10.891(0.012)∗∗∗
member
homophily
              
       
−0.285(0.016)∗∗∗ −0.283(0.018)∗∗∗ −0.165(0.009)∗∗∗
sender
              
       
−1.540(0.017)∗∗∗ −0.803(0.019)∗∗∗ −0.403(0.010)∗∗∗
receiver
              
       
1.889(0.018) 1.606(0.020)∗∗∗ 2.047(0.010)∗∗∗
gender - male
homophily
              
       
0.083(0.029)∗∗ 0.058(0.028)∗ 0.090(0.015)∗∗∗
sender
              
       
0.032(0.027) −0.126(0.025)∗∗∗ 0.107(0.013)∗∗∗
receiver
              
       
0.122(0.023)∗∗∗ 0.085(0.020)∗∗∗ 0.007(0.012)
candidate - not elected
sender
              
       
−0.012(0.059) 0.218(0.080)∗∗ −0.736(0.100)∗∗∗
receiver
              
       
0.245(0.040)∗∗∗ 0.440(0.048)∗∗∗ −0.187(0.046)∗∗∗
candidate - elected
sender
              
       
0.549(0.076)∗∗∗ −0.745(0.235)∗∗∗ −0.996(0.276)∗∗∗
receiver
              
       
1.994(0.032)∗∗∗ 2.044(0.039)∗∗∗ 2.404(0.034)∗∗∗
Table 5.4: Network effects and standard errors obtained with an exponential random graph
modelling of the network of direct replies on the Forum
restricts to members the privilege of opening a new thread: members receive
more incoming connections because users are more likely to reply to the main
post of the thread instead of replying to comments to the thread. In any case,
members and non-members do appear to connect. Gender also does not seem to
limit engagement among users. Although two users are significantly more likely
to connect if they share the same gender, the effect is very limited.
The effect of candidate and elected users is more interesting and seems to in-
dicate that the Forum recognised early the leadership role of a few users that were
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successively elected to parliament. Although the results of the primary elections
were never published, those who were elected to parliament necessarily received
more votes in the primaries than those candidates who were not elected.12 In
all three periods, thus also before the primaries (first column) and before the
election (second column), elected candidates show they were much more likely to
attract incoming connections—which is arguably a measure of relevance within
the discussion networks—than other users, including non-elected candidates.
And notably, their effect as the receivers grow stronger peaking after the elections.
On the contrary, non-elected candidates show that they slightly increase their
effect as receiver only up to the election: afterwards they are actually less likely
to receive a comment. The effect as senders of candidates is instead nonlinear:
elected candidates are significantly more likely to engage other users before the
primaries—when the opinion of their fellow Movement’s members was certainly
valued—but less likely to do so after the primaries. Indeed the fact that elected
candidates were more engaged, reaching out to other users on the Forum, could
possibly have helped them receive relatively more votes in the primaries than
non-elected candidates.
A limit in the ERGM presented before is that it is necessary to treat a dynamic
network as a static one. But it is reasonable to assume that the behaviour of nodes
at t0 will have an effect on the behaviour of the same nodes at t1. In particular, we
might assume that a user that is active today is also likely to be active tomorrow.
And less trivially, we can wonder what is the effect of past indegree to future
indegree. In order to model the dynamics of the direct reply network I used the
method proposed by Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais (2016) that extends ERGM.
The complete network describing users’ activity between 2009 and 2015 is subset
in an ordered series of networks describing the interactions happening over seven
days. Because of the computational demand deriving from modelling the entire
12The number of votes in the primaries defined the order of the list of candidates in the election.
According to the electoral law, candidates are elected, proportionally to the number of votes the
party received, in the order in which they appear on the list.
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series of 312 week-networks, I proceeded by subsetting once more the series in
windows of 25 weeks and modelling a random sample of four 25-week networks.
The results are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix. They indicate that, first, gender
is not a significant predictor of interaction throughout the four samples: a male
user will be more likely to interact with another male user only in one out of
four sampled periods. Second, past degree is consistently a significant predictor
for the present degree. Not surprisingly users with a higher past outdegree
tend to have a significantly higher present outdegree and symmetrically users
with a higher indegree tend to have a higher present indegree. Coherently with
the static model we observe that users with a high past indegree tend to have
a lower present outdegree. Finally and more interestingly, users with a high
past outdegree are consistently associated with a lower indegree in the present,
signalling that if in general being vocal is a good strategy to get attention in the
short term, it is, in fact, counterproductive in the long term. This final finding
seems to provide evidence that the deliberative system somehow counterbalances
the overexposure of a few users—which as seens is a crucial problem in online
deliberation if leading to over-influence—by dedicating to them progressively
less attention.
4.3. Discussion network on immigration
The analysis of the period around the 2013 general election indicates that users
and their behaviours are not independent of the political trajectory of the Move-
ment. In fact, candidates of the M5S active on the Forum attracted significant
attention from other users in the months around the election. Moreover, users’
interests in a traditional topic such as the environment progressively declined
in favour of discussions more connected to the broader political debate, as the
Movement gradually became a national actor with evident political responsibilit-
ies derived from its role in parliament, where the M5S had more than 150 MPs.
But whether or not online users do engage with others with a different set of
opinions and political views is still to be investigated. The relevance of the ques-
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tion is reinforced by a wide academic literature on online political polarisations
and more generally on Internet social behaviours. Moreover the M5S offers an
almost unique case, being a national political community with an electoral base
extending all the way from the far-left to the far-right of the political spectrum.
Given the constitution of the Movement, diversity of opinions on the Forum
seems highly likely. How this diversity plays out in the interactions among users
will be the focus of the rest of the chapter.
Immigration, not dissimilarly from other countries, is a recurrent issue in
the Italian political debate. The discussion is usually either triggered by a news
event (such as migrant boats or crime) or by a political event such as a law
reform. The network analysis of the discussion focuses on a time-window of few
weeks, between October and November 2013. Specifically, the sudden increase in
attention to the issue illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 5.16 is triggered by
two events. The first event on 9 October 2013 (red intercept in the Figure) was the
vote in parliament, supported by many MPs of the M5S, on a bill to decriminalise
entering the country without a visa. The second event was a blog post published
by Beppe Grillo the following day (Grillo, 2013e) censuring the vote of his MPs.
The discussion network, limited only to postings related to immigration and
published between October and November 2013, is composed of 112 users and
214 connections. The limited size of the network allows coding of the political
orientation of the users based on the content of their postings. Approximately 50%
of the users were labelled either left-wing (29% of the total) if their positions were
in line with the vote of the M5S in parliament (in that occasion the Movement
voted in agreement with other left-wing parties) or right-wing (21% of the total)
if they were in favour of stricter controls on immigration flows. Additionally
users were labelled left-wing if they expressed concerns in terms of human rights
protections (‘Children and minors must be protected ... According to international
law newborn and pregnant women must ...’) and right-wing if they disagreed
with humanitarian concerns either for economic, practical or political reasons
(‘To be indulgent in welcoming [migrants] ... causes more incentives for these
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The region highlighted in the upper panel is zoomed in the lower panel. The blue and red vertical
intercepts indicate pbeginning and end of the network slice used in the network analysis.
Figure 5.16: Frequency of postings on immigration on the Forum
journeys and more capsizing and deaths ...’).
The network effect estimated by fitting an exponential random graph model
(ERGM) on the discussion network on immigration is presented in Table 5.5.
Network effect Estimate (SE)
edges
              
       
−4.788(0.169)∗∗∗
reciprocity
              
       
2.729(0.446)∗∗∗
gender homophily
              
       
−0.093(0.173)∗∗∗
political homophily
              
       
0.885(0.209)∗∗∗
sender (right-wing)
              
       
1.060(0.187)∗∗∗
receiver (right-wing)
              
       
−1.818(0.360)∗∗∗
Table 5.5: Network effects computed fitting the discussion network on immigration between
October and November 2014 with an exponential random graph model
The first effect in the Table is reciprocity, which is—not surprisingly for a social
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network—strongly positive: the fact that user a replies to user b increases the
likelihood that user b reciprocates by replying to user a. Gender has no significant
effect in determining who talks with whom. Instead, political orientation seems
to have a significant—although not very strong—effect in the network: users
with similar political orientation are more likely to be connected. And yet the
effect of political orientation on the likelihood of a user sending or receiving a
comment seems to indicate that political homophily is not symmetrical because
right-wing users are at the same time more likely to send a comment and less
likely to receive one. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5.17 political homophily
appears to be limited to left-wing users only, who prefer to discuss with their
likes. Right-wing users show the opposite tendency, engaging more often with
left-wing users. The result is that, as a matter of fact, the number of connected
pairs of users with different political orientation is very close to the number of
connected pairs with the same political orientation.
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Figure 5.17: Political attributes of the comments in the immigration debate
The asymmetry in behaviour between right-wing and left-wing users con-
tinues if we model with a binomial regression agreement, disagreement and the
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inclusion of facts in the postings (see regression tables in Section 4 of the Ap-
pendix). When approaching left-wing users, the right-wing user will be more
likely to use facts in their postings and less likely to openly express a disagreement.
The network analysis of the discussion on immigration provides some evid-
ence that, especially within a well-defined political community such as the
community of the M5S, online political discussion does not necessarily take place
among those who are like-minded. In fact, the discussion that took place on
the Forum between October and November 2013 showed that users engaged
with different opinions, refrained from using vulgar terms (only 3% of postings
contains a vulgarity) and were ready to mention facts in support of their opinion
(42% of postings report a fact). Nevertheless, this specific discussion needs to
be necessarily contextualised within the political enterprise of the M5S. The
asymmetric pattern that emerges from the discussion can be explained in terms
of the shifting of internal balances between the different political constituents of
the Movement. In this particular circumstance it was the right-wing component
that had to steer the Movement in a different direction (exactly as Beppe Grillo
tried to do with his blog post). The attempt of right-wing users to engage with
left-wing users, who held at the time the predominant position on immigration
in the Movement, also frequently bringing facts to their attention. For example,
citing from a newspaper and presenting figures to support his argument, a user
wrote:
The Sole 24ore [an authoritative financial newspaper] publishes num-
bers on the presence of Chinese in the triangle Milan-Parto-Verona,
their commercial businesses have increased in only a few years from
6000 to 14,800 and those run by Italians from 54,000 to 31,000. Either
we are totally stoned or immigrants are benefitting by more favourable
conditions.
The attention dedicated by those holding an anti-immigration opinion to
engage with pro-immigration users could have been motivated by a wish to
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convince them but also by a desire to show to all readers of the Forum that
a right-wing view on immigration was not necessarily a minority within the
Movement.
4.4. Discussion network on 2013 confidence vote
The unexpected success of the M5S in the general election of 2013 generated a
spike in participation in all the online platforms of the Movement (see Figure 5.7).
Although the M5S won fewer seats than the centre-left Democratic Party, Beppe
Grillo and the Movement were depicted by the media as the real winner in the
contest. The electoral coalition led by the Democratic Party and its candidate
for the premiership, Pier Luigi Bersani, did not obtain enough seats in the two
chambers to form government alone. As the size of the electoral capital of the
M5S became apparent, after the polls closed in the evening of 25 February 2013,
the debate on the position the Movement should have kept in parliament started
to snowball.
Beppe Grillo always maintained before the election that the Movement would
have steered clear of alliances and inciucio13 with parties that bore the full respons-
ibility of the degeneration of political institutions. Importantly, no pre-electoral
polls gave the M5S any weight in the post-election negotiations to form a gov-
ernment: it was assumed that the centre-left coalition, eventually together with
the centre coalition of former prime minister Mario Monti, would have had the
necessary number of seats to form a government. The results of the election that
started to emerge in the early hours of the afternoon of 25 February disrupted this
scenario. The distribution of seats in Parliament allowed only for two possible
coalitions: a centre-left centre-right grand coalition, necessarily including Ber-
lusconi’s PDL, or a coalition of Bersani’s PD and the M5S. The Movement really
faced the possibility of assuming political responsibility to execute its program.
Figure 5.18, in the lower panel, shows the volume of comments on the Forum
13Beginning with 1995 in the jargon of Italian politics these post-election alliances are labelled
with the popular term ‘inciucio’, which both brings the meaning of something messy and fraudulent
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since the closure of the polls on 25 February. In the morning of 26 February
(2 in the Figure) a post, which would receive more than 5000 comments, was
published on the Forum asking for the Movement to support a government led
by Bersani. But it was only on 27 February that the debate really started to
intensify. That day, all major newspapers led with Bersani’s offer to Grillo to
form a coalition government. Late in the morning an online petition was posted
on change.org14 by a voter of the M5S asking Beppe Grillo to ‘give confidence’
to a coalition government. The petition, which was eventually signed by 161,719
people, gained widespread attention in the media. Beppe Grillo, a few minutes
after the petition opened to signatures, when it was clear that it was going viral,
published on his blog (4 in the Figure) a post title ‘Bersani, talking deadman’
(2013b). In the post, with 18,841 comments one of the most discussed on the
blog, Grillo declared that ‘the M5S will not give any confidence vote to the
PD (or other parties)’. Two days later a post titled ‘Confidence vote?’ was
published on the Forum and directly addressed the creator of the petition: ‘Dear
[name omitted], the Movement revolutionised the way of doing politics. NO
CONFIDENCE! NO INCIUCIO! NO PREDEFINED AGREEMENT! [...] Old
politics [...] IS DEAD! The Movement and those who supported and support it
MUST AVOID DEGENERATION.’15 The post, the second most commented-on in
the Forum, attracted 12,623 comments.
In order to analyse the debate on the Forum, I defined a discussion network
of users’ direct replies and limit it to postings that refers to the debate on the
confidence vote16 published between February and April 2013. The network
contained 317 users and 288 links connecting them: each link represented a
comment a user posted in reply to a posting. Analogously to the previous analysis,
each comment was binary-coded according to whether it expressed agreement
14www.change.org/p/caro-beppe-grillo- dai-la-fiducia-al-governo-per-cambiare-l-italia-
grillodammifiducia
15http://www.beppegrillo.it/listeciviche/forum/2013/03/votare-la-fiducia-4.html
16Postings were identified as part of the discussion is matched against the regular expression
(?=.*(vot(.*?)|dare|diamo)\s(di|la)\s(fiducia))(?=.*bersani)"
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(1) News that the M5S is the first party in the lower chamber; (2) A proposal is posted on the
Forum attracting 5242 comments to request the M5S to support a government led by Bersani
of the Democratic Party (PD); (3) A petition is posted online asking Beppe Grillo to support a
PD-led government; (4) Beppe Grillo posts against supporting a coalition government with the
PD, (5) a post is published on Beppe Grillo’s blog critising the online petition; (6) a proposal is
posted on the Forum attracting 12,597 comments in support of Beppe Grillo’s position against
forming a coalition government.
Figure 5.18: Signatures per hour for the online petition to support the government of the Demo-
cratic Party and comments per hour on the Forum
or disagreement, or whether it contained a fact. The political orientation of the
comment, either in favour of or against an alliance with the PD, was also estimated.
Although in most of the cases a binary classification was appropriate, for a few
comments the result was problematic. As a guiding line, a comment showed
approval towards the coalition government if the author’s opinion was that
favouring the creation of a government led by the PD was somehow acceptable.
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Classification of opinions that accepted a coalition with the PD but only with a
government led by the M5S or by a person not compromised by the establishment,
was decided case by case: in general if the comment expressed agreement with
opening negotiations with a party (the PD) that was seen as sharing a few
programmatic similarities with the Movement the opinion was classified as
favouring a coalition government.
Based on these criteria, postings allowed the classification of 56.5% of the
users: of those classified, 52.5% agreed with the position expressed by Grillo,
opposing any coalition with other parties, 40.8% expressed the opposite view,
favouring some sort of agreement with the PD, and 6.7% had somehow conflicting
views. The exponential random graph modelling of the discussion network allows
testing for the presence of patterns in the formation of ties among users. The
effect of each configuration tested by the model on the discussion network is
shown in Table 5.6. As with the ERGM on the migration debate and most social
network, reciprocity is an important factor in determining the creation of ties.
What instead is quite different from what is found generally in a social network
discussing political views is that the probability of observing a tie among a pair of
users sharing the same opinion is lower than among a pair with different opinions.
In other words, in this discussion users showed heterophily more often than
homophily. Moreover, users against a coalition government appeared to be more
active in directly engaging users who favoured a coalition government.
Network effect Estimate (SE)
edges
              
       
−6.096(0.097)∗∗∗
reciprocity
              
       
2.522(0.734)∗∗∗
political homophily
              
       
−0.690(0.339)∗
sender (against)
              
       
1.074(0.129)∗∗∗
receiver (against)
              
       
−1.973(0.333)∗∗∗
Table 5.6: Network effects computed fitting the discussion network on parliamentary confidence
vote between February and November 2014 with an exponential random graph model
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Heterophily is in fact quite surprising in online political discussion networks,
where ideological polarisation has been continuously observed over the years
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Barberá, 2015). And yet this pattern is perfectly under-
standable in the context of a political community, empowered by an unexpected
electoral result, where users try very hard to convince and persuade others and
in so doing steering the position of the Movement. Moreover, the data show
that cross-opinion engagement is again not symmetrical. As in the case of the
migration debate, it appears that one side of the debate—interestingly the side
that aligns with the position of the leader—played a more active role in engaging
with the other view. It can be argued that their activism in defending the purity
of the Movement and its intransigence towards the ‘old politics’ was a response to
the pressure, mounting from the media and probably also from a non-negligible
number of M5S voters, to give a stable government to the country and show
political responsibility in a difficult economic crisis. According to a user opposing
any opening towards the PD,
[o]ur role is to dismantle the current party system and create a new
one. What’s the point in voting to support a government led by the
PD, and its secretary Bersani, that during the last 20 years governed
for more than 10 and now they pretend they did not contribute to
the disasters of the last 20 years [...]. We must move forward with
our program of dismantling the current system without doubts or
interruptions.
The criticism towards Beppe Grillo and the preconceived attitude of closure
towards any debate, was articulated around two arguments: in terms of pragmat-
ism and natural evolution of the Movement—according to a user ‘the M5S must
show its value and move from protesting to realising its political program’, but
also in terms of a lack of internal consultation. For another user,
humiliating the base and the bottom-up democracy, the decision
[...] was taken by the top [...]. In article 4 of the Movement’s manifesto
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‘it is recognised to the Internet a central role for the phases of [...]
consultation, deliberation and decision and election’. [...] Nothing
of this occurred. By reading comments in the Forum, it appears that
users are more or less divided in half [...]
As previously noted in the topic analysis, the debate on internal democracy
and consequently the role of citizen-users in shaping the politics and the policies
of the Movement attracted on the Forum, and throughout the M5S, a large
number of postings. It was a crucial issue for the Movement since so much of the
identity of its supporters active online depended on it. It is then not surprising
that the issue reemerged vehemently during the debate on whether to support a
coalition government. In the days after the general election of 2013, the sense of
empowerment of the community of citizen-users reached its peak along with the
frequency of online activity.
Notwithstanding the fact that some within the Movement (according to my
coding about 40% of commenters) favoured a political agreement for the creation
of a government also supported by the votes of the M5S, the issue was never
put to a vote and in general the discussion was discouraged, that is, the role of
users around the most important decision in the history of the Movement was
undermined. Grillo, as the debate started to unfold following the success of the
online petition, made clear that the issue was not debatable since during the
campaign the Movement had always professed its opposition to any coalition
government. The non-negotiability of the position of the Movement against
any coalition crushed those who saw the assembly of citizen-users as the only
authoritative forum for deliberation and decision-making. The entire affair put
then the Movement under strain because Grillo had to defend his position not
against the old forces of politics but against an online petition signed by thousands
(the very essence of the idea of Internet democracy) with what was seen by many
as an anti-democratic decision.
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4.5. Discussion network on exiting the common currency
The discussion on abandoning the common European currency is, similarly to the
discussion on immigration, diffused across time (see Figure 5.9). Yet, in October
2014, after the Movement launched its campaign for a referendum on the euro,
the domain of the debate on the Forum became more defined: the referendum.
The attention Beppe Grillo dedicated to the issue significantly increased after the
campaign was launched and the position expressed by Grillo on his blog entered
and fuelled the debate on the Forum. The option of leaving the common currency
was never contemplated by any of the main parties with the notable exception
of the right-wing Northern League and was not in the M5S electoral manifesto
presented in 2013. In fact, few users complained about the decision of launching
the campaign, which they perceived both as useless and far from the original
(environmentalist?) roots of the Movement. A user wrote:
I have a personal impression that, at least where I live, a few
old militants of the meetups who organised stands and went on the
ground are pissed off. I am against both the pointless referendum
and leaving the euro [...] I phoned and asked old militants who were
on the ground in 2005 and 2007 [...] and I felt a general detachment.
Can you imagine what is like to keep a stand open for 6 months [to
collect the signatures for the referendum]? It’s crazy [...]. NOW, GO
ON, web-revolutionaries. I give way.
Nevertheless, although most of the self-described left-wing users did identify
the issue of leaving the Euro as a right-wing issue, it does not appear from the
data that those in favour of leaving the Euro spent relatively less time on the
Forum. In fact the median permanence of users in the two groups, measured as
the number of days between the last and the first post, was almost the same: a
user supporting leaving the common currency is expected to have been active on
the Forum for 648 days while a user with the opposite view only slightly longer:
675 days.
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The discussion network for the quantitative analysis was drawn from 254
postings of 144 users, published on the Forum between October and December
2014. The opinion of 56.2% of the 144 users was binary-coded based on whether
the author agreed or not with leaving the European common currency. Many
users also raised the issue of the opportunity and constitutional legitimacy of
a referendum on the issue. Nevertheless, coding only focused on the opinion
on the common currency and not on the discussion on how to obtain an exit.
According to the data, the majority (58.02%) of users active in the discussion
for whom an opinion was coded favoured leaving the common currency against
29.62% who said they wanted to remain in the common currency and 12.34%
who expressed mixed opinions.
Notably, the majority of postings (59%) used facts in support of the argument,
while only 35% of postings included facts in the debate on the coalition govern-
ment and 42% in the debate on immigration. This could indicate that the debate
on the Euro currency, pertaining to the domain of economics, is more technical
or at least is perceived as more rigorous by users: for example, if the debate of
migration and party coalitions was probably conceived as driven by moral (and
thus absolute) considerations, multiple postings of the debate on the Euro listed
meticulously pros and cons of any action. This is also confirmed by a tabular
analysis on the number of postings in the debate on the Euro currency that
contained a link to any page. If in the corpus of about 400,000 postings published
on the Forum between 2009 and 2015, about 6% contained a link (indicated by
the presence of a string containing http...), 18% of postings discussing leaving
the Euro currency contained one. A Pearson’s Chi-squared test confirmed the
significance of the difference.
In terms of opinion polarisation, the debate showed a pattern similar to the
debate on migration, with a higher probability of tie-formation between users
with similar views, when controlling for other configuration such as reciprocity
and sender and receiver characteristics (see Table 5.7). And yet 52.17% of ties
connected pairs of users with different opinions (a pair of users can have more
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than one tie if they exchanged multiple comments). This could indicate that
although users did exhibit homophily on this argument, when they engaged with
users with opposing view they tended to exchange more comments.
Network effect Estimate (SE)
edges
              
       
−4.701(0.097)∗∗∗
reciprocity
              
       
2.709(0.329)∗∗∗
political homophily
              
       
0.819(0.196)∗
sender (against Euro)
              
       
0.119(0.153)
receiver (against Euro)
              
       
−0.713(0.181)∗∗∗
Table 5.7: Network effects computed fitting the discussion network on exiting the common
currency between October and December 2014 with an exponential random graph
model
5. Conclusion: The everywhere political talk
In this chapter, we observed behaviours and interactions of tens of thousands of
users across the different online platforms deployed over the years by the M5S.
From the analysis of empirical evidence based on transactional data generated
by users it emerged that, first, in its aggregate form participation in online
deliberative systems is non-linear and difficult to compress with the traditional
averages of normal distributions. This has not only consequences for the analysis
(non-linear distributions are inherently more difficult to describe) but also for the
democratic value and potential contribution of the online deliberation experiment.
Second, online deliberating communities do not necessarily fragment along
opinion lines: evidence from the network analysis of three distinct debates
shows that users engage (possibly also because of strategical considerations) with
different opinions. Third, evidence suggests that users active on the Forum are
strongly interested in debating how to practically implement online deliberation,
which is consistently among the most discussed topics. This suggests that the
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citizen-users who took to the Internet and to the Forum are not only interested
in policy goals (the relative importance of discussion on environmental issues,
represented by four of the five stars in the name of the M5S, progressively
faded away) but also in transforming the meaning and weight of direct political
participation through the Internet (the fifth star of the name).
The chapter has provided evidence supporting the dialogic potential of online
deliberation, in which citizen-users interact and arguably produce knowledge
that is shared throughout the community of the Movement. I first noted that
the dialogue is real in the sense that differences of opinions are represented and
accounted for by the users involved; no debate shows a strong segregation of
the debating community. But I also noted that the community under analysis is
not necessarily representative of the political talk taking place everywhere on the
Internet since users might feel ‘a sense of community’ and agree on fundamental
issues. Second, the dialogue is informed by facts and frequently users add links
to other resources to add credibility or to inform. The occurrence of links in
postings varies, more technical debates (such as the debate on the Euro currency)
are found to contain links with a higher probability, but still in general about 6%
of postings contain a link.
Nevertheless, the profound inequality in the level of attention to postings and
participation casts serious doubt on whether the debate is actually democratic (in
the sense of representing opinions fairly and in an unbiased way). As observed,
present attention is a formidable predictor for future attention and consequently
new opinions, contrary to the belief of equal access guaranteed by the Internet,
have an extremely high chance of going totally unnoticed by the community of
users. Specularly, users also behave extremely differently. As seen by comparing
activity patterns of female and male users, demographic characteristics might
contribute to explain the difference. But it seems difficult that demographic
differences could integrally explain such extreme differences in activity. These
two patterns that emerge from the behaviour of users (long-tailed distributions
for both attention to nodes and activity of nodes) can be interpreted in light of
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the fact that users are networked individuals (Rainie & Wellman, 2012).
The blips of activities that are captured by the data should be put into the
context of individuals that are simultaneously actors on different networks, which
they navigate, activate, deactivate, based on preferences that are influenced by
constant exposure to the very same networks. Thanks to Internet and mobile
technologies, the activation/deactivation cycle can last a fraction of a second
(a user likes a posting shared through one of its networks such as friends,
coworkers, members of the M5S) or exceptionally can last for hours, days, months
or even years. The multiplication of networks, of layers of interactions, provides
individuals with an immense pool of nodes to connect to but paradoxically the
omniscient influence of the networks, in which each user is immersed, results in
the promotion (exponentially in terms of the size of the network) of only very
few nodes—the promotion of which can only be justified based on the actual
quality of the node’s content.
An additional effect of the multiplication of networks around individuals is
that everyday political talk, the talk that based on the conceptualisation of Mans-
bridge (1999) is conductive to the formation of political opinions, is also much
more ubiquitous and diverse. It happens everywhere because the multiplication of
layers of personal networks, which are constantly recombined and reconfigured,
produces much more intersection points between different domains that allow
politics to pop up at any time, even unexpectedly when the ego-user at the centre
of the network is not actively looking for it. It is diverse because traditional
forms of representing political arguments and opinions are outmatched by visual
content (often in the form of memes).
If the analysis presented in this chapter has indicated that the practice of
online deliberation is compatible with the ideal of dialogic deliberation, the next
chapter will assess whether it can also sustain instrumental deliberation, which
results in decision making (J. Kim & Kim, 2008). From the topic, analysis emerged
that direct participation through Internet tools played an important role in the
debate on the Forum. But the analysis of the debate on the M5S support for
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a coalition government identified a tension between citizen-users’ aspiration
of placing decision-making within the perimeter of formal online deliberation
mechanisms (made manifest in the voting platform that the Movement created
in 2013) and the leadership of Beppe Grillo, who in practice deprived the online
community of any authority on that issue.
256
Chapter 6
Online deliberative discourse
Go home, public sphere. You’re drunk.
@NeinQuarterly
The chapter offers a discourse analysis based on natural language processing
of the deliberation process for the institution of a guaranteed minimum income.
The policy proposal was not part of the original electoral manifesto of the M5S but
became part of the program of the Movement, and actually turned into a flagship
item, after being discussed online. The analysis explores how the discourse on
the GMI took shape in the online discussion and assesses its trajectories both
internally to the Movement, from discussion to voting and then to an official
position of the party organisation, in the online community of citizen-users, and
in the broader national public sphere. There are two reasons for the choice of the
discussion on the GMI as a case study. First, the proposal for the introduction
of a so-called ‘citizen’s income’ after the 2013 general election quickly became
the flagship item for the Movement: the M5S and its leadership dedicated
considerable attention to the GMI and the GMI never left the Movement’s agenda.
This continuous attention allows to treat the multiyear discussion as a single
thread instead of independent fragments. Second, the relevance of the item both
within the Movement and in the public arena triggered a large and sustained
volume of comments from the users of the Forum. The choice of the GMI as
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case study is thus motivated by its historical and political relevance and by the
practical considerations of finding a debate that was sustained over the years.
In October 2013 the M5S presented a law proposal to the Italian Senate to
introduce nation-wide a ‘citizen’s income’ (Catalfo, 2013) which was then also
widely publicised by Grillo himself on different media platforms. The proposal
followed an online debate on the Movement’s platforms that dated back to at least
2005 and 2009 when it was first discussed respectively in the comment section of
Grillo’s blog and on the Forum of the M5S. The first online vote on the GMI took
place just before the general election of 2013, in a survey organised on Grillo’s
blog. In November 2013, a few days after the bill was presented in the Senate, the
Movement also opened a discussion on the bill on the deliberation platform of the
Movement (the so-called ‘Operative system’, sistemaoperativom5s.beppegrillo.it).
The M5S bill proposed the institution of a GMI for every EU citizen residing in
Italy fixed at an ‘at-risk-of-poverty threshold’ computed annually by the National
Institute for Statistics (ISTAT).
In this chapter, I argue that the online debate contributed significantly in
pushing the GMI onto the public agenda and to parliamentary deliberation,
although the policy item was already intermittently present in the public and
political debate. The online discussion resulted first in the popularisation of a
policy idea: a ‘citizen’s income’. The idea of a benefit to be distributed universally
to all citizens, which is the text-book definition of ‘citizen’s income’, appeared first
in the context of a conspiratorial theory, shared among users who had an active
role in online fora of the M5S, according to which monetary financial institutions
such as central banks impoverished ordinary people through seigniorage, that
is, by illegitimately keeping the difference between the cost of printing money
and the nominal value of money. Second, as the idea was discussed in the
commenting sections, Grillo progressively legitimised it by presenting it as
economically sound: if the first ‘expert’ to appear on the blog had no scientific
accreditation (purportedly he never completed any graduate course) the second
expert was a Nobel prize recipient: Joseph Stiglitz. Third, the label of the policy
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idea was appropriated by the Movement—although the content was not integrally
incorporated—in the run-up to the general election of 2013 and it trickled down
to the discourse of candidates of other parties. Fourth, after the general election,
at least three parties, including the M5S, discussed the ‘citizen’s income’ in
Parliament and bills to introduce nation-wide some sort of GMI were presented.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I provide some
clarification on the definitions of ‘guaranteed minimum income’ and ‘citizen’s
income’ and consequently of the terms I used to search different corpora of
texts for documents related to this issue. In the second section, I present a
method of semantic analysis based on the collocation of documents within a
multidimensional concept space. The method will provide (in the fourth section)
a reading of the semantic evolution of the discussion via a quantitative analysis of
thousands of posts published during almost ten years on different platforms. In
the third section, I present the national debate on GMI by querying the archives
of the two major Italian newspapers and of the Italian Parliament for documents
containing specific terms. In the fourth section, I present the debate as it unfolded
on different online platforms within the M5S. In the final section, I present an
assessment of the impacts that the online debate might have had on the official
position of the M5S and on the national debate.
1. Definitions of ‘guaranteed minium income’ and ‘citizen’s
income’
According to economists active in the public debate on the reform of the Italian
welfare system (see Boeri & Perotti, 2013), the policy proposed by the M5S
was in fact not a ‘citizen’s income’ (or basic income), the label chosen by the
Movement, but a guaranteed minimum income (GMI).1 In the definition of
1During a Senate hearing to provide an opinion on the M5S bill, National Institute for
Statistics (ISTAT) also pointed to the inexactness of the terminology adopted by the M5S in
labelling its policy, which is ‘denominated citizen’s income, but in this case amounts to a selective
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political economist Philippe Van Parijs (2004) a ‘basic income is an income paid
by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without
means test or work requirement’ (Van Parijs, 2004, p. 8) but the law proposed
by the M5S clearly involved a means test: ‘measure of the citizen’s income [...]
is calculated monthly based on the household income’ (Catalfo, 2013, Art. 3 §
5). In other words, if the provision of a citizen’s income as generally intended
by economists involves the periodic transfer from the state to all citizens of the
same amount of money without any conditions but citizenship, the formulation
of the M5S law implies a conditionality and the ‘citizen’s income’ is intended as a
supplement to a household’s income to allow it to reach a minimum income fixed
by the state, which in fact is, for economists, the definition of the GMI. The M5S
was not the first party to propose or pass a GMI provision labelling it citizen’s
income. The first example is probably the left-wing coalition at the Campania
Regional Council, which passed a law granting a ‘citizen’s income’ to those with
annual income below 5,000 euros (Giunta Regionale della Campania, 2004).
Taking into account that in practice the GMI is recurrently—although improperly—
referred to as citizen’s income by news media and political movements, I searched
the corpus of news media and political text for both phrases. Still, I refer here to
GMI, independently from the proponents’ own denomination, if the proposed
benefit is conditional on the actual income of the recipient.
2. Mapping documents in the concept space
The challenge in mapping a conversation made up of thousands of fragments of
written texts disseminated through different channels—in the current case, a blog,
a forum, two newspapers and Parliament—is in maximising the compression
of contents minimising the loss of relevant information, that is, of interest for
the analysis. My descriptive analysis of the debate for the introduction of GMI,
measure, limiting payments of benefits to households with an income below a determined
threshold’ (Alleva, 2015, p. 6)
260
Francesco Bailo
alternatively referred to as ‘citizen’s’ or ‘guaranteed minimum’ income, aims
to seek relations of influence among written contributions of very different
actors (from ordinary citizens to journalists and MPs). The assumption is that
each contribution is potentially influenced by previous contributions and can
potentially influence successive contributions. The expected individual ‘weight’
of each contribution varies greatly, depending on whether it is posted in the
comment section of a forum or published in a major newspaper. Still, because
of the new topography of the public sphere flattened by the wide diffusion of
communication technologies, contributions of marginal actors are now at the same
‘click-distance’ from the general public as front page articles. But if differences
in technological endowments for expressing ideas and opinions between actors
in the public sphere have been reduced (or arguably disappeared), whether this
new geography brings practical consequences in the development of the debate
is still an open question.
In order to follow the evolution of the conversation and track the direction
of possible influence, I mapped the relationship among texts, or documents,
that entered the debate (via online fora, newspapers or parliamentary acts)
based on the concepts expressed in them. Concepts are either abstract ideas
(e.g. unemployment, poverty) or tangible objects or people (e.g. car, horse,
Shakespeare). A concept is not an opinion. Two actors might both use a concept
in a discussion, such as unemployment, without necessarily sharing a common
opinion (or for that matter, a common understanding) of the concept. Still,
especially in a policy debate, if concepts are sufficiently well defined, mapping
the use of concepts by actors can provide insights on the general direction of the
debate and support inference on the relations among interventions.
Operationally I needed to construct a concept space populated by a finite set of
concepts and collocate each of my documents (posts, articles or parliamentary
acts) in that space. In the process, the distance between each document and each
concept is measured. Once documents have a position relative to all the concepts,
I can infer the relative importance of each concept within the document (e.g.
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the concept ‘car’ is expected to be more important than the concept ‘motorbike’
in a document discussing car safety) but also whether two documents are both
similarly distant to the same set of concepts based on their respective cosine-
similarity.
2.1. The concept space
Explicit semantic analysis (ESA) was proposed by Gabrilovich and Markovitch
(2007) to compute a document position in a high-dimensional concept space.
At the core, the technique compares the terms of the input document with the
terms of a document describing the concepts to estimate the relatedness of the
document to each concept. As in Gabrilovich and Markovitch (2007) I populate
the concept space for the analysis with a selected number of articles from the
Italian version of Wikipedia. Wikipedia is particularly well suited for use as a
source of the concept space. First, the encyclopaedic mission of Wikipedia makes
it sufficiently universal to cover a wide range of topics (or concepts). Second, the
fact that many different users contribute to Wikipedia (although not necessarily
from different demographics2) should increase the variety of the terminology that
appears in the description of the concepts. Third, Wikipedia articles are nested
into a hierarchical tree of categories, thus making filtering articles by categories
of interest easier. Fourth, the entire corpus of Wikipedia articles is published
under a Creative Commons licence, and thus freely available to researchers.
To define my concept space based on relevant Wikipedia articles for the
debate analysis, based on Gabrilovich and Markovitch (2007), Milne and Witten
(2013), Egozi, Markovitch, and Gabrilovich (2011), I proceeded as following.
I downloaded the entire corpus of webpages published under the domain it.
wikipedia.org as of February 2016 along with databases containing information
on internal links connecting the different pages of Wikipedia, links connecting
2According to the last survey conducted, among contributors to the Italian Wikipedia 86% are
male, 49% have a university degree (Wikimedia, 2012).
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pages and categories, and relations between pages in different languages.3 From
the raw corpus containing 2,574,955 pages, I immediately filtered out all pages
that were not encyclopaedic articles but pages dedicated to maintaining Wikipedia
and all articles with fewer than 100 words, which I considered insufficient to
fully describe a concept, remaining with a corpus of 864,274 articles. To assess
the relevance of each remaining article I mapped the inter-page links connecting
the article; in this sense, pages with a relatively higher number of incoming
or outgoing links were considered more relevant. After fixing a threshold for
relevance to the median values of eight incoming and 27 outgoing links, 277,416
articles remained for the analysis.
The last layer of filtering was based on the categories of the articles. The cat-
egory structure of Wikipedia is hierarchical. The uppermost category of the Italian
Wikipedia taxonomy is Categoria: Categorie which has three child-categories:
Categoria: Wikipedia, Categoria: Multimedia and Categoria: Enciclopedia.
I immediately eliminated the first two child-categories since they related the pages
dedicated to the administration of the site. From the remaining categories, I
constructed a graph mapping their hierarchical relations (all categories must have
a parent-category). This successively allowed me to extract categories in the close
proximity of a few categories of interest and remove others (such as categories
of people). Specifically, to define the set of categories to include in the analysis
I identified, after inspecting the textual documents discussing GMI, nine broad
categories that in their English translation were ‘Category: Poverty’, ‘Category:
Unemployment’, ‘Category: Banking’, ‘Category: Income’, ‘Category: Politics’,
‘Category: Politics of Italy’, ‘Category: Monetary economics’, ‘Category: Consti-
tution of Italy’ and ‘Category: Five Star Movement’. Starting from these eight
categories I queried the graph for all categories with a maximum of two-degree
3More specifically I downloaded from dumps.wikimedia.org/backup-index.html
the following database backup dumps: itwiki-20160203-pages-articles.xml,
itwiki-20160203-pagelinks.sql, itwiki-20160203-categorylinks.sql and
itwiki-20160203-langlinks.sql.
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Figure 6.1: Relations between the most relevant Wikipedia categories used to map the concept
space
separation from them, obtaining a set of 540 categories. Figure 6.1 shows the
most relevant categories and their relations obtained by extracting the neighbour-
hood of the eight categories listed above. All articles not belonging to these 540
categories were removed, bringing the final number of Wikipedia articles for the
concept space to 4827.
2.2. Term frequency analysis
Once I had defined the two corpora, the corpus of posts, news articles and
parliamentary acts and the corpus of Wikipedia articles forming the concept
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space, I proceeded to their term frequency analysis to make them quantitatively
comparable after removing stopwords and stemming remaining terms. Term
frequency analysis is widely applied in NLP. In its most basic implementation
each document of a corpus is considered as an unordered list of words (that is,
where each word actually appears within the document is irrelevant) and the
number of occurrences of each word in each document is computed. We can then
think of a document as a vector of term frequencies within a common vector space
indicating the frequency of all words that appears at least once in the corpus (see
Manning et al., 2008, Chapter 3).
Assigning to each word within a document the same importance irrespective
of how often the word is used in the corpus can be undesirable because it may
underrate the significance of a word that is used rarely across the documents. To
address this problem I applied as weighting for each term its inverse document
frequency defined as
id ft = log
N
d ft
where N was the number of documents of the corpus and d ft the number of
documents containing the term t. Then I derived a weighted term of frequency
t ft simply by multiplying it for the corresponding d ft obtaining, for each term
of document d, t f × id ft,d, finally obtaining a term frequency–inverse document
frequency (TFIDF). The effect of this weighting is to increase the relative importance
of terms that appear in few documents over terms that appear in most of the
documents, thus weighting more words that we assume to be important to
interpret the document. Still, two documents with similar terms could have very
different term frequency vectors simply because in a longer document a term has
a higher chance of appearing more often. Because the length of documents in
both corpora used in the analysis varied significantly (from short comments to
long Wikipedia articles), I normalised each vector.4
4The term-document matrix was computed with the function
TermDocumentMatrix(corpus, control = list(weighting = function(x)
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2.3. The semantic interpretation vector
Each document and concept were at this point described by a vector of weights,
one weight for each word contained in the document, that is, in the former, the
collection of all documents of the discussion under analysis and in the latter,
the Wikipedia articles forming the concept space. Each weight indicates the
relative importance of a corresponding word within the document or concept.
The last step is to interpret each document in terms of the set of concepts in
the concept space, thus identifying which concepts better interpret the content
of a document. What we want to obtain is computing for each document D a
‘semantic interpretation vector’ Gabrilovich and Markovitch (2007, p. 1607) of
length N so as to describe with a scalar value the strength of the association
between the document D and concept cj for cj ∈ c1, ..., cN. For document D we
already know its TFIDF vector 〈vi〉 where vi is the weight of word wi, and so we
know 〈k j〉 containing an inverted index of concept weights for word wi. The final
step is then to multiply the vi of each word wi of document D with k j of concept
cj and sum the results:
∑
wi∈D
vi · k j
which returns the weight of concept cj in document D.
2.4. Evaluation
To evaluate the result of the semantic interpretation vector in rendering the
meaning of a document, I list in Table 6.1 the top 20 concepts (which correspond
to articles of the Italian Wikipedia) returned from a Forum’s comment and a
newspaper article, selected among documents below 1500 characters. Importantly,
as seen before, the concept space was pre-processed so as to include only concepts
of interest for the analysis. Still, concepts were not handpicked but, leveraging
weightTfIdf(x, normalize = TRUE))) from the R package tm (Feinerer, Hornik, & Meyer, 2008)
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the relations among Wikipedia articles defined by the taxonomy of hierarchical
categories, drawn into the analysis based on their taxonomic proximity to target
categories (see Figure 6.1). The reduction in the number of categories helped to
bring the computation required down to manageable levels but also to focus the
concept analysis and reduce the chance of false positive results (that is, concepts
that were totally unrelated to the document). In fact, the objective of the analysis
is not to simply retrieve the information contained in the document (that is to
understand what the documents are saying) but to map their relations and their
relation to concepts relevant to understand the evolution of the discourse.
In the two documents shown in table 6.1 there are in fact a few false posit-
ives.The online comment (left column) is related to the concepts of ‘Rebirth of
Christian Democracy’ or ‘Italian fiscal code card’, which clearly are not mentioned
in the document. The newspaper article is instead associated with concepts of
union organisations that—although part of the Italian General Confederation
of Labour (CGIL), mentioned in the document multiple times—are not directly
referred to. Still, the concept analysis is quite effective in identifying the main
concepts mentioned in the document without any significant false negative. In
the comment (left column) the analysis rightly identified the concepts of ‘pro-
ductivity’, taxation on firms (‘tax wedge’), public debts (‘fiscal cliff’) while in
the newspaper article the concepts of ‘unemployment’, ‘Regional government of
Lazio’ and ‘CGIL’. Notably the absence of the concept of GMI is by design. In
fact since all documents contained a reference to GMI, the weight assigned to all
the terms pointing to the concept was low (see 2.2).
For the current analysis the absence, or low chance thereof, of false negatives is
crucially more relevant that any issue occurring with the false positives results. In
fact, the interest is not in retrieving the exact meaning of documents, which could
potentially be polluted by a large number of false positive, but in identifying
which document referred to a specific concept before subjecting it to a qualitative
analysis. Moreover, from the two documents illustrated in Table 6.1 it emerges that
false positive points to very specific and semantically limited concepts—‘Rebirth
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document concepts
1) we are talking about basic income, non-guaranteed minimum
income 2) and in any case with the various cuts you don’t reach
30 billion per year 3) money to subsidise idleness and unpro-
ductivity? absurd and who should create jobs since companies
are closing because Italy is a tax hell? the state? Another fake
welfarism. 4) with both citizen’s income and with GMI the gen-
eral Italian mentality is fraudulent so it would cost even more
than any normally budgeted calculation.
Productivity; Tax wedge; Fiscal cliff;
Rebirth of Christian Democracy; Profit;
Government agency; Tax haven; Social
stigma; Italian fiscal code card; Declara-
tion of taxable income
2) Alert work, unemployment at 10% Di Berardino, CGIL∗: we
need immediately investments for public works. Economy, The
union: "Insufficient resources? The Region must use EU funds
and cut external consultants". The problem of unemployment
is becoming a ’social emergency in our territory ": Claudio Di
Berardino, general secretary of the CGIL in Rome and Lazio,
raises the alarm. According to union estimates, the unemploy-
ment rate is now back to almost 10%, but also including the
"discouraged" (ie people without work who do not enroll at the
job centres) the rate exceeds 12%. And yet, says Di Berardino, "in
Lazio region one million people, mostly pensioners and casual
workers, live on less than 800 euros per month while recourse
to irregular work and evictions for non-payment do increase."
The CGIL, therefore, calls for immediate investment to boost the
economy and jobs. And to recover the resources, the region
"makes maximal use of the available European funds and resets
for five years the costs of any outside consultancy." Berardino
also asks the Regional government of Polverini to restore the
"citizenship income", the ’check for 530 Euros per month for the
poor introduced by’ former governor Marrazzo, but cancelled
for budgetary reasons.
Federation of knowledge workers∗;
Italian General Confederation of Labour
(CGIL)∗; Unemployment; Regional gov-
ernment of Lazio; Federation of Me-
tallurgical Workers∗; Investment; His-
tory of CGIL∗; General Labour Union;
Administrative region; Italian Labour
Union
∗ Italian General Confederation of La-
bour (CGIL). Federation of knowledge
workers and Federation of Metallurgical
Workers are part of CGIL.
Table 6.1: Two documents (top row) and the respective top 10 concepts (bottom row) derived by
comparing their term frequency to the term frequency of Wikipedia articles
of Christian Democracy’ is an obscure party and the ‘Italian fiscal code card’ is a
card containing the Italian tax number, while all broad concepts—‘productivity’
and ‘unemployment’—are correctly identified.
An additional evaluation of the result of the analysis was conducted of
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the highest weighted concepts across the different corpora: online, media and
Parliament (for details on the 20 highest concepts for each corpus see Table 4 in
Appendix).
3. The GMI public debate in Italy
The debate on the GMI is an interesting case study because before it was actively
promoted by the M5S, the issue was rarely discussed by the media and in
Parliament. GMI, whether referred to as ‘guaranteed minimum wage’ or ‘citizen’s
income’, was present in the debate before 2013 but sparsely mentioned. Even
if these specific measures were not debated, unemployment and poverty are
constant themes in Italian political discussion, and parties and newspapers alike
routinely advance analyses or proposals to tackle them. In fact, both poverty and
unemployment have dramatically increased in the temporal period covered by
the analysis of the online discussion (2005-2015, see Figure 6.2).
To track the evolution of the debate on GMI that occurred in the Italian Parlia-
ment, I analysed bills and parliamentary acts containing the phrases ‘guaranteed
minimum income’ and ‘citizen’s income’ either in the title of the document or,
when present, in the description of the document.5 Based on the terminology
adopted by the two chambers of Parliament, which equally contribute to each
national legislation, Bills are law proposals presented by one or more Members of
Parliaments not necessarily members of the the same party (‘progetto di legge’ or
‘disegno di legge’ in Italian) while acts are a broader class of documents presented
by MPs including ‘interrogations’, ‘motions’, items in discussion agendas and
‘resolutions’. The analysis of the parliamentary documents helps understand
not only if and how often the issue was debated but also which parties put the
issue forward. Based on the data structure of the historical archive of Parliament,
each document is linked to one or more MPs and each MP to one parliamentary
5Documents were obtained querying the online databases of the two chambers (Camera
dei Deputati, 2016; Senato della Repubblica, 2016) with the regular expression filters reddito
(minimo )?di cittadinanza and (reddito minimo garantito).
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group, which usually corresponds to a party. If MPs were members of a party
that participated in a general election when presenting the document—MPs can
switch parliamentary groups after the election—they are assigned a left/right
score based on the coding of the electoral manifestos (Volkens et al., 2014) nearest
to the date of the presented document.
Figure 6.3 presents the data from the historical archive of the Italian Parliament
for the period 1989-2015. In total 105 documents were retrieved, 89 from the
Chamber and 16 from the Senate6 with respectively 383 signatures of Members
of the Chamber and 150 Senators. The left-right alignment of each party (vertical
axis) is based on the coding by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2014). Points
are slightly jiggled to improve readability. Based on Manifesto Project coding, acts
and bills presented by the M5S are clustered in the lower part of the panels (see
Section 2). In the top panels, each mark corresponds to a signature of a MP and
is collocated on the vertical axis based on the political position of the signatory
MP. The blue lines indicate a locally weighted smooth (Cleveland & Devlin, 1988;
as implemented by in Wickham, 2009) with the corresponding standard error
(computed excluding the M5S data points) to appreciate the political collocation
of the signing MPs. The bottom panels depict the occurrences of documents
across time. The first observation is that the frequency of occurrences over the 26
years under analysis of the two phrases do increase dramatically after the election
of 2013 and not just because of the activity of the MPs of the M5S. Second, the
GMI issue cannot be labelled either as left-wing, since right-wing MPs actively
discussed GMI policies, nor as a radical issue since centrist and moderate parties
also discussed it.
The first ever record in the archive of Parliament to refer to GMI is a bill
presented in the Chamber of Deputies in 1989 by Proletarian Democracy, a far-left
party (Russo Spena, 1989). The bill openly linked the concept of a guaranteed
minimum income (GMI) to the concept of a ‘“salary of citizenship” as a right
6In the case of the Senate only bills were collected because it was not possible to link acts to
MPs in the Senate’s archive.
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of every citizen to obtain public money with the aim of guaranteeing (at least
in part) his needs’ (Russo Spena, 1989, p. 1). Interesting the 1989 law proposal
is very similar to the bill presented 24 years later by the M5S, both in terms of
the conditionalities established by the law—beneficiaries must actively look for a
job if they are able to work (Russo Spena, 1989, Art. 3)—but also in terms of the
justifications formulated on Constitutional grounds; both bills referred to Article
3 of the Constitution (Russo Spena, 1989, Art. 1 § 1; Catalfo, 2013, Art. 1 § 1),
which states that ‘[i]t is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an
economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens’
(‘Constitution of the Italian Republic’, 1948, Art 3).
In 1994 National Alliance, a right-wing party successor of the post-fascist
Italian Socialist Movement, presented a bill to institute a GMI within a policy
aimed at protecting the family as a fundamental component of society (Buon-
tempo, 1994, p. 1). Although the bill referred to Constitutional economic guar-
antees, explicitly mentioning the Article 3 of the Constitution in line with the
1989 and 2013 bills, it also added as justification in the third paragraph of its
introductory section a ‘Letter to Families’ written by the Pope. In 1999 National
Alliance proposed a new bill for the institution of a ‘universal citizen’s income’
but this time within a bill focusing on tax reform and wealth redistribution
(Gramazio, 1999).
Figure 6.4 shows the relative frequency of articles mentioning the GMI in the
two major Italian daily newspapers mentioning it between 1992 and 2015. La
Repubblica discussed GMI between December 2003 and February 2004, following
the approval of a regional law in Campania but then reduced the level of attention
dedicated to GMI until the end of 2012.7 Il Corriere della Sera barely mentioned
GMI before late 2012. In fact, between January 2008 and October 2012, ‘citizen’s
income’ is only mentioned in the newspaper five times. What increased attention
towards GMI by October 2012, as is visible in Figure 6.4, was the electoral
7The archive of la Repubblica also returns results for articles that appeared in the local sections
of the newspaper.
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Figure 6.4: Number of articles mentioning ‘citizen’s income’ as fraction of articles mentioning
‘politics’ published in the same period.
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campaign waged by Grillo and the M5S. Between the end of October and the
general election of February 2013, 17 articles in il Corriere della Sera referred
to ‘citizen’s income’—without providing a comprehensive description of the
provision—and mostly in relation to the M5S campaign. In fact, GMI was
recognised as a feature of the electoral campaign of the M5S in both newspapers
(see Stella, 2010; Buzzi, 2012; Emanuele, 2012; ‘Grillo’, 2012). Yet GMI was not
only put forward by the M5S and during the campaign other centre-left parties
were also associated with the proposal, although more weakly (see for example
Giannattasio, 2012).
The interest of other parties is confirmed by the parliamentary debates follow-
ing the general election of 2013. As the M5S was preparing (and voting online on)
its proposal almost every left-wing party put forward a proposal, and sometime
multiple proposals, explicitly mentioning the GMI or the ‘citizen’s income’. If
the economic crisis certainly played a role in the attention dedicated by MPs to
proposals targeting unemployment and poverty, it cannot be excluded that those
proposals were tactical: a response to the campaign of the M5S.
4. The GMI debate within the M5S
May 2005 First comment to appear on the blog;
March 2009 First proposal to appear on the forum (Esposito, 2009);
November 2011 First mention of GMI in a post on beppegrillo.it (Grillo, 2011);
December 2012 Grillo launches his ‘agenda’: GMI is the second among 16 issues
(Grillo, 2012b);
February 2013 Online ‘survey’ to identify the five most pressing social issues to
be addressed by the M5S, GMI is the fourth most voted (28,868 votes from
60,155 voters) (Grillo, 2013f);
October 2013 M5S formally presented a bill in the Senate to introduce the GMI
(Catalfo, 2013);
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November 2013 M5S launched an online discussion (followed by a vote) on its
deliberation platform for the bill introducing the GMI (Grillo, 2013a).
GMI was not mentioned in the program of the M5S first published in 2009 on
beppegrillo.it or in the versions published in the following years (Movimento 5
Stelle, 2009b, 2013, 2015). The 2009 program referred instead to a ‘guaranteed
unemployment benefit’ (Movimento 5 Stelle, 2009b, p. 7) without providing
further details on what the actual measure would imply. Still, the law proposed
by the M5S in 2013 clearly expanded the pool of recipients, from the unemployed
to all citizens below the official poverty line (Art. 2 § 2 Catalfo, 2013).
Figure 6.5 presents the weekly number of posts mentioning GMI, either as
‘citizen’s income’ or ‘minimum income’, relative to the total number of posts
published the same week. It was necessary to normalise the data since participa-
tion on every platform increased dramatically with the general election of 2013.
The fora, considered separately, are the blog posts published by Beppe Grillo,
the comment section of the blog, the Forum of the M5S, the comments on posts
on the Facebook page of Beppe Grillo and the posts published on 979 public
Facebook pages related to personalities of the Movement. Additionally, I also
analysed the description of 111,054 public events organised by meetups linked to
the Movement. All digital traces were left between February 2009 and February
2015.
4.1. Discussion Forum: 2009-2011
The conspiracy theory on seigniorage is an important concept in the debate on
GMI on the Forum between 2009, when the Forum went online, and 2011, when
the discussion hit Beppe Grillo’s blog. In this time span the discussion on the
Forum was not intense—there were 22 mentions of GMI—36% concentrated in
March 2009 and almost 70% in three discussion threads. The topic never faded
completely from the discussion. After March 2009, GMI was mentioned again in
June 2009, March 2010, October 2010 (twice), February 2011 (twice) and finally
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‘citizen’s income’. The vertical line indicates the publication of Grillo’s agenda.
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March 2011. GMI was only marginally discussed in the Forum (in the same period
the Forum received 20,761 postings) but it nevertheless turned out to be a key
programmatic issue for the M5S after Grillo endorsed it. The concept analysis of
this period confirms that concepts related to ‘monetary economics’ have received
more attention than concepts linked to ‘unemployment’ or ‘poverty’—traditionally
perceived as the policy problems that GMI should address. Figure 6.6 shows the
relative weights of the different concepts in the discussion and the frequency
of interventions on GMI: a weight should be intended as proximity (or cosine
similarity of the term frequency vectors) of the postings discussing GMI relatively
to the Wikipedia articles used to define the concept space. The concept of
‘seigniorage’ appeared among the top 20 concepts in 23% of the postings and
only three comments out of 22 did not refer to concepts linked to the categories
of ‘monetary economics’ or ‘banking’.
A qualitative analysis of the texts confirms the importance of the theory of
conspiracy in framing the discussion on GMI. In fact GMI was in this period
only marginal to the discussion focused on seigniorage and was seen as a tool
to redistribute surplus value supposedly created by central banks in the activity
of printing money. The fact that the debate was driven by a conspiracy theory
should not be surprising. M5S militants were motivated by a profound distrust
for institutions and especially for those institutions that were perceived as distant
from ordinary people in times of economic crisis. The European Central Bank
was an ideal target since it could be identified as undemocratic, officials are not
elected, and foreign, its headquarters are in Frankfurt, Germany. For one user of
the M5S Forum, it is the ECB that is ultimately responsible for seigniorage
The currency printed in debt, on which is imposed seigniorage ... [The
ECB] prints currency (for few cents) LENDING it to states (at face
value) with interest ...
The problem then would be solved by returning monetary sovereignty to national
states, a solution shared by many on the Forum. In the words of the same user
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How can you imagine eliminating or even reducing public debt when
monetary sovereignty is in the hands of the ECB? ... It ’s a vicious circle.
If a state could print money, could create liquidity and consequently
jobs, producing goods and therefore inflation would not exist ... there
would be no debt and with the money from seigniorage you could
easily create a citizen’s income.
The radical tone of the debate and the targets, central banks and the financial
sector in general, was set in one of the earliest posts published in March 2009 on
the Forum and titled ‘Abolition of the private banking system’. The post, opening
a thread that was intensely discussed receiving almost 300 comments, stated:
The issue of currency and credit management must be part of the
functions performed by the State: it must provide this service to
citizens. The tools are there: both technological, informational, and
knowledge of monetary emission mechanisms of credit regulation.
Minds working today for private bankers could use their knowledge
for the State; maybe even with the same salary. So we will see what
they can do for the community! The state would then have the most
important tool to adjust the structural interventions needed in the
country. A country free from debt, from fear. A country that can invest
in schools, health care, culture, infrastructure, public buildings, with a
view to the long term, wide-ranging. A free state! To this, it would
associate a citizen’s income that guarantees the minimum to live with
dignity for all. We would be free from debt, bank seigniorage, and the
free will of a handful of criminal bankers.
Not all interventions that proposed the introduction of the GMI were framed
within the broader issue of seigniorage. In fact the justification of GMI on ethical
grounds and to facilitate social cohesion and inclusion appeared early on in the
discussion along with the concept of ‘unemployment’, which would, later on, play
a crucial role in framing and justifying the M5S law proposal. A post published
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also in March 2009 opening a thread titled ‘Minimum income of citizenship’
stated
An unemployment check is necessary. We must do continuous retrain-
ing for those who remain out of work. Those who remain out of work
should give their availability to participate in retraining in exchange
for a minimum income of citizenship. A minimum income without
which you can not claim to be a citizen of a collective ... This requires
signing an ethical agreement between citizens and collective and a
continuous exchange between the individual and society. An ethical
agreement for social inclusion not tolerating any misconduct [from
recipients, which would cause the] cessation of the social support
A later thread, opened in November 2010 and titled ‘Abolition of VAT’ (value
added tax), also triggered some discussion on GMI—although GMI was not
mentioned in the opening post. GMI was introduced in the first comment to the
opening post where a user suggested introducing a ‘basic income’:
VAT affects rich and poor without distinction and is not a progressive
tax, but this can be fixed with a tax-free transfer from the government,
also called BASIC INCOME or CITIZENSHIP INCOME
The provision of a non-taxable transfer, explained here by this commenter,
was explicitly included in the bill on GMI presented by the M5S (see Catalfo,
2013, Art. 3 § 10). According to the same user, GMI was a key policy instrument
in a more just tax-reform and he offered an example to explain the mechanism.
f the government transfers to each citizen 1000 euros (symbolic amount,
actually the basic income should be sufficient to live with dignity), if I
do not have another job and I spend all of the 1000 euros, I will have
paid 500 euro tax (VAT at 50%) and then I will have received from the
government a benefit of 500 euros, the difference. If instead I have a
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job that pays 1000 euro, in total at the end of the month I will have
2000 Euros.
If I spend all 2k euros, I have paid 1000 in taxes, the government
did not give me any support. Those who spend more than twice the
basic income will begin to pay taxes to the state proportionally, until
arriving at the rate of VAT.
A basic income also would make for a better labour market, less
competition, more equality between employees and managers. (I)
This posting is an excellent example of a comment trying not only to express
an opinion but also to inform the debate by providing a justification, technical
information in an didactical tone (in this case with two hypothetical examples)
and a link to external resources—a series of 10 German YouTube videos with
Italian subtitles. External links are frequently used on the Forum: about 7% (or
405) of the Forum’s postings published between 2009 and January 2015 in the
GMI debate contains at least one link. Most of the links (28%) pointed to the
domain of beppegrillo.it, which hosts both Grillo’s blog and the Forum, and
10% of the links were directed toward the domain of the European Commission
(ec.europa.eu), which hosted an online consultation for the introduction of the
GMI. But links frequently have an informative purpose. If about 8% of links
pointed to YouTube and 3% to Wikipedia, we also find among the top linked
hosts news media websites, the website of the Italian agency for social security,
of the Italian Senate—where the bill was presented in 2013, of the Italian Central
Bank and of the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission.
To better understand the structure of the discussion in the three threads which
attracted most of the postings about GMI in the period 2009-2011, before Beppe
Grillo entered the debate, I constructed a network mapping of all the comments
that users active in these three threads addressed to each other. Mapping direct
replies helps appreciate what type of discussion we are observing and if any
user was active in more than one thread. A thread, with an opening post and
282
Francesco Bailo
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 6.7: Star-shaped (left) and horizontal (right) online discussions among ten users
subsequent comments, can take multiple shapes. At one extreme it can replicate a
perfect broadcasting star-shaped model with one central node, the user publishing
the original post, and a crown of commenters linked only to the central user
and only in one direction, from periphery to the centre. At the other extreme,
we find a perfectly horizontal discussion, where everyone talks to everybody else.
Figure 6.7 exemplified these two types of discussions among ten users.
Figure 6.8 maps instead the actual comments among users in the three threads
discussed above. Nodes are colour-coded according to the thread where each
user was active: red nodes for users active in the thread on seigniorage (that
only marginally referred to GMI), yellow for the GMI thread, blue for the VAT
thread and orange for the four users that discussed both the seigniorage and
GMI thread. Again each directed link represents a comment posted by a user in
reply to another user. The three threads have very different sizes, with 86, 23 and
5 active users respectively.
The seigniorage thread, (red) attracted much more comment and comments
per user than the thread narrowly focused on the formulation of a policy to create
a GMI and on the abolition of VAT (blue). But also the structure of the discussion
is much more complex, with a region of users reciprocating each other comments.
In network terms, a way to measure the level of dialogic involvement of users
or the interactivity of the discussion is to compute the probability of finding for
each comment from user A to user B a reciprocated comment from user B to
user A. In a random sample of 1000 threads of the Forum we found a very low
propensity to reciprocity; in fact given a random thread the expected probability
for a comment to be reciprocated is 0.30% but we also observe that in 37.5% of
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threads no comment is actually reciprocated.
In the seigniorage thread 20% of comments are reciprocated while no comment
is reciprocated in the thread on GMI, which also received only about 15% of the
comments of the thread on seigniorage and about 10% of the upvotes. In other
words, users participating in the discussion on seigniorage demonstrated a higher
level of dialogic involvement.
It is not surprising that narratives based on conspiracy theories attracted
significantly more attention and interaction on the Forum, since they are probably
much more entertaining. But then only postings from the other two threads—
more pragmatic and detailed—raised and discussed items (conditionality, tax
exemption, retraining, sanction of misconduct and the moral obligation of a
policy of income guarantee) that would be included in the bill finally proposed
by the M5S, which not incidentally does not include any mention of monetary
sovereignty or seigniorage as the main policy problem justifying the institution
of GMI. The tone of the discussion in the seigniorage thread was too extreme
(implying at a minimum leaving the Euro area) to be converted into a credible
policy proposal by the M5S. Users showing a radical anti-capitalist approach were
vocal in criticising the institution of GMI without obtaining first full monetary
sovereignty, as one user posted ‘Only under monetary sovereignty can a citizen’s
income be allowed’. Another of the few users who cross-commented in both the
GMI and seigniorage thread, posted in the GMI thread
But what are you discussing? Do you even know that with the current
debt-money issued by counterfeiters-bankers, EVERY investment or
state subsidy (as the citizen’s income) is a PURE COST to be unloaded
on the whole community, either by increasing taxes or by disposing
of state assets to have liquidity either by borrowing more and more
inevitable from the same counterfeiters-bankers ...?
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Figure 6.8: Users active in three selected threads: on bank seigniorage (red nodes), GMI (yellow
nodes), on value added tax (blue nodes) and on both seigniorage and GMI (orange
nodes). Direct links represent a comment from user to user and nodes’ size are
proportional to the level of activity of the corresponding user
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4.2. Discussion Forum and Blog: 2011-2012
The first mention of the GMI to appear on Beppe Grillo’s blog was on November
2011 (Grillo, 2011) when the blog hosted a post by Domenico De Simone, a
former lawyer, journalist, writer, blogger and self-professed ‘counter-economist’
with no academic affiliation.8 GMI was only marginally mentioned in the post,
which was mainly a critique of the financial and banking sectors and an account
of their responsibility for the global financial crisis. De Simone’s post finally
proposed levying a tax on financial transactions, the so-called Tobin Tax named
after economist James Tobin, and to redistribute it in the form of some type of
citizen’s income.
Bank seigniorage was never explicitly mentioned but the theory exposed in
the post certainly shared with users active on the Forum’s thread opened almost
three years earlier, and titled ‘Abolition of the private banking system’, a common
understanding of the functioning of modern finance and economics. If the original
poster of that Forum’s thread identified the policy problems to be addressed as
the ‘debt, bank seigniorage, and the free will of a handful of criminal bankers’,
De Simone wrote on Grillo’s post that
our work justifies the issue of that money [which according to De
Simone is paper money, bank money, public debt and financial deriv-
atives], but who creates it, without doing anything, takes possession
of our work through the interest mechanism and through such a
mechanism by which people are not put in a position to repay their
debt.
After this first mention of GMI on his blog—although in a guest post—within
the framework of a bank seigniorage economic and financial theory, Grillo started
delinking his proposal for a citizen’s income from ‘counter-economics’—to use
8In the biographical page of his blog, Domenico De Simone openly distances himself from
academia. He wrote that his views ‘are strongly opposed by the academic establishment’ (de
Simone, n.d.).
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the definition of De Simone—and ‘bankers conspiracy’ theories. Notably, in line
with the online base of the M5S, Grillo did maintain strong opposition towards
the current monetary policy regime, and would end up raising the flag of a
referendum for leaving the euro in October 2014 (see Section 4.5 in Chapter 4).
This detachment from monetary theory in justifying GMI is also apparent in the
concept map detailed in Figure 6.6 where after De Simone’s post in November
2011, the more traditional concepts of ‘unemployment’ and ‘Constitution’ exper-
ience a relative increase in weight while the concept of ‘Monetary economics’
experiences a decrease. This is evident also from a later post, in which Beppe
Grillo personally proposed the ‘the creation of a fund for the citizen’s income
for all the unemployed equally, to meet their primary needs’ (Grillo, 2012c).
Indicating that Grillo probably considered the issue to be relatively novel for his
audience (GMI was still a marginal topic in the fora of M5S) he embedded in the
post a link to the Wikipedia page on citizen’s income.
Between February 2012 and December 2012, Grillo referred on his blog to the
GMI only four times. One of those references was in August 2012, when the blog
published an article signed by Economics Nobel prize recipient Joseph Stiglitz
and Italian economist Mauro Gallegati (Grillo, 2012a). The article offered an
analysis of the global economic malaise following the financial crisis—anaemic
economic growth, unemployment and public debt—and suggested a ‘progressive
introduction of a citizen’s income’ to redistribute wealth. To publish an article from
two economists, one of whom world famous, was a dramatic departure from the
previous post of De Simone. Between 2011 and December 2012, the focus of the
GMI debate internal to the M5S was moved by Grillo from the fringe to more
pragmatic grounds, supported by political and economic sound arguments.
In the period between November 2011 and December 2012, the discussion on
GMI on the Forum was spread across 93 threads, although in only 13 threads
the main topic was GMI. In this period the number of postings mentioning
GMI increased substantially but mostly because the Forum grew. The fraction of
weekly posts on GMI remained marginal and would stabilise at around 1% of all
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posts published in the Forum only after Grillo published his agenda in December
2012.
Figure 6.9 maps the conversation among users in the seven busiest threads
on GMI in this period (interactions among users are less meaningful for the blog
since there is only one author and all comments are necessarily replies to a Grillo
blogpost). In comparison with the only thread dedicated to GMI in the period
considered in the previous section, we notice an increase in the interactivity of
the discussion measured by the reciprocity of the exchanges among users but also
by the number of comments being exchanged horizontally, that is, in replying to
other comments rather than in reply to the opening post of the thread.
The first thread focusing on GMI (red nodes in Figure 6.9) to be published in
this period (and the most commented-on) was opened by Marino Mastrangeli—
who would be later elected to Parliament and after a few months expelled from the
M5S—in December 2011, a few days after the post by De Simone was published
on Grillo’s blog. The opening post by Mastrangeli (Mastrangeli, 2011), titled
‘Let’s propose a constitutional revision to make explicit the right to guaranteed
minimum goods and service, thought expropriation from those who have more’,
interestingly framed for the first time the issue of GMI in terms of fundamental
rights. In fact, Mastrangeli opposed the institution of a guaranteed minimum
income and proposed to guarantee goods and services instead because an income
‘could be spent by people on vices and luxuries’. The reciprocity of this thread
is extremely high (0.73) but it is driven by the style of Mastrangeli who replied
(very politely) to almost every comment that his opening post received: in fact,
95% of all comments of this thread are published by or directed to Mastrangeli,
indicating an extremely vertical conversation.
The second major thread to be dedicated to GMI is published a few months
later (blue nodes in Figure 6.9), in August 2012—that is a few months before
the general election. The thread is interesting not only because of the fairly
large number of comments (61) but also because of the intense dialogic exchange
among users: reciprocity is just above the average of the Forum (26%) and most
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Figure 6.9: Users active in the busiest threads on GMI (2011-2012). Direct links represent a
comment from user to user and nodes’ size are proportional to the level of activity of
the corresponding user
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of the comments (73%) are not directed to the opening post, but are posted in
reply to other comments. In fact the discussion of this thread is also linked to the
discussion of Mastrangeli’s thread, because of one single user who posted four
comments in that thread.
The concept analysis of this thread confirms that the focus is on unemploy-
ment. Among the 61 postings, the concepts of ‘unemployment’ and ‘unemploy-
ment rate’—the most frequent—appear among the top 20 in 29% and 34% of
the comments respectively while ‘income’—the third most frequent—appears in
25% of the comments. By grouping all concepts into broad categories, we find
that the most frequent concept categories used in the discussion are, almost with
the same average weight, ‘Income’ and ‘Unemployment’ while ‘Constitution of
Italy’ is in third place, above ‘banking’ and ‘monetary economics’, that appear
respectively in fifth and seventh place. This is representative of a general trend
both in the Forum and on the blog of Beppe, to distance the discussion on GMI
from monetary theories: citizen’s income was mainly turned into a response
to the policy problem of ‘unemployment’. Antonio, a commenter to the thread
published in August 2012, stressed the problem of unemployment also bringing
forward his personal situation:
I agree with the citizen’s minimum income also because if one is
unemployed like me with no hope at age 49 of returning to work
(but certainly not because of my decision) only when you are in these
situations can you understand how you feel.
4.3. Discussion Forum, Blog and Parliament: 2012-2015
In December 2012, less than three months before the general elections, with a
blog post titled ‘Grillo’s agenda’, Grillo and the M5S presented their plan for the
upcoming election in the form of a list of 16 items: the introduction of a ‘citizen’s
income’ was number two in the list, after an ‘anti-corruption law’ and before
the suppression of public funding to parties. The blog post explicitly referred
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to the contribution of the online discussions; Grillo wrote that the plan is ‘an
excerpt from the program of the M5S [the author included here a link to the
document] and from proposals discussed on the forum and on the blog’ (Grillo, 2012b).
If we compare the program of M5S and the agenda, we note that GMI is not
contained in the official electoral program, which instead, as I already mentioned,
referred to a ‘guaranteed unemployment benefit’ (Movimento 5 Stelle, 2013, p. 10).
This seems to imply that Grillo himself acknowledged that online discussion
contributed significantly putting GMI on the agenda of the M5S. Notably, other
points listed in the agenda but not mentioned in the 2013 M5S program were
the abolition of public funding of parties and the referendum for the common
currency. Both the GMI and the referendum for the Euro became after the general
election of 2013 defining issues for the Movement, while a law abolishing the
public funding of parties was passed by Parliament in the December 2013 general
election thus removing the issue from the debate.
Grillo’s post on December 2012 ‘officialised’ support of the M5S for GMI
and dramatically increased the volume of the discussion on GMI, online and
offline, but—as emerges from the analysis of postings previously published—
did not create the discussion. Figure 6.5 clearly shows that the publication of
Grillo’s agenda was an impactful event for each time-series. All fora reacted to
the publication of the agenda by increasing the attention dedicated to the GMI.
Still, if the blog, the posts of prominent figures of the Movement and the onsite
discussions did show negligible attention to GMI before the publication of the
agenda, the commenting section of the blog and the Forum regularly discussed it
in the four years preceding the publication. By comparing the average relative
frequency of the two periods separated by the publication of Grillo’s agenda,
we can also quantify the difference in reactions on the different platforms. The
strongest impact in online discussion resulting from the publication of the agenda
appeared in the posts published by prominent figures of the movement, with the
average weekly attention dedicated to GMI after the publication being 37 times
the average weekly attention before the publication. On the other side, the weekly
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average on the Forum and the commenting section on the blog of Beppe Grillo
before the publication of the agenda already represented respectively 15.08% and
12.97% of the average after the publication.
On the same blog the number of posts mentioning GMI increased dramatically
after December 2012. The concept analysis of the blog posts indicates that
Grillo closely linked the discussion of GMI to the M5S, much more significantly
than in the same discussion developing in the forum (see Figure 6.6). In other
words, Grillo did not only aim to push a bill on GMI forward but repeatedly
attempted to connect the discussion to the Movement itself. And this certainly
succeeded with the media, for which the concept ‘M5S’ was always highly
weighted (again see Figure 6.6). In the 81 posts discussing GMI published on the
blog in the two years between December 2012 and January 2015, the word ‘M5S’
or ‘Movimento’ appeared in 72% of the documents with an average of 3 mentions
per document, while during the same period only slightly less than 30% of the
postings mentioned the M5S.
After the general election in February 2013, when the M5S turned overnight
into the most voted-for party in Italy, Grillo met in a formal round of consultations
with Italy’s President of the Republic, who is in charge of nominating the Prime
Minister. In those days, because of the surprise victory in the election and key
role that the M5S could have played in the formation of a new government, Beppe
Grillo reached a peak of media attention (see Figure 4.17). It is reasonable to
assume that the wording of the blog posts was especially carefully measured
in those days and the target audience broader than usual. In a blog post that
received almost 10,000 comments, Grillo wrote
This morning I went to the Quirinale [official residence of Italy’s head
of state] with the House and Senate leaders, Roberta Lombardi and
Vito Crimi, to meet with the President of the Republic and commu-
nicate the position of the Five Star Movement. The M5S gained the
highest number of votes in the last election. For that we officially
ask for the mandate to form a new government to carry out our pro-
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gram, in particular to implement the measures to support small and
medium-sized enterprises, the citizen’s income and cut the waste out
of politics (Grillo, 2013c)
From being totally absent from Grillo’s blog stream between 2005 and the
end of 2011 and only sporadically mentioned in the following year, GMI turned
after the general election into one of the three main items of the M5S executive
program for the government.
A few weeks later, in June 2013, the newly elected M5S MPs presented in the
Senate a brief document for a vote, in which the Movement asked the Government
to ‘take initiatives to introduce a guaranteed minimum income, by preparing a
plan identifying beneficiaries, considering as an indicator the number of citizens
living below the poverty line’ (Morra, 2013). The policy problem was explicitly
framed in terms of a growing ‘unemployment rate [that] reached 12.8%’ and
poverty; accordingly ‘in 2013 in Italy there will be over 4 million poor’ and ‘more
than 9 million Italian citizens ... do not receive any income and are therefore at risk
of poverty and social exclusion’. The document also pointed to the constitutional
right to a ‘full participation in social life’ and referred to the ‘minimum income’
as a ‘fundamental social right intended to serve as an instrument to protect
the dignity of the individual’. Interestingly although the document asked for
the introduction of a ‘guaranteed minimum income’, the blog presented it as a
proposal to introduce the ‘citizen’s income’ (Grillo, 2013d), then purposely or
accidentally confusing the two.
5. Conclusions: Measuring the influence of online
deliberation
To estimate the net impact on a policy process of a discussion distributed across
multiple fora and media is clearly difficult. As seen, GMI could hardly be defined
as a new policy item when it was first introduced in the Forum discussion and
then on the blog by Beppe Grillo.
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GMI, both in the more utopian form of ‘citizen’s income’ and in the more
economically pragmatic formulation of a ‘guaranteed minimum income’, was
discussed in the academic literature by economists and political philosophers,
and importantly was already adopted at the time of the discussion as actual
welfare policy in numerous European countries and by a few Italian regional
administrations—something Forum’s users repeatedly noticed, as one commenter
wrote in August 2012: ‘Citizen’s income is reality everywhere in Europe but
in Italy, Greece and Hungary’. Over the years, the media did report on policy
experiments at the regional level. Parties, both on the right and left of the
political spectrum, included provisions for GMI in their electoral programs and
in documents and bills presented in Parliament. And yet although GMI had
been floating in the ‘“policy primeval soup” in which specialists try out their
ideas in a variety of ways—bill introductions, speeches, testimony, papers, and
conversation’ (Kingdon, 1995, p. 19), a strong opportunity to move the discussion
forward did not present itself until Beppe Grillo’s decision to introduce GMI to
his agenda.
Beppe Grillo never openly engaged—at least not under his real name—in the
Forum or to reply to a comment on his blog posts. Nevertheless, the temporal
evolution of the discussion on GMI seems to indicate that the discussion did
originate in the crowd of posters of beppegrillo.it before being picked up by
Grillo himself. It is possible that Grillo was convinced of the importance of a
campaign for the introduction of GMI because of its political relevance more than
for any economic and welfare consideration.
The economic plan of the M5S formalised in the Movement electoral mani-
festo published in 2013 was vague and missing any flagship item that could
be identified by the electorate with the Movement. Moreover since GMI was
desirable for both right-wing and left-wing voters, it became even more attractive
to a party that after the general election of 2013 discovered it had a highly hetero-
geneous electoral base (see Chapter 4). Even assuming that the explicit reference
by Grillo to the contribution of the deliberation on the Forum to his agenda (he
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mentioned the contribution of online deliberation in a post, see Grillo, 2012b) was
opportunistic and politically motivated, we observe a temporal correspondence
in the evolution of the concepts being discussed the debate on the Forum and the
concepts used by Grillo in his blog posts.
In the previous sections, I assessed the evolution of the discussion both with a
qualitative content analysis of few representative documents and in terms of the
concept analysis conducted by mapping the location of each document within a
concept space populated by approximately 4000 concepts. I aggregated a few of the
most relevant concepts into broader categories (i.e. unemployment, poverty, mon-
etary economics, the Italian Constitution and the M5S) and tracked the evolution
through time of their mean weight based on their relevance in the documents. The
average suggested that the importance of concepts in the discussion on the Forum
and the blog had changed over time, in particular, the concepts framing GMI as
an answer to a monetary conspiracy of banking institutions declined relative to
concepts framing the discussion in terms of unemployment and fundamental
rights. Moreover, the weight of concepts referring to the M5S, thus suggesting a
politicisation of the discussion, increased on the Forum (slightly) and on the blog
and in the media (substantially).
I already observed (see Figure 6.5) that a crude frequency analysis of the
postings could support the existence of a causal relation between the discussion
of GMI on the Forum and its adoption by Grillo and the M5S. But in the interest
of understanding whether, in fact, Grillo did follow the shift in focus occurring
on the Forum—something that is corroborated by the qualitative content analysis
of a representative sample of documents—it is useful to map the evolution in
time of the documents within the concept space. For each document, I already
computed a vector of weights of length N, with N equal to the number concepts,
corresponding to the association of the document with each of the concepts
of the concept space. By binding all vectors, I obtain a matrix of where each
column corresponds to the vector of the weight of a document and each row to
a concept. Because the interest is in comparing the similarity of documents I
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computed the cosine similarity,9 which is largely applied in NLP (see Manning
et al., 2008, p. 111), of each pair of documents. I finally visualise the ‘distance’
between documents with a technique called t-SNE for high-dimensional data
(Van der Maaten & Hinton, 2008).
The results are illustrated in Figure 6.10. Each dot in the Figure represents a
document and is colour coded based on the concept category with the highest
weight in the corresponding document.10 Dots are placed according to their relat-
ive distance; in this sense the two axes represent coordinates of a two dimensional
space resulting from the dimensionality reduction algorithm illustrated before
and have no intrinsic value. Although dots do not perfectly cluster according
to their colour—this is a consequence of the fact that the position of each dot is
estimated based on all 4827 concepts while the colour represents only the most
relevant concepts in the document—regions with a clear prevalence of one colour
do emerge in the plot. From the top, the second row of plots shows the kernel
density estimation of four concept categories, indicating the region in the plot
where dots from that categories are denser: ‘monetary economics’ on the far right
of the plot, ‘M5S’ on the left and ‘unemployment’ and ‘Constitution’ respectively
in the centre-left quadrant and centre-right quadrant. Notably, the concept cat-
egory of unemployment and Constitution have a large intersection while the M5S
and monetary economics are more peripheral (although monetary economics
does marginally intersect with unemployment). This should not be a surprise
because a discourse based on concepts related to unemployment might also tap
into concepts related to constitutional rights: in fact, ‘the right of all citizens to
work’ is constitutionally recognised (‘Constitution of the Italian Republic’, 1948,
Art. 4). The triangle, representing the 2013 M5S bill proposing the introduction
of the M5S, is colour coded in the Constitution concept category—as previously
9Formally for vectors ~V(d1) and ~V(d1) of documents d1 and d2 we compute the cosine
similarity wth the formula sim(d1, d2) =
~V(d1)·~V(d1)
|~V(d1)||~V(d2)|
.
10Again the weight of a concept category is computed by averaging all the concepts of the
category.
296
Francesco Bailo
noted the bill refers explicitly to fundamental rights.11
The last two rows in Figure 6.10 show, for the blog and the Forum, in which
region of the concept space documents are found to be more numerous or denser
in the three periods analysed in this chapter: between 2009 and the first mention
of GMI on Grillo’s blog in November 2011 (period 1), between November 2011
and the presentation of the M5S bill in October 2013 (period 2), and between
October 2013 and January 2015.
As observed through the content analysis, the discussion started on the Forum
with a focus on monetary economics (and specifically on seigniorage). In period
2, that is after Beppe Grillo entered the debate, the focus of the discussion
shifted leftward, with a new burst of activity around the concept category of
unemployment. In period 3, monetary economics is relatively less important,
a new focal point opened around the concept category M5S, but documents
discussing unemployment still populated the densest region of the concept space.
In other words, in the last period if the discussion maintained its focus on
the concept of unemployment, the relative importance of the Movement as the
concept grew within the discussion signalled that GMI also assumed a role as
flagship proposal for the M5S.
Overall, the ‘barycentre’ of the figure moved over time from right to left and,
especially in the shift between periods 1 and 2, closer to the location of the bill.
The discussion on the blog followed a similar pattern, from right to left, but with
a one-period lag. In fact in period 2 (Grillo was not active in period 1), Grillo’s
posts were still on the right on the concept space while the discussion on the
Forum was already closer to the bill, in the centre of the concept space. Grillo
eventually moved rightward, but only after the bill was presented and to focus
more on framing the issue of GMI as a battle of the M5S. In conclusion, Grillo
11In the third paragraph of the introductory part of the bill, the M5S lawmakers wrote: ‘It is
necessary to act now to change course and focus political action on the welfare of the citizens,
first recognising basic rights: the opportunity and capabilities needed to live a decent life, the
right to work, education, information and culture.’
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Figure 6.10: Postings on GMI from the forum and the blog distributed according to the similarity
of their concepts. Dots indicate the position of individual documents, lines their
density
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followed the pattern of the Forum with a lag of few months: first focusing on
monetary arguments for the GMI and then moving through the concept category
of unemployment towards the concept of M5S.
In conclusion, the longitudinal analysis of the debate on the M5S suggests that
online deliberation, and in particular the discussion on the Forum, had an impact
on the policy platform of the Movement. Two elements support this conclusion:
first, references to the GMI unequivocally appeared first on the Forum and only
later in the postings of Grillo and, second, Grillo made explicit mention of the
contributions of the Forum while presenting the policy on his blog. Moreover,
because of the relevance of the M5S within the Italian political system—online
deliberation was able to reach and eventually influence the national debate. This
evidence thus suggests that online fora might sometimes have an organic relation
with broader political organisations. The analysis presented in Chapter 5 on the
online debate for the participation of the M5S in a coalition government, from
which Beppe Grillo quickly drained any deliberative power, pointed to the limits
of online fora as instruments for political influence in the presence of strong
leadership. But the deliberation on GMI also illustrates when and how online
deliberation might have a significant impact, not in opposition to the leadership
but in agreement with it.
First, the online fora were able to push an item onto the agenda not against a
set of strong alternatives but in the absence of any. A factor that increased the
chances for the emergence of GMI as a proposal was the fact that no other credible
welfare policy had been endorsed by the leadership of the Movement. Second,
online deliberation by itself had a significant impact only when its discourse was
endorsed by Grillo. That is, the actual impact of online deliberation was mediated
by the leadership of the Movement—and possibly also by news media and other
parties, which entered the debate after Grillo’s public endorsement.
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Conclusion
1. Internet-enabled organisation beyond the M5S and Italy
Politics is progressively more mediated through ICTs. Thanks to the Internet—
intended as a technological platform for the exchange of information and com-
munication across society—and mobile phones, ICTs have been incorporated into
daily routines, normalised by constant use in mediating their personal commu-
nication and more in general to accompany everyday activities. Because of the
enormous commercial payoff from mediating people’s lives, it is easy to predict
a constant stream of technological innovations. Internet technologies will keep
adapting in response to user preferences and behaviours; new ones will replace
old ones, people will adopt and adapt to some while dropping others.
And yet the core innovation that these technologies brought, that is the
capability to reach out and be reached by information and communication on a
massive scale instantaneously, cheaply and through friendly interfaces, is here to
stay. Even assuming that politics will at least partially oppose resistance to being
mediated by ICTs, it is hard to imagine a future in which Internet technologies will
be less relevant than today in the processes of political organisation, participation,
deliberation and voting. In fact, it is easier to imagine a future in which politics
will be shaped much more substantially by ICTs than it is today.
At the time of writing it is still too early to fully evaluate the importance of
301
Chapter 7. Conclusion
the role played by Internet technologies in the 2016 US presidential campaign—
because they certainly played a role, preliminary evidence points to a very
significant one. Not only because ICTs were used by candidates in radically
different ways than in past campaigns—notably Donald Trump used Twitter
unconventionally through the campaign, more intimately and less institutionally—
but because the Internet provided to a candidate with no organisational support
the essential infrastructure to bridge the gap and compete with better resourced
candidates. This is not to argue that the Internet was not successfully used before.
As argued by Karpf (2012), the Internet had played an important role in political
campaigning since at least 2003, when Howard Dean leveraged Meetup.com to
organise his base. But so far the Internet had complemented traditional party and
organisational infrastructure, which were still essential to mobilise supporters,
fundraise and broadcast the candidate image and message. In the 2008 US
presidential campaign, Barack Obama savvily used ICTs, exploiting expertise
accumulated in the Democratic party after Dean’s primary campaign in 2003,
but his campaign was also run on 750 million dollars, more than double the size
of Trump’s campaign eight years later. In 2016, the success of Donald Trump
defied traditional expectations because he had neither a strong party affiliation to
implement a strong organisational infrastructure nor the financial support to buy
what was thought to be an essential element of any successful campaign: space
in broadcasting media.
To keep Trump’s campaign in perspective, Figure 7.1 presents the cumulative
campaign spending as reported to the Federal Election Commission, by different
candidates in the 2016 US presidential race. The campaign of Donald Trump
spent less than any other major Republican candidates during the primaries and
significantly less than Hillary Clinton after he secured the Republican Party’s
nomination. Between June 2015, when he officially launched his campaign, and
January 2016 the cumulative expenditure of Trump’s campaign was less than
50% of Cruz’s campaign. Even more stark is the difference in media buy. In the
initial months of his campaign, Trump spent about a tenth of Cruz’s expenditure
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Figure 7.1: Cumulative expenditure of candidates in the 2016 US presidential campaign (Source:
Federal Election Commission)
on media buy, and between the nomination and election day Trump spent on
media buy about one-quarter of Clinton’s expenditure (and about a half since the
beginning of the campaign).
The outsourcing to ICTs of campaigning functions traditionally played by
internal organisation structures and legacy media (at a cost) can not alone explain
the rise of political outsiders such as Trump in the US and Grillo and the M5S.
For one thing, neither Trump nor M5S had a monopoly on the use of the Internet.
In other words, the Internet seems a convincing answer to the question ‘how
did they make it without organisational and financial resources’ but it does not
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provide an answer to the much more substantial question of ‘why them and not
others’. The Internet, by dramatically lowering the access barriers to political
competitions, has made their success possible although not easily replicable. And
this alone might represent a deep and lasting change for political contests. It
demonstrates, as argued by Margetts et al. (2015), that politics has the potential
to become more ‘chaotic’ because of the ‘turbulence’ introduced into the political
system by outsiders that thanks to the Internet are much better able to gain
traction in the debate and thus become successful political entrepreneurs. And
not only in a traditionally chaotic country such as Italy but even in a country
with a very stable party system and political traditions.
More research is need on the mechanisms that make this possible in practice.
Some have argued that, notwithstanding the importance of the Internet, the
workhorse of political communication is still legacy media; political entrepreneurs
indirectly leverage their reach by having their controversial (and ‘clickable’)
statements, originally published on the Internet, broadcast by them (see Diamanti,
2014). These entrepreneurs, as outsiders, would simply exploit the fact that legacy
media institutions have still to develop norms and policies to manage and control
the flow of Internet-mediated political communication, which is one-way since it
does not involve any journalistic enquiry or cross-examination. In their absence,
the usual behaviour is to simply re-publish integrally the most controversial part
of the message.
But evidence presented in this thesis points also to the importance of Internet-
mediated social networks to deliver political communication far beyond Internet
users. The strong association between membership of Internet-enabled meetups
and the results in three successive elections indicate that the M5S did not reach
voters only through the media (either old or new) but also by local networks
of family members, friends and colleagues. The importance of social networks
(partially or totally Internet-mediated) as an alternative channel for political
communication is also supported by the analysis of airtime (see Figure 4.16)
dedicated to parties in the 2013 campaign for the general election. Even assuming
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that the media were readily broadcasting Grillo’s blogposts because they were
entertaining and controversial, airtime data indicate that the attention dedicated
by television to the M5S was significantly lower than the attention dedicated to
other parties.
Trump’s campaign probably also leveraged the hybrid social networks (that is,
only partially Internet-mediated) of thousands of supporters to reach millions
of voters, in so doing outsourcing essential mass communication functions that
in the past had to be managed by a large organisation, responsible not only
for producing and coordinating political communication but crucially also for
fundraising the media buy to eventually broadcast the candidate’s messages. So
far attention has been mainly focused on the spread of fake news over social
media, but the point is not really what is shared but the potential reach of this
hybrid network of personal networks. In an article published in the New York
Times, Maheshwari (2016) estimates that a photo apparently showing anti-Trump
protesters bussed in from other cities taken by Eric Tucker (not a journalist) and
tweeted during the campaign to his 40 followers was retweeted 16,000 times and
shared on Facebook 350,000 times. Assuming 200 friends for each Facebook users
who shared the story, its potential reach was 70 million Facebook users.1 And
this without any contribution from broadcasting media—indeed, the fact that
news media quickly disproved the story without affecting its circulation proves
that social media networks can also operate independently from news media
influence—and no resources, either financial or organisational, were invested by
the Trump campaign.
If evidence suggests an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Internet might have radically changed political competition by lowering entry
barriers, more conflicting evidence is found in impacts on the shape of political
1The number of 200 friends is assumed based on a survey conducted by Pew Research Center
(2014) among adult Facebook users in the US. The number of 70 million users reached by the
story must be intended as ‘potential’ and not as an actual estimate since Facebook friends have
always partially overlapping list of friends.
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organisations. Do ICTs enable political organisations that are leaderless, non-
hierarchical and fundamentally horizontal? The debate around this question has
been defined and popularised by the Utopian vision of authors such as Benkler
with The wealth of networks (2006), by Shirky with Here Comes Everybody (2008), by
the disenchanted perspective of Morozov (‘The brave new world of slacktivism’,
2009) and Gladwell (‘Small change’, 2010). The events developing at the turn of
the 2010s, both in the West, with the 15-M movement in Spain and the Occupy
movement in the US, and in the Middle East, with the Green revolution in Iran,
the Arab Spring in multiple countries and the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, were
interpreted both in terms of the disruptive potential of the Internet and the
limits of Internet-mediated social movements. Internet-mediated mobilisations
did bring down a number of regimes but they failed in bringing lasting change
because movements not supported by strong interpersonal ties (that is, non-
Internet mediated) will eventually dissolve and without a hierarchy will not be
able to make decisions, thus falling into irrelevance (compare Gladwell, 2010;
Karpf, 2010).
In this sense, it is true that the figure of Beppe Grillo has been essential for
the experience of the M5S. Notwithstanding the Movement’s rhetoric, which
rejects any formal hierarchy and place on the Internet and with the community
of ‘Internet users the role of governing and leading’ (Movimento 5 Stelle, 2009a),
Grillo is unquestionably the leader of the Movement and the Movement would
not exist in its form without him. Yet sporadic evidence of the autonomy of the
community of citizen-users and of the independence of the Movement from the
figure of its founder have emerged. First at the end of a debate that cut through the
different components of the Movement (one leaning towards environmentalism
and left-wing values, the other towards nationalism, anti-Europeanism and right-
wing values) the position of Grillo on immigration was rejected by members in
an online vote, which Grillo eventually accepted. Second, in the period between
the European election of 2014 and the first months of 2015, based on the analysis
of the archives of the two major Italian newspapers, the number of articles
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mentioning the M5S exceeded the number of articles mentioning Beppe Grillo.
This is important because as observed, the presence of Grillo in the 2013 campaign
of M5S was predominant not only over any other figure of the M5S but also over
the Movement itself.
Moreover, the importance of the leadership of Grillo must be relativised by
the continue existence and functioning over a period of more than 10 years of
thousands of meetups with tens of thousands of members. The figure of Grillo
was important in mobilising and motivating this large crowd of members. And
the national successes of the Movement contributed to sustaining mobilisation
(see Figure 4.1). But it is difficult to justify sustained participation through the
media system of the M5S and in the meetups only by the charismatic presence
of Grillo. The Movement has successfully created a tangible community of
citizen-users—steadily active online and onsite—that acquired a sense of self-
consciousness through continuous participation and strengthened its internal
cohesion through repeated interactions among its members. It was finally this
community, depending on Internet services to articulate its activities and critically
to keep existing in its current identity of a community of citizen-users, that
sustained over years the development of the Five Star Movement (M5S), of
its organisation, and that gave a crucial continuity to the identity behind the
Movement between the most public events.
The experience of the M5S provides empirical evidence of the development
of a political organisation that in less than 10 years brought onto the national
scene and to Parliament the ideas and identitarian discourse of a community of
citizen-users born on the Internet and organised through the Internet. Parallel
experiences of Internet-enabled political organisations in different regions of the
world confirmed that, following a transnational process of massification of access
to ICTs that brought, at the end of the 2000s, mobile phones to about 80% of
people living in of upper-middle income countries and Internet access to about
70% of the those living in high-income countries (see Figure 7.2), the Internet
has modified the dynamics of political organisation and participation by making
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## Error in country %in% cc_groups: object ’country’ not found
Figure 7.2: Internet users and mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people (Source: World Bank,
2016a and 2016b)
horizontal coordination much easier, along with bringing broadcasting capability
to every node connected to the Internet-mediated networks of networks.
Yet successful cases of Internet-mediated political organisations and mobil-
isation, that is with the ability to enter and to remain in the political system as
relevant actors, always involved the presence of a strong and charismatic leader-
ship. Succesful cases are the M5S in Italy and Podemos in Spain, but also as we
seen the mobilisation in support of Donald Trump’s candidacy for the presidency
of the US. A list of less successful or unsuccessful cases includes instead the
Occupy movement, the 15-M movement, all the movements that took the streets
in the Middle East between 2009 and 2011, and notably also the German Pirate
Party, which did not succeed in consolidating the good (and unexpected) results
obtained in 2011 and 2012.
In this sense, the Internet has been really effective in mobilising and channel-
ling into visible forms of organisation bursts of discontent but it has appeared to
be less effective in normalising participation into stable forms of organisations
without the presence of a charismatic founder. I argue that the M5S is a partial
exception to this, since its community of citizen-users has stabilised through
recurrent interactions and has consequently given to the Movement the continuity
indispensable for political relevance. The importance of Grillo in the everyday
organisation of the M5S, a network of thousands of meetups and as many elected
members scattered around the country, should not be overestimated since in
practical terms most of the decisions of the Movement must be taken out of his
direct or indirect control. If on one side Grillo has repeatedly demonstrated
himself to be for the Movement a crisis-solver of last resort, on the other the
network of meetups and members has demonstrated itself to be a functioning
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political organisation winning votes and electoral competitions. More ethno-
graphic research is needed to evaluate how individual meetups and those elected
to represent the M5S coordinate in practice with the broader movement and what
role online deliberation plays in their internal decision making, but from the
data presented in this thesis, which have assessed trends in participation, it is
already possible to make the simple consideration that a political organisation,
fully exploiting the resources offered by ICTs, was able to mobilise, grow and
stabilise—something that, given the political opportunities, is not unachievable
in other national contexts.
2. Asymmetric online deliberation
In this thesis, I have adopted a definition of online deliberation that encompasses
different forms of interactions. I intended deliberation as a spectrum of beha-
viours, moving from talking informally about politics with the aim of expressing
an opinion (but also of making one) to formally taking decisions within a set
of formal rules. I linked the informal part of the spectrum to concepts such as
everyday political talk (Mansbridge, 1999) and dialogic deliberation (J. Kim & Kim,
2008) both built on the Habermasian concept of communicative action. I also
conceptualise the informal deliberation process observed on different Internet
platforms as part of a system, not because I think it behaves organically through
harmonic and predictable interactions among its different threads (it does not)
but because I observed that they dynamically influence each other.
The online deliberative system of the M5S, articulated over different platforms,
played three positive roles within the Movement. First, thanks to Facebook the
M5S pushed politically deliberative content into the feed of millions of users
leveraging an already extensive network of supporters. This new condition of
ubiquity of the deliberative stream, ‘everywhere political talk’, is not a feature
characterising only the M5S political communicative environment but is instead
a new feature brought in by the new reality of multiple, intersecting, Internet-
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mediated networks connecting individuals. In this setting, politics is more often
delivered to individuals—who are thus not necessarily politically active in the
traditional sense—than sought.
Second, the discussion fora provided a real, in the sense of reflecting different
opinions, mediating chamber among those interested in the future of the Move-
ment. Further research is needed to understand whether fora also played a role in
conciliating or reducing differences—an essential function to maintain the unity
of a political organisation. Yet it is already possible to make the argument that by
keeping an always-on deliberative system, a real possibility for Internet-mediated
organisations, strong differences might manifestly coexist without imperilling
unity. Indeed, this is also a crucial feature of electoral systems in which losers,
thanks to constitutional warranties, perceive their status as only temporary and
are encouraged to maintain their dissent within the legal limits of the political
system. Based on my analysis of the deliberative system of the M5S, strong
divergences that emerged in the debate along a traditional left-right political
spectrum did not result in a splintering of the Movement.
Third, the deliberative system demonstrated its political relevance by influ-
encing in at least one case the agenda of the ‘Movement-in-Parliament’ and
the national debate. This provides important evidence on the question of what
role an online deliberative system might play in practice. One of the strongest
critiques of the relevance of online politics, let us call it the ‘slacktivism’ critique,
is that political relevance is obtained only through strong organisation. Only
organisations can act strategically enough to frame and push items onto the
agenda and eventually bring about change. Yet the M5S has demonstrated that
an organisation can emerge from low-threshold political activities (the origin of
the Movement is a blog’s comment section) providing that users have easy access
to the resources to scale involvement up as they see fit.
In the case of the M5S, the community of citizen-users never sealed off low-
threshold activities, downplaying their significance relative to more involved
forms of participation. In fact, it kept encouraging them. Many postings cir-
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culating within the Movement’s social networks emphatically end with the
sentence ‘Let’s share this!’ The memefication of the distinctive signature of
the M5S citizen-user significantly points to its importance and identitarian
value: a parody Facebook page titled ‘Shame Let’s stop this Let’s share it’
(www.facebook.com/eloradifiniamola) has at the time of writing reached more
than 50,000 likes. The deliberative system has in the case detailed in Chapter 6
acted organically within the organisation, by providing a specific service to the
Movement, elaborating and naming through deliberation a policy proposal to
be officially adopted. This played two important roles: it gave credibility to the
rhetoric of a Movement founded on a community of deliberating citizen-users
and filled a relevant vacuum in the economic policy agenda of the Movement.
Along with a positive role—because of its normative, strategic and tactical
value for the political organisation—online deliberation has nevertheless also
shown to have a counter-democratic feature with the potential to undermine the
organisation that fosters it. As found in a number of studies on online deliberation,
and more broadly on online behaviour, the distribution of attention as well as
the frequency of participation of single users is highly asymmetric. This is
important because as political organisations embrace tools of direct participation
to strengthen internal democracy, they might actual have the opposite effect, in
which a few users have extreme influence and a few topics attract disproportionate
attention. Preferential attachment, the tendency to prefer nodes (either posts or
users) that already have a high number of incoming connections, is a feature
found in different networks (see Chapter 5) but if it is not necessarily problematic
in most cases, it is troubling in settings such as online deliberation in which the
output might obtain legitimacy from the supposedly democratic (that is, fairly
participated) character of the process.
Moreover, the fact that many political organisations, such as the M5S, out-
source deliberative functions to Facebook introduces additional issues. As the
importance of Facebook in mediating public discourse and political communica-
tion (both vertical and horizontal) has been growing, so has the inquisitiveness
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dedicated by academics, journalists and politicians to its potential effect on the
debate. Accordingly, the problem is that Facebook is not only a social networking
service; the company has also acquired a role in filtering and redistributing
content based on totally opaque rules. It is argued that suggestion algorithms
(based on other users’ behaviours) might induce the creation of filtering bubbles
in which users are all exposed to the same content and totally segregated from
what users in other bubbles are exposed to. Facebook internal researchers have
confirmed the existence of bubbles but they also argued that users play more of a
role in creating these bubbles, through their choices, than Facebook’s suggestion
algorithm (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015).
Data from platforms other than Facebook presented in Chapter 6 provide
evidence that Internet users on mass communication platforms tend indeed to be
distributed extremely unequally and around very few nodes, thus supporting the
idea that users bear responsibility. Preferential attachment seems a foundational
feature of Internet communications that is independent of design. Nevertheless,
Facebook is also proven to show more extreme distributions than other platforms
because it tends to experience more low-threshold activities (i.e. liking) and
probably also because of the importance of the filtering algorithm. If the amount
of content to filter is larger (because the social network fuelling it is larger) the
relative importance of the filter is consequently higher.
Similarly to but more extremely than other platforms, Facebook runs the risk
of producing online deliberation processes that are strongly asymmetric in terms
of user participation and attention dedicated to content and also segregated. The
fact that segregation did not happen on the Forum of the M5S is a positive sign
because it means that it ought not to necessarily happen in online deliberative
contexts. But based on a number of studies especially focusing on mass deliber-
ation on Twitter and Facebook it seems to be more exceptional than significant
due to the specific and hardly replicable context in which it happened: a cohesive
and self-conscious community of citizen-users.
In this sense, a simple simulation can demonstrate that when preferential
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Figure 7.3: Simulation of bipartite network formation with preferential attachment corrected by
binary homophily
attachment is not only motivated by popularity or past clicks but also by opin-
ion—not surprisingly found to be by Bakshy et al. (2015) a strong predictor of
what a user will eventually click—it can generate filtering bubbles without any
algorithmic intervention. Figure 7.3 shows the result of 10 simulations generating
networks connecting 200 nodes of two types: users and posts. Each post and each
user is assigned one of two possible opinions and each post is labelled as either
popular or unpopular. Each edge connecting a user to a news item will be created
with probability 0.98 (that is, in 98% of the cases) if the post is popular and the
user share the same opinion, 0.02 if the post is popular but the user shares a
different opinion and 0.01 if the post is unpopular whether or not the user shares
the same opinion. In the 10 simulations, filter bubbles have emerged four times.
In conclusion, I argue that the online deliberative system of the M5S played
a positive and important role in promoting cohesiveness and influencing in a
measurable way the politics of the Movement, which is rare not only in the Italian
political system but in general in large political organisations. Nevertheless,
the democratic value of such a process must be questioned. Whatever emerges
from a deliberation process emerges through a process that does not guarantee
scrupulous vetting of all arguments nor fair participation of all voices, in other
words, something that would allow it to reach the Habermasian ideal of reasoned
but informal deliberation. Online deliberation is fundamentally asymmetric
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independently of any specific technological design and can easily degenerate into
segregated deliberating communities.
3. Citizen-user and democracy
In the terminology of information and communication technologies (ICTs), a user
is the individual at the centre of a computer or network service. The Internet
and mobile revolutions, or more broadly the information revolution, have diffused
and popularised ICTs to the point where individuals are almost constantly users
of and connected to some sort of service; whether a telephone network, a social
networking service, a sharing service, a location service or a search engine. The
empowerment perceived by the user depends not only on the resources available
through the service but also on the ease in navigating, filtering and selecting
these resources, which ultimately are determined by the design of the user-
interface, the layer through which the user communicates with the service itself.
The technological advances in both the accumulation of digital resources but
also—and probably more importantly—in the sophistication of the user-interfaces
responsible for their retrieval and utilisation, have enormously empowered the
average user (see Rainie & Wellman, 2012); so that nowadays the information
and communication resources available to everyone with an Internet connection
would have been unaccessible even to the largest human organisations, public or
private, only a few decades ago.
The growing sense of empowerment on the part of users of ICTs enabled
services in the last two decades contrasted vividly with the sense of disempower-
ment caused instead by participation in the political system. A large body of
literature produced over more than two decades has been describing on the
one hand that citizens of Western democracies seemed to invest less time and
dedication to traditional forms of political participation (see Putnam, 2000; Van
Biezen et al., 2012) and on the other an erosion of trust between citizens and
political institutions—especially the institutions of representative democracy (see
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Hayward, 1995; Norris, 1999a; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006). Politics and political
institutions have perceivably failed in the eyes of citizens to deliver what they
promised. They have failed in centralising the role of citizens—experiencing
unprecedented centrality in their online existences—and in increasing their im-
portance within the political system, factual and perceived.
The response of those protesting the failure of politics is then to reinitialise
it from the bottom, from citizens, as individuals and as a multitude. The word
‘citizen’ or ‘citizens’ appear in more than 30% of blog posts published by Grillo
between 2005 and 2015 and in more than 8% of postings on the Forum. To put its
frequency in perspective, Grillo used the word ‘citizen’ or ‘citizens’ once every
764 published words, the users of the Forum once every 670, while the analysis
of a corpus of Italian web texts of about 380,000 documents (Lyding et al., 2014)
indicates that those words are generally expected to be used once every 5000
words. In January 2005, in the second blog post ever published on his blog,
Grillo wrote: ‘The only way to ensure the survival of democracy is to make sure
that government does not control the potential for citizens to share information
and to communicate’ (Grillo, 2005c). Also, the flagship policy proposal of the
M5S was named citizen’s income—although technically, as seen in Chapter 6, it
was not, since the amount of benefits is conditional. An analysis conducted
on the manifestos of anti-austerity protest movements in Spain and Greece of
the early 2010s by Gerbaudo (2017) encountered a similar focus on ‘citizen’ and
‘citizenship’, as a source of ‘collective identification’—‘citizen movements’ as
opposed to social movements and party organisations—and as a justification for
economic and political demands.
The Five Star Movement aimed to fix politics and government by bringing the
citizen to the centre of the political system through the very same technologies
that boosted the information revolution, as a user of sophisticated interfaces
that would allow him or her to navigate distributed sources of knowledge and
information, actively contribute to deliberation and unceasingly monitor the
institutions. The ideology of the M5S is not interested in defining relations
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among citizens but instead in depicting a new relation between state and citizens,
made possible by ICTs that are not only available but also very popular. The
ideal citizen is then a citizen-user: constantly connected, informed, participating
and empowered through a set of Internet services. ICTs connect citizen-users
into a perfectly horizontal and rational community, with neither a centre nor
a periphery, a top or a bottom. Political power is diffused instead of being
centralised. The supreme power rests in the community (polity) of citizen-users
as a whole; it is not exercised through representative institutions but through
ICTs and deliberating services.
In this sense, the community of citizen-users represents the people as opposed
to the elites, with a dichotomous division that has convinced many (Diamanti,
2014; Franzosi, Marone, & Salvati, 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2016) that the
M5S is, in fact, a populist movement. Empowering citizen-users translates into
the weakening of forms of representative democracy with the justification that,
first, representative institutions have failed through incompetence and because
they have been captured by special interests, and second, that citizen-users—
armed with common sense and motivated only by the common good, have the
competence and legitimacy to govern directly. Inherently, this implies that policy
and political solutions to the polity’s problems are always easy, clear-cut and
non-conflictual, that is, they do not imply the possibility of so-called ‘wicked
problems’.2 As correctly pointed by Mudde (2004), from a normative perspective,
the problem with populism is not really in the dichotomy people/elite (which
is clearly present in the rhetoric of the M5S) but that a dichotomous vision
necessarily refuses to acknowledge differences and divisions within the people and
consequentially to address them democratically, that is, mediating when possible
and always protecting the rights of minority groups.
2According to Head (2008), in a public policy context a ‘wicked problem’ is a problem
characterised by ‘uncertainty’, ‘complexity’ and ‘value divergence’. Head offers a few examples
of wicked problems from domestic policy areas in Australia: among those are ‘Overcoming
Indigenous disadvantage’, ‘Sustainable use of natural resources’ and ‘Self-harming (“unhealthy”)
behaviours’.
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In this research, I observed that citizens in large numbers do participate in
a wide array of discussions, share information from different sources, monitor
the behaviour of institutions and influence policy-making; directly and indirectly
(as through elections), formally and informally. Yet, I also observed that the
citizen-user in practice is distant from the deliberating ideal imagined by the
Movement. First, users are not peers; the networks mapping the interactions
among users show an extreme level of disparity, with a very few responsible for
most of the activity (and influence). Second, the social network that emerges from
interactions among users is no community but instead a crowd, in which users’
presence is extremely volatile. Yes, at times communities—that is, rational, cohesive
and self-reflective groups of individuals—do emerge from the crowd but they
are not long-lasting and are mostly focused on individual problems or specific
collective actions. Third, if the crowd has demonstrated on a few occasions that it
influences the Movement’s positions on specific issues and policy-making more
in general, it has not done it consistently; it is almost impossible to determine
beforehand the level of influence (if any) that it will eventually have on any issue.
Fourth, citizen-users are an elite among citizens.
The relationship between citizen-users and democracy is problematic, al-
though the citizen-user is ideally perceived by a number of contemporary polit-
ical movements and organisations as a democratising force. Even assuming that
the entire population has the same level of access to the Internet, which given
current trends is a realistic scenario for the near future but is currently not a
valid assumption, the Internet mediation of politics does not necessarily solve
known problems of ‘representational distortion’ in participation and deliberation
(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). As observed, women comment less than men
even if, based on liking records, they make up almost half of the audience. And
it is realistic that other demographic traits, such as education, could also affect
participation.
Moreover, it is not clear how citizen-users, in the absence of leadership, could
solve complicated (wicked) problems. In this sense, the community of citizen-
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users debating on the Forum of the M5S has been shown to be functional for the
emergence of differences. This provides evidence for the idea that online social
networking might have the merit of allowing the formation and protection of
publics of different size thus also facilitating contacts among members of minority
groups (see Dahlberg, 2007). Nevertheless, there is no clear solution to the
problem of how to reconcile minority and majority positions when deliberation
takes place online and must indicate a final decision. The example of Wikipedia
is often cited as case of successful decision-making by large online communities
(see Konieczny, 2010) but Wikipedia does not need to guarantee equality among
users (in fact, a few users have a disproportionate influence) and notably, since
by design the editing of articles is a continuous process with no possibility of
settling on a final version, there is no need for definitive decisions.
In the case of the M5S and many other online communities, decisions are
taken by voting and thus by the majority of the citizen-users. An online vote can
legitimise a decision but does not solve all the potential democratic deficits of the
deliberation process. In fact, establishing a vote is a complicated decision by itself.
How to formulate substance, scope and timing of online voting has enormous
consequences. At the time of writing, the M5S allowed registered members to
propose legislation through its online voting platform but did not allow the
proposal of a vote on the politics of the Movement and only the leadership of the
Movement had authority over whether or not to put a political decision to a vote.
Even disregarding the problems of the process that establishes a vote, it is easy to
envision how voting could unfairly penalise minority groups and opinions and
clash with basic democratic principles.
The M5S built its image in opposition to the idea of party and traditional party
organisations; ‘we are not a party!’ is recurrent slogan. What is rejected is not
only the party as organisation (accused of being too financially burdensome and
aggressively protective of its privileges) but also the delegation of power from
members to the leadership. In fact, the M5S ideologically refuses any transfer
of power from citizens to (elected) representative institutions. This position
318
Francesco Bailo
changes the quality of the relationship among members and between members
and the political organisation. But it also lowers the entry barrier: by joining
the Movement, the citizen-user does not delegate power to an assembly or to a
leadership (neither is constitutionally present in the organisation M5S) but instead
gains access to an online deliberating platform, which is restricted to approved
members only. Moreover, since the official programmatic document of theM5S
is limited to only a few items and does not address the most controversial and
complicated issues on the public agenda (e.g. immigration, reproductive rights,
foreign policy), membership is not ideologically burdensome. The question is
how more traditional parties will respond to the political offer of the Movement
and more in general to the emergence of citizen-users. Citizen-users, from
their screens and displays, are at the center of empowering informational and
communication systems. This centrality and the individualistic values that it
enables are not compatible with traditional party hierarchy and activist obedience
(according to the M5S is not compatible with the very existence of representative
institutions). I argue that to attract support parties will need to make their
deliberative processes more participatory. In order to mobilise citizen-users,
parties will need to devolve some power to the members for example by using
primaries more frequently. This will have an effect on the political system. The
question is whether more participation will mainly produce more instability and
more turbulence or instead whether political organisations will prove to be able
to govern a continuous stream of participation.
In conclusion, I do not argue that citizen-users do not play a positive role in
a democracy. Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, they complement
democracy by enriching the debate. Nevertheless, it is problematic to paint
them as the only genuine repositories of democratic legitimacy as opposed to
undemocratic representative and technical institutions. Evidence from the M5S
experiment points to the fact that although the rhetoric of the Movement assigned
to the figure of the citizen-user the highest prestige and authority, in practice the
organisation of the M5S limited the real autonomy of citizen-users. This suggests
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that within the organisation it was the crowd that influenced through mediation
the politics of the Movement rather than individual citizen-users.
4. Crowd-mediated politics
Behind the rhetoric of individual, personal access to political participation that
ICTs offers to citizen-users, the practice of mass political participation in the fora
of the M5S returns a picture of a mediating crowd more than that of a community
where individual contributions regularly emerge.
Further research is needed on whether the parliamentary activity of the M5S
derived significant input from online deliberation. Chapter 6 describes in detail
how online deliberation might influence policy making: indirectly and through
the initiative of the leadership. Bills proposed by MPs elected with the M5S
might have been directly influenced by the discussion on the Forum. Yet, from
the analysis I conducted on digital traces illustrated in Chapter 5, it emerged that
after being elected MPs reduced their engagement with the other users on the
Forum.
This is confirmed by comparing their presence on the Forum before and
after the general election (see Figure 7.4). There are at least two elements that
contribute to explaining this noticeable decrease in attention by MPs after the
general election. First, as already noted, in the months after the general election,
the M5S developed and finally deployed an online voting platform. This could
have convinced MPs to dedicate more attention to the new platform than to the
Forum. Unfortunately, the voting platform restricts at the time of writing access
to members of the Movement, so it is not possible to fully investigate the actual
involvement of MPs on the web site. Second, as noted, the relevance of Facebook
both as communication channel and forum has been growing along with the
popularity of Facebook in Italy—according to Facebook, more than 23 million
Italians, or about half of the electorate, had an account with the service at the
time of the 2013 general election. At the time of writing, virtually every M5S MPs
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had a page on Facebook. These two factors alone could explain why MPs might
have withdrawn from the Forum to dedicate more attention to the online voting
platform and notably to curate their personal profile on Facebook, which allows
them to control the ‘agenda’ on the page and cultivate an audience, something
that is not possible debating on the Forum. And yet, if alternatives to the Forum
have been emerging after the election, a few thousand registered users (and
registered also with the M5S) still maintained a regular presence on the Forum
until mid-2014. The fact that MPs have not used the Forum as frequently as other
members does not point to a strong ‘top-down’ support for online deliberation.
So far, no convincing evidence has emerged that the community of citizen-
users active within the M5S has been able to push ‘bottom-up’ any item on
the agenda of the Movement or to influence important decisions. This is not
to say that there was no ‘bottom-up’ influence, though. On the contrary, in
Chapter 6, I substantiated evidence of this influence. But I also argued that the
influence was more of an inorganic crowd than that of an organic community.
The difference is relevant because only an organic community has the capacity,
through well-defined rules and norms, to express opinions and proposals that
are legitimately the expression of the multitude of citizen-users—even if they
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of everyone. Crowds do not have such
capacity. Crowds produce noise and unordered streams of political talk without
the capacity to legitimately solve conflicting opinions. When the crowd prevails
on the community, democratic legitimacy is lost.
Grillo and the M5S always predicated a strong preference for direct democracy
over representative democracy, perceived as corruptive, inefficient and thanks
to the Internet no longer needed. The Movement’s online deliberation platform
was unequivocally named after Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who in his Social contract,
offered a strong critique of representation justifying it with the observation that
‘the moment that a people provides itself with representatives, it is no longer
free; it no longer exists’ (Rousseau, 1762/1999, p. 129). The M5S’s argument for
direct democracy is in the tradition of a political critique towards neo-liberal and
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representative democracy formulated in the 1960s by the New Left and by the
European social and environmental movements of the last decades of the 20th
century. The argument is also in line with Barber’s criticism of representative
democracy and call for ‘participatory politics’ (1984). But the Movement fails to
appreciate—in theory, but not in practice—the inherent problems with a radical
application of ‘participatory democracy’, which indeed Barber never postulated,
proposing instead to supplement, and not replace, the current institutional
arrangements (Adamson, 1989). In a similar vein, Bobbio argued that
if by direct democracy is meant the participation of all citizens in all the
decisions which concern them, the proposal is absurd. For everyone
to make decisions on everything in the increasingly complex societies
which exist in modern industrial nations is physically impossible (1984/
1987, p. 187).
Even assuming continuous deliberation by citizens to be possible (because
of the development of ICTs as postulated by Grillo and the M5S) according to
Bobbio it would still be
undesirable in human terms, i.e. from the point of view of the ethical
and intellectual development of humanity. In his early writings, Marx
had held up the total human being as the ultimate goal of the social
evolution of the species. But the Rousseauistic individual called
upon to participate in the political process from morning to night in
order to exercise his rights as a citizen would not be the total human
being but the total citizen (a term coined by Dahrendorf with obvious
polemical intent). And the total citizen is on closer inspection merely
another aspect, and a no less menacing one, of the total state. It is no
coincidence that Rousseauistic democracy has often been interpreted
as totalitarian democracy, in basic conflict with liberal democracy.
(1984/1987, p. 187)
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In the political trajectory of the M5S, ICTs have not emerged as a transformat-
ive force for political deliberation although the online community of citizen-users
had played consultative roles on more than one occasion. Notwithstanding the
fact that the Movement has been built around and continues to be defined by
ideals of radical direct participations of the community—that is the entire polity—
of all citizens, it never applied that configuration. It did not because, faced with
the problems that would have resulted from its practical implementation—which
as the Movement correctly argued were not technological but as I argue political,
the M5S preferred to maintain its ideological purity and avoid any compromise.
The absence of norms regulating and necessarily limiting how opinions could
take shape and emerge ‘bottom-up’—in other words, defining what online de-
liberation meant for the Five Star Movement (M5S)—inevitably resulted in the
dissolution of the community into a crowd.
As ICTs, especially social networking services, progressively take up internal
communication and organisational functions of political organisations, it is in-
evitable that political mediation by online crowds will become more frequent.
But crowd-mediation does not necessarily empower participating citizen-users.
In fact, in the presence of divisions and conflicts—usually the norm in political
talk—it mostly empowers the leadership, free to promote selected opinions and
views at the expense of others. Problematic is that, as in the case of the M5S, the
absence of any democratic guarantee for the deliberation process (crowds are
not compatible with the most basic norms of democratic proceduralism) does
not stop the leadership from implying the democraticness of the process—as
opposed to undemocratic traditional politics—even though the outcome has not
spontaneously emerged from a community but has been selectively derived from
a crowd.
In this thesis, I provided evidence and analysis in support of the argument
that the development and mass distribution of ICTs has levelled the field of
political competition, to the point in which substantial financial and organisa-
tional resources are no longer a necessary condition. If on one side, this means
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the injection of chaos and turbulence (see Margetts et al., 2015) into political
systems, on the other, by facilitating access, it improves the quality of democracy.
Nevertheless, the risk is that technology might be excessively ideologised and
used to mask very traditional underlying disparities or, even worse, authoritarian
decisions.
The diffusion of ICTs has introduced an unprecedented problem to politics.
The ‘total citizen’, that is the continuously deliberating citizen, is no longer im-
possible to imagine given the familiarity with ICTs of the broad population. This
makes it even harder for those defending the merits of representative democracy
and its wide set of rules—already put in a weak position by the world-wide
collapse of trust in elected institutions—to argue for its preservation. Political
entrepreneurs such as Grillo can easily exploit this objective weakness and argue
for the replacement of most of those institutions with deliberating platforms. The
fact that Grillo himself has not been able to deliver on his promises within the
Movement he created is even more worrying. It points to a scenario in which
an institutional arrangement involving crowd-mediation and leadership author-
ity instead of representative democracy and rules is sold as direct democracy.
From any standard, such an arrangement is going to be not only less democratic
than the traditional one based on representation that it has replaced but also
profoundly undemocratic.
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Francesco Bailo
1. Linear regression on meetups’ membership, Facebook
activity and M5S votes in 2010, 2013 and 2014
Dependent variable:
log(votes)
Regional elections 2010 General election 2013 European election 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(voters) 0.596∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.036) (0.036)
log(members) 0.432∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.089) (0.040) (0.021) (0.045) (0.024)
Constant 6.801∗∗∗ 0.410 8.552∗∗∗ −0.304 7.644∗∗∗ −0.298
(0.353) (1.838) (0.220) (0.372) (0.271) (0.352)
Observations 37 37 110 110 110 110
R2 0.526 0.653 0.539 0.929 0.522 0.923
Adjusted R2 0.512 0.633 0.535 0.927 0.517 0.922
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
log(votes) votes_ratio
General election 2013
(1) (2) (3)
log(voters) 0.914∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.009) (0.010)
log(members) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
log(days_90liking_users) 0.014 0.003
(0.010) (0.002)
log(days_90commenting_users) 0.002
(0.003)
Constant −0.371 0.636∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.097) (0.106)
Observations 86 86 77
R2 0.933 0.178 0.144
Adjusted R2 0.931 0.148 0.109
Residual Std. Error 0.174 (df = 83) 0.043 (df = 82) 0.045 (df = 73)
F Statistic 575.854∗∗∗ (df = 2; 83) 5.904∗∗∗ (df = 3; 82) 4.108∗∗∗ (df = 3; 73)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Francesco Bailo
2. Tabular analysis for online and offline participation
responses to 2013 electoral survey
Didn’t participated
in online political
discussions
Did participated in
online political dis-
cussions
Tot
Did’t go to meet-
ings, political de-
bates or rallies
81.82 18.18 100.00
Did go to meetings,
political debates or
rallies
68.18 31.82 100.00
Tot 75.51 24.49 100.00
Table 1: Source: Associazione Itanes, 2013
Didn’t participated
in online political
discussions
Did participated in
online political dis-
cussions
Tot
Did’t go to meet-
ings, political de-
bates or rallies
72.97 56.25 77.62
Did go to meetings,
political debates or
rallies
27.03 43.75 22.38
Tot 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2: Source Associazione Itanes, 2013
Pearson’s χ2 contingency table test on the two variables returns a p-value of
0.11.
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3. Temporal exponential random graph models
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
edges -7.987 * -7.777 * -8.739 * -9.278 *
mutual 6.319 * 5.503 * 5.970 * 7.348 *
nodematch.gender 0.222 * -0.013 0.006 0.280 *
nodeifactor.gender.male -0.019 -0.068 0.705 * 0.025
nodeifactor.gender.unknown -2.160 * -0.656 -0.345 * -1.355 *
nodeofactor.gender.male -0.091 0.020 0.172 -0.282 *
nodeofactor.gender.unknown 0.380 * 0.189 0.569 0.250 *
nodeicov.past_outdegree -0.443 * -1.355 * -0.916 * -0.873 *
nodeicov.past_indegree 1.331 * 2.616 * 1.993 * 1.432 *
nodeocov.past_outdegree 0.810 * 1.660 * 1.334 * 1.350 *
nodeocov.past_indegree -0.663 * -1.655 * -1.372 * -1.356 *
Table 3: Results of a temporal ERGM on four 25-week long network mapping the direct reply
within the Forum of the M5S
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4. Binomial (logistic) regression on comment
characteristics posted in the immigration debate
Dependent variable:
right_to_left left_to_right fact disagreement agreement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
agreement −0.243 −0.475
(0.517) (1.085)
disagreement −0.756∗ 1.092∗
(0.429) (0.649)
fact 0.669∗ −1.086 0.568∗ −0.282
(0.360) (0.715) (0.295) (0.392)
pol_code_V1right 0.533∗
(0.287)
Constant −1.068∗∗∗ −2.628∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗∗ −0.973∗∗∗ −1.590∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.496) (0.191) (0.201) (0.239)
Observations 167 161 205 214 214
Log Likelihood −93.965 −37.694 −137.696 −133.407 −91.744
Akaike Inf. Crit. 195.929 83.389 279.391 270.814 187.487
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5. Semantic analysis: top concepts in the corpora analysed
forum blog corriere repubblica camera_acts camera_bills senato_bills
1 Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
V2-Day Movimento 5
Stelle
Assessore
(Italia)
Comunità
europea
Contributo Contributo
2 Disoccupazione Voto disgiunto V-Day Regione am-
ministrativa
Unione eco-
nomica e
monetaria
Contributi ob-
bligatori per le
assicurazioni
obbligatorie
Contributi ob-
bligatori per le
assicurazioni
obbligatorie
3 Baby pensioni Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
V2-Day Assessore Povertà estrema Indennità di
mobilità
Pensione
4 Voto disgiunto Patto del Nazar-
eno
Fondazione
cassa di
risparmio
Giunta provin-
ciale
Previdenza so-
ciale
Previdenza so-
ciale
Limite di sos-
tenibilità
5 Potere direttivo Fondazione
cassa di
risparmio
Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
Cuneo fiscale Pensione Soggettività
tributaria
6 Pensione V-Day Voto disgiunto Unione Demo-
cratica Sarda
Organizzazione
per la co-
operazione
economica
europea
Limite di sos-
tenibilità
Presidente del
Senato della
Repubblica
7 Fondazione
cassa di
risparmio
Movimento 5
Stelle
Disoccupazione Giunta comun-
ale
Unione dei Fed-
eralisti Europei
Lavoro nero Previdenza so-
ciale
8 Pension scheme Mozione di
sfiducia
Riforma delle
pensioni
Fornero
Consiglio re-
gionale del
Lazio
Politica di bilan-
cio
Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
Lavoro nero
9 Riforma Dini Debito pubblico Riforma del la-
voro Fornero
Politica di bilan-
cio
Europa Fed-
erale
Lavoro subor-
dinato
Schema pen-
sionistico con
formula delle
rendite pre-
definita
10 V-Day Baby pensioni Federazione Im-
piegati Operai
Metallurgici
Esterino
Montino
Investimento Teoria
costituzionale
nel diritto della
previdenza
sociale
Modello 730
Table 4: The top 20 concepts (which correnpond to an article of Italian Wikipedia) emerging from
the semantic analysis of online postings (forum and blog), newspaper articles (corriere
and repubblica) and parliamentary documents (camera acts, camera bills, and senate
bills).
368
forum blog corriere repubblica camera_acts camera_bills senato_bills
11 V2-Day Pensione Pensione Fondazione
cassa di
risparmio
Baratro fiscale Schema pen-
sionistico con
formula delle
rendite pre-
definita
Impiegato
12 Cuneo fiscale Cassa di
risparmio
Baby pensioni Consiglio re-
gionale (Italia)
Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
Potere direttivo Potere direttivo
13 Certificato
unico di-
pendente
Elezioni
politiche itali-
ane
Federazione
delle Liste
Verdi
Disoccupazione Banca europea
degli investi-
menti
Hovevei Zion Prestazione
14 Cassa di
risparmio
Trappola della
liquidità
Confederazione
Generale Itali-
ana del Lavoro
Federazione
delle Liste
Verdi
Bolla previden-
ziale
Impiegato Indicatore della
situazione eco-
nomica equival-
ente
15 Pension scheme Povertà estrema Riforma Dini Consiglio met-
ropolitano
Accordi europei
di cambio
Decreto legislat-
ivo 10 febbraio
1996, n. 103
Lavoro subor-
dinato
16 Baratro fiscale Disoccupazione Federazione
lavoratori della
conoscenza
Voto disgiunto Movimento
Federalista
Europeo
Assegno Tasso di disoc-
cupazione
17 Contributo Riforma del la-
voro Fornero
Estrema sinistra V2-Day Macroeconomia Indicatore della
situazione eco-
nomica equival-
ente
Indennità di
mobilità
18 Sussidio Stella Alpina
(partito)
Sussidio Sindaci di
Trapani
Deficit pubblico Disoccupazione Decreto legislat-
ivo 10 febbraio
1996, n. 103
19 Movimento 5
Stelle
Voto di scambio Articolo 18
dello statuto
dei lavoratori
Sussidio Assicurazione Lavoro
autonomo
Sistema di col-
locamento pub-
blico
20 Debito pubblico
implicito
Banca Popolare
Cinese
Schema pen-
sionistico con
formula delle
rendite pre-
definita
Movimento 5
Stelle
Economia
keynesiana
Riforma Dini Assegno
Table 5: The top 20 concepts (which correnpond to an article of Italian Wikipedia) emerging from
the semantic analysis of online postings (forum and blog), newspaper articles (corriere
and repubblica) and parliamentary documents (camera acts, camera bills, and senate
bills).
